

# **RULES**

## **FOR THE CLASSIFICATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR SHIPS AND FLOATING FACILITIES**

ND No. 2-020101-168-E



**St. Petersburg  
2022**

## **RULES FOR THE CLASSIFICATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR SHIPS AND FLOATING FACILITIES**

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Rules for the Classification and Construction of Nuclear Ships and Floating Facilities of Russian Maritime Register of Shipping have been approved in accordance with the established approval procedure and come into force on 1 January 2022.

The present edition of the Rules is based on the 2018 edition taking into account the amendments and additions developed immediately before publication.

The proposals of the organizations participating in the construction and operation of nuclear ships, as well as the practical experience of the application of the 2018 edition have been taken into consideration.

**REVISION HISTORY<sup>1</sup>**

(purely editorial amendments are not included in the Revision History)

Amended paras/chapters/sections	Information on amendments	Number and date of the Circular Letter	Entry-into-force date
<a href="#">Part I, para 3.1</a>	The definition "Nuclear power unit" has been amended	110-312-1-1695c of 04.02.2022	15.02.2022
<a href="#">Part IV, para 6.6</a>	The requirements have been specified due to changing the title of Part VII	110-312-1-1695c of 04.02.2022	15.02.2022
<a href="#">Part VII, title</a>	The title has been changed	110-312-1-1695c of 04.02.2022	15.02.2022
<a href="#">Part VII, para 1.1</a>	The parts of the Rules for the Classification and Construction of Sea-Going Ships have been introduced containing requirements to the nuclear power unit	110-312-1-1695c of 04.02.2022	15.02.2022
<a href="#">Part VIII, para 7.5.7</a>	The requirements have been specified due to changing the title of Part VII	110-312-1-1695c of 04.02.2022	15.02.2022
<a href="#">Part VIII, para 17.3</a>	The requirements have been specified due to changing the title of Part VII	110-312-1-1695c of 04.02.2022	15.02.2022
<a href="#">Part X, para 2.7</a>	The requirements have been specified due to changing the title of Part VII	110-312-1-1695c of 04.02.2022	15.02.2022

<sup>1</sup> Amendments and additions introduced at re-publication or by new versions based on circular letters or editorial amendments.

## **PART I. GENERAL**

### **1 APPLICATION**

**1.1** These Rules for the Classification and Construction of Nuclear Ships and Floating Facilities<sup>1</sup> developed by the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping<sup>2</sup> apply to nuclear ships and floating facilities (for definitions of nuclear ship and nuclear floating facility, refer to [Section 3](#)) fitted with two-circuit nuclear steam supply systems and pressurized water reactors.

**1.2** Scope of requirements to nuclear ships and floating facilities using steam supply systems other than those specified in [Para 1.1](#) is subject to special consideration by the Register.

**1.3** These Rules represent the main normative document that regulates safety aspects related to special nature of nuclear ships/floating facilities having a harmful radiation effect on personnel, passengers, population and environment.

**1.4** These Rules establish safety standards and criteria for nuclear ships/floating facilities, their classification principles and procedure as well as design and testing requirements to be met to ensure safety.

**1.5** Requirements of these Rules are supplemented by provisions of Guidelines on Supervision During Construction of nuclear ships and Floating Facilities, Nuclear Support Vessels and Manufacture of Materials and Products.

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<sup>1</sup> Hereinafter referred to as "these Rules".

<sup>2</sup> Hereinafter referred to as "the Register, RS".

## **2 APPLICATION**

**2.1** The requirements of the Rules for the Classification and Construction of Sea-Going Ships<sup>1</sup>, Rules for the Equipment of Sea-Going Ships, Rules for the Cargo Handling Gear of Sea-Going Ships, Load Line Rules for Sea-Going Ships and Rules for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships apply in full to nuclear ships and floating facilities other than those to which the other provisions of these Rules apply.

**2.2** Requirements of these Rules apply to nuclear ships/floating facilities, their machinery and equipment with draft designs submitted to the Register for approval after the effective date of these Rules.

**2.3** Nuclear ships/floating facilities under construction as well as their items with documents approved by the Register before the effective date of these Rules are to comply with requirements that were valid at the time of approval of those documents.

**2.4** Nuclear ships/floating facilities to be refitted or repaired are to comply with requirements of these Rules as far as it is reasonable and technically grounded in each specific case.

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<sup>1</sup> Hereinafter referred to as "the RS Rules".

### **3 DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS**

**3.1** For definitions and explanations concerning general terms of the RS Rules, refer to Part I "Classification" and appropriate parts hereof.

For the purpose of these Rules, the following definitions have been adopted.

**Reactor emergency protection** is a function of reactor control and protection system intended to prevent development of accidents on reactor by switching the reactor to the subcritical state.

**Emergency state** is a state of the ship, plant or unit after abnormal short-term failure to perform their intended functions (post-accident state).

**Reactor core** is the portion of a nuclear reactor containing the nuclear fuel components where the controlled nuclear chain reaction takes place.

**Nuclear steam supply system** is a component of the power unit designed for steam generation from nuclear energy.

**Nuclear power unit** is the main power unit designed to perform primary functions of nuclear ship or nuclear floating facility. Nuclear power unit comprises nuclear reactors including supply systems, steam turbines including supply systems and electric energy system.

**Nuclear floating facility** is a self-propelled/dumb floating facility fitted with nuclear power source (power plant, thermal plant or other facility) as a source designed to perform its primary functions.

These facilities are generally designed as rack-mounted facilities. Self-propelled floating facility may use organic fuel/nuclear power for its propulsion. Requirements to nuclear self-propelled floating facilities and then-steam supply systems are similar to those imposed to nuclear ships and then-steam supply systems. Requirements to steam supply systems of organic fuel self-propelled floating facilities are the same as those imposed to steam supply systems of dumb floating facilities.

**Nuclear ship** is a ship propelled by nuclear power.

**Metal-water shielding tank** is a multi-layer metal tank filled with water between the layers. This tank is to be used for attenuation of radioactive radiation emitted from nuclear reactor core.

**Reactor biological shielding** comprises reactor structural components and water layer for protecting personnel against radioactive radiation.

**Leakage rate** is an air mass/volume escaped from the controlled volume per unit time at given initial parameters (pressure, temperature).

**Relative leakage rate** is a ratio of leakage rate (by weight/volume) to air mass/volume in the controlled volume at given initial parameters (pressure, temperature) expressed as a percentage per unit time.

**Gaseous radioactive waste** is defined as a waste discharged in air as gaseous and aerosol emissions.

**Leak tightness** is the ability of structures, systems and their components to withstand gas/fluid exchange through them within design limits.

**Date of construction of a nuclear ship/floating facility** is defined as an actual date of expiry of Classification Certificate and termination of technical supervision of ship/floating facility under construction.

**Single failure** is defined as an accidental event which results in the loss of capability of a component/system to perform its intended safety/technical functions. Multiple failures which result from one event/operator's error are considered as parts of a single failure.

**Liquid radioactive waste** is defined as a radioactive fluid containing dissolved or suspended radionuclides in concentrations greater than values as specified in applicable standards and regulations. This radioactive fluid is not to be utilized.

Beyond design-basis (anticipated) accident is defined as an accident being analyzed in the design project as unlikely so no safety measures are taken to prevent it.

Containment is defined as a ship structure with steam supply system inside. The containment is designed to maintain the radioactive emissions released from steam supply system within permissible limits.

Shielding barrier is a ship's structural barrier surrounding the containment and major radioactive sources related to steam supply system. This shielding is additionally provided to minimize release of radioactive materials from the containment to the environment and other compartments of the vessel or floating facility.

Safety class is defined as a class assigned to structures, systems and their components according to their significance for nuclear safety of the ship or floating facility. This safety significance is defined with regard to effects of loss of functions being performed in various intended situations.

Design class is a class which establishes the specific design standards for equipment and systems of steam supply system according to their impact on steam supply system safety.

State class is a combination of states selected by its frequency of occurrence and assumed effects which can occur under normal operation or foreseen operating faults and accidents as well as when the ship/floating facility is exposed to external or internal forces, natural and human-induced disasters.

Active component is defined as a component driven by external exposure (excitation, mechanical exposure or power supply)<sup>1</sup>.

Passive component is defined as a component with no moving parts which is sensitive to variation in pressure, temperature and working fluid flow<sup>2</sup>.

Collision, grounding and stranding protection comprises specific structures of the ship/floating facility in the vicinity of reactor compartment and fuel assemblies storage facilities which protect steam supply system, its safety systems and storage facilities for radioactive waste and nuclear fuel against actions in the event of collision or grounding and stranding.

Controlled area is defined as an area which comprises compartments of the ship/floating facility with higher level of ionizing radiation and/or radioactive contamination under normal conditions, with controlled access and to which Standards for Protection Against Radiation are applicable.

Maximum design-basis accident is defined as an accident resulting in the highest radiation hazard for the crew and environment. In general, maximum design-basis accident is related to the rupture of the primary coolant pipeline.

Montejus is a special-purpose enclosed container for collecting and storing liquid radioactive waste with liquid pumped out by means of compressed air.

Supervised area comprises compartments of the ship/floating facility where radioactive contamination and higher levels of ionizing radiation are likely to occur in case of abnormal operation of steam supply system which requires continuous radiation monitoring.

Normal operating state and habitability conditions are conditions when the ship/floating facility, its machinery, systems and equipment which ensure its propulsion, intended operation, steerability, safe navigation, buoyancy, internal signals and communication, means of escape, boat winches operation as well as minimum habitability conditions are working properly (i.e. capable of performing all functions within given design limits and conditions including startup, operation at power, deactivation, maintenance, testing and nuclear fuel handling).

Similar-type failure is a failure in several devices or components due to particular event or for some reason.

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<sup>1</sup> For example, pumps, fans, relief valves, non-return valves, etc.

<sup>2</sup> For example, heat exchangers, pipelines, ships, electric cables, etc.

Main design-basis accident is the submitted accident which defines basic design requirements to the ship/floating facility, steam supply system and its safety systems.

Operator's error is a single operator's erroneous action or inaction (when action is required) towards controls.

Steam generating unit is a unit built on the basis of the nuclear reactor where the components forming main circuit loop of the primary coolant, reactor core, steam generators, hydraulic chambers with primary circulating pumps are located in one integral case. Intended for generation of overheated steam as part of the nuclear steam supply system

Primary circuit of steam supply system is the reactor-steam generator closed tight circuit with coolant circulating over it. The coolant removes heat from the nuclear reactor core and transfers the heat converted into steam in steam generators to the secondary circuit water.

Personnel are crew members to be exposed to ionizing radiation according to their occupation.

Emergency cooling control station is an area or compartment of the ship/floating facility fitted with equipment and devices for disabling the steam supply system in case of failure in central control station.

Potential nuclear-hazardous operation is an operation, which may result in pre-emergency or nuclear/radiation accident.

Single failure concept is a capability of the system to perform its design functions in case of single failure.

Design-basis accident is an accident considered and analyzed in the draft design of the steam supply system and ship/floating facility. This accident is prevented by means of appropriate arrangements and procedures and harmful effects are reduced to the applicable standards.

Reactor control and protection system actuator is a device for changing reactor reactivity being moved by a single drive of the reactor control and protection system.

Radiation safety is a capability of the facilities and measures used to protect crew, passengers and environment against harmful radioactive radiation and contamination within specified limits.

Process radiation monitoring is monitoring of the state of steam supply system equipment and shielding barriers for all state classes by recording ionizing radiation by means of special-purpose instruments and procedures.

Radioactive waste are the equipment, items, materials, substances in any aggregative state which are not intended for further use, with radionuclide content exceeding the permissible values as specified in applicable standards and regulations.

Radioactive waste are divided into solid, liquid and gaseous waste. Radioactive waste is classified by the degree of its radioactivity as per applicable Principal Sanitary Radiation Safety Rules.

Reactor plant is a component of the nuclear power unit. The reactor plant comprises the nuclear reactor, systems and equipment directly related to the reactor to provide its normal operation, prevent and control accidents as well as reduce their effects.

Reactor compartment is a watertight compartment of the ship/ floating facility restricted by its bottom, sideboards, bulkhead deck, forward and aft bulkheads or cofferdams with the reactor plant inside.

Decontamination station is a special-purpose compartment or cluster of compartments designed for checking for radioactive contamination of personnel, changing clothes and shoes as well as for sanitary treatment of personnel allowed to the controlled area.

Unrestricted area comprises all premises of the ship/floating facility which do not form part of the controlled/supervised area.

Reactor control and protection system is a combination of technical, software and information facilities to provide appropriate conditions for safe chain reaction at a given power and

its variation at startup, stop, reactor switchover, to check for chain reaction intensity, ensure fast termination of fission reaction in case of accident as well as to control power density fields.

**Safety systems** are systems designed to disable the reactor reliably, remove heat from the reactor core and/or reduce effects of foreseen operating deviations and accidents.

**Solid radioactive waste** are solid items, materials and substances contaminated with radioactive materials in concentrations exceeding the permissible levels as specified in applicable standards and regulations. This waste is no longer useful.

**Physical security** is a combination of measures and engineering facilities to prevent sabotage/acts of terror and theft regarding to nuclear materials and nuclear plants installed on board nuclear ships/floating facilities.

**Central control station** is a compartment of the ship/floating facility designed for control and monitoring of nuclear power unit operation under normal conditions, in case of foreseen operating deviations and accidents.

**Nuclear accident** is an accident related to damage of fuel elements exceeding the specified safe operation limits.

**Nuclear safety of a nuclear ship/floating facility** is a capability of the ship/floating facility and crew to reduce harmful radiation impacts on the crew and environment down to specified limits under normal operation and in case of accidents.

**Nuclear reactor** is a device used to initiate and maintain the controlled nuclear fission chain reaction.

#### **4 ABBREVIATIONS**

- EEBDs – Emergency escape breathing devices.
- HVAC – Heating, ventilation and air conditioning.
- IEES – Integrated electric energy system.
- LRW – Liquid radioactive waste.
- SRW – Solid radioactive waste.
- UPS – Uninterrupted power supply.

## **PART II. CLASSIFICATION**

### **1 CLASS NOTATION OF NUCLEAR SHIP AND FLOATING FACILITY**

**1.1** Where the nuclear ship/floating facility is fitted with nuclear power unit and complies with requirements of the RS Rules and these Rules, radioactivity symbol ☸ shall be added to the class notation specified in Part I "Classification" of the RS Rules.

## **2 CLASSIFICATION SURVEYS OF NUCLEAR SHIP AND FLOATING FACILITIES IN SERVICE**

**2.1** Classification surveys of nuclear ships and floating facilities shall be performed as per requirements of this Part and Rules for the Classification Surveys of Ships in Service developed by the Register.

**2.2** For additional scope of periodical surveys of nuclear ships and floating facilities, refer to [Table 2.2](#).

Surveys upon the 15-year cycle expiry shall be repeated as per [Table 2.2](#). The scope of survey shall be established by the Surveyor depending on technical state and used service life of the ship/floating facility.

The Register may assign the continuous survey of the nuclear ship/floating facility based on Owner's written statement. The continuous survey cycle shall cover the period not exceeding the prescribed period between appropriate periodical surveys with regard to delays as permitted by the Rules for the Classification Surveys of Ships in Service.

Scheduled surveys of steam supply system shall be typically combined with reactor core handling or other operations associated with opening of primary circuit, replacement, repair or preventive maintenance of equipment. In any case, during core handling and before further activation of the plant, the following surveys and tests shall be performed:

**.1** surveying double bottom, structures and foundations within the reactor compartment;

**.2** surveying biological shielding;

**.3** surveying and testing pressure vessels, pipelines and fittings related to steam supply system;

**.4** surveying reactor including its assemblies to be dismantled (with the core unloaded) by means of remote inspection and non-destructive testing arrangements;

**.5** surveying and testing the primary system;

**.6** surveying machinery and systems serving the steam supply system;

**.7** integrated functional test of steam supply system and safety systems;

**.8** testing the containment for leak tightness;

**.9** functional tests of radiation monitoring system;

**.10** integrated tests of travel and motion forces of control rods group;

**.11** surveying the set of fuel assemblies before loading.

**2.3** The state of reactor body shall be estimated by stressed assemblies nondestructive testing system.

Survey shall be also conducted by means of remote control arrangements.

**2.4** In the course of surveys and tests of steam supply system equipment, the personnel involved shall be properly protected against radioactive radiation including additional biological shielding and decontamination, if required.

Table 2.2

**ADDITIONAL SCOPE OF PERIODICAL SURVEYS OF NUCLEAR-POWERED VESSEL AND FLOATING FACILITY**

Symbols:

O – inspection with accessing, if required, and opening by means of remote inspection and non-destructive testing arrangements

C – external inspection

M – wear, clearance, insulation resistance measurements, etc

H – hydraulic, pneumatic tests

P – functional test of machinery, equipment and devices, their external inspection

E – checking for applicable documents and/or stamps on instruments calibration by competent authorities, when they are subject to such checking.

No.	Item of survey	Ship survey														
		First annual survey	Second annual survey	Third annual survey	Fourth annual survey	First annual survey	First annual survey	Second annual survey	Third annual survey	Fourth annual survey	Second scheduled survey	First annual survey	Second annual survey	Third annual survey	Fourth annual survey	Third scheduled survey
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
<b>1</b>	<b>Hull</b>															
<b>1.1</b>	Underwater hull <sup>1</sup>	C	C	C	C	O	C	C	C	C	OM	C	C	C	C	OM
<b>1.2</b>	Collision protection	C	C	C	C	O	C	C	C	C	OM	C	C	C	C	OM
<b>1.3</b>	Grounding and stranding protection	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	OM	C	C	C	C	OM
<b>1.4</b>	Supporting structures, platforms and foundations within reactor compartment					O					O					O
<b>1.5</b>	Containment															
<b>1.5.1</b>	Hatch cover, covers, doors, windows, cable boxes, shut-off and safety valves and fittings of containment	C	C	C	C	OH	C	C	C	C	OH	C	C	C	C	OH
<b>1.5.2</b>	Containment bulkhead, protection units, lining	C	C	C	C	OH	C	C	C	C	OH	C	C	C	C	OH
<b>1.6</b>	Shielding barrier	C	C	C	C	CH <sup>2</sup>	C	C	C	C	CH <sup>2</sup>	C	C	C	C	CH <sup>2</sup>
<b>2</b>	<b>Steam supply system equipment</b>															
<b>2.1</b>	Nuclear reactors	P	P	P	P	O <sup>3</sup> HP	P	P	P	P	O <sup>3</sup> HP	P	P	P	P	O <sup>3</sup> HP
<b>2.1.1</b>	Case and main connector pins					O <sup>3</sup>					O <sup>3</sup>					O <sup>3</sup>
<b>2.1.2</b>	Covers with their fasteners					O <sup>3,4</sup>					O <sup>3,4</sup>					O <sup>3,4</sup>
<b>2.1.3</b>	Internal removable and non-removable parts					O <sup>4</sup> P					O <sup>4</sup> P					O <sup>4</sup> P
<b>2.1.4</b>	Safety devices	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP
<b>2.2</b>	Control and protection systems (actuators)	P	P	P	P	OPM	P	P	P	P	OPM	P	P	P	P	OPM

Rules for the Classification and Construction of Nuclear Ships and Floating Facilities (Part II)

No.	Item of survey	Ship survey														
		First annual survey	Second annual survey	Third annual survey	Fourth annual survey	First annual survey	First annual survey	Second annual survey	Third annual survey	Fourth annual survey	Second scheduled survey	First annual survey	Second annual survey	Third annual survey	Fourth annual survey	Third scheduled survey
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
<b>2.3</b>	Cores <sup>4</sup>					CE					CE					CE
<b>2.4</b>	Parameter testing arrangements, instruments	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE
<b>2.5</b>	Steam supply system machinery															
<b>2.5.1</b>	Primary coolant circulating pumps	CPM	CPM	CPM	CPM	CPM	CPM	CPM	CPM	CPM	CPM	CPM	CPM	CPM	CPM	CPM
<b>2.5.2</b>	Fresh water pumps for equipment cooling and protection	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP
<b>2.5.3</b>	Core emergency cooling pumps	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP
<b>2.5.4</b>	Sea water pumps for equipment cooling	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP
<b>2.5.5</b>	Pumps and ejectors of primary water drainage, storage and discharge system	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP
<b>2.5.6</b>	Pumps and ejectors for steam supply system spaces drainage system	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP
<b>2.5.7</b>	Primary make-up pumps	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP
<b>2.5.8</b>	Automation hydraulic pumps	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP
<b>2.5.9</b>	Pumps of residual heat removal system	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP
<b>2.5.10</b>	Gas, air compressors for steam supply system service	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP
<b>2.5.11</b>	Controlled area fans	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
<b>2.5.12</b>	Pumps fir pressure reduction system in containment	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP
<b>2.5.13</b>	Spare parts					C					C					C
<b>3</b>	<b>Pressure vessels and units</b>															
<b>3.1</b>	Steam generators <sup>5,6</sup>	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	HP
<b>3.1.1</b>	Case										O <sup>6</sup>					O <sup>6</sup>
<b>3.1.2</b>	Piping systems					O					O <sup>6</sup>					O
<b>3.1.3</b>	Supporting structures										O					O
<b>3.1.4</b>	Safety devices	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	OP
<b>3.1.5</b>	Fittings and valves <sup>7</sup>	P	P	P	P	OHP	P	P	P	P	OHP	P	P	P	P	OHP
<b>3.2</b>	Pressure compensators <sup>5</sup>	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	HP
<b>3.3</b>	Primary filters with refrigerators <sup>5</sup>	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	HP
<b>3.4</b>	Hydraulic chambers <sup>5</sup>	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	HP
<b>3.4.1</b>	Case										O <sup>8</sup>					O <sup>8</sup>
<b>3.4.2</b>	Internal structures										O <sup>8</sup>					O <sup>8</sup>
<b>3.4.3</b>	Supporting structures										O <sup>8</sup>					O <sup>8</sup>
<b>3.5</b>	Heat exchangers for equipment fresh water cooling circuit					C					CH					CH
<b>3.6</b>	Drainage and bilge containers					C					CH					C
<b>3.7</b>	Gas and air tanks	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	HP

Rules for the Classification and Construction of Nuclear Ships and Floating Facilities (Part II)

No.	Item of survey	Ship survey														
		First annual survey	Second annual survey	Third annual survey	Fourth annual survey	First annual survey	First annual survey	Second annual survey	Third annual survey	Fourth annual survey	Second scheduled survey	First annual survey	Second annual survey	Third annual survey	Fourth annual survey	Third scheduled survey
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
3.8	Hydropneumatic cylinders	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
3.9	Metal-water shielding tanks	P	P	P	P	CP	P	P	P	CP	P	P	P	P	P	CP
4	<b>Steam supply systems</b>															
4.1	Primary coolant circulating system	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	P	HP
4.2	Primary coolant purification system	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	P	HP
4.3	Primary coolant make-up system	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	P	HP
4.4	Residual heat removal system	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	P	HP
4.5	Core emergency cooling system	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	P	HP
4.6	Deaeration system	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
4.7	Primary water drainage system <sup>5</sup>	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
4.8	Primary volume compensation system <sup>5</sup>	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	P	HP
4.9	Secondary system (to the secondary circuit)	P	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	HP	P	P	P	P	P	HP
4.10	Fresh water system for equipment cooling and protection	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
4.11	Sea water system for equipment cooling	P	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	OP	P	P	P	P	P	OP
4.12	Air ventilation and purification	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
4.12.1	Fittings and valves on the containment	P	P	P	P	CH	P	P	P	P	CH	P	P	P	P	P
4.13	Liquid radioactive waste collection, storage and discharge system					P					P					P
4.14	Steam supply spaces drainage system	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
4.15	Explosive mixture removal system					P					P					P
4.16	Automation hydraulic and fitting control system	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
4.17	Containment pressure reduction system	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
5	<b>Radiation safety</b>															
5.1	Biological shielding <sup>9</sup>	OC	OC	OC	OC	OCM	OC	OC	OC	OC	OCM	OC	OC	OC	OC	OCM
5.2	Radiation monitoring systems and arrangements	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE	PE
5.3	Core handling equipment <sup>10</sup>	C	C	C	C	OHP	C	C	C	C	OHP	C	C	C	C	OHP
5.4	Fuel assemblies storage facilities	C	C	C	C	OH	C	C	C	C	OH	C	C	C	C	OH
5.5	Liquid radioactive waste treatment equipment	C	C	C	C	OHP	C	C	C	C	OHP	C	C	C	C	OHP
6	<b>Physical security</b>															
6.1	System of physical security engineering facilities	C	C	C	C	P	C	C	C	C	P	C	C	C	C	P

<sup>1</sup> Surveys in the vicinity of the reactor compartment shall be conducted annually.  
<sup>2</sup> In case of containment depressurization, it shall be tested for leak tightness between scheduled surveys. Shielding barrier tests (H) may be omitted if pressure within the shielding barrier is maintained below atmospheric pressure.  
<sup>3</sup> Survey shall be conducted in accessible places without dismantling after scheduled measurements.



### 3 TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS

**3.1** Design documents for the nuclear ship and floating facility being the most sophisticated items shall be considered in the process of developing of technical statement. Draft design materials shall be submitted for consideration in a scope as agreed upon with the Register.

**3.2** In the lists specified in [3.3 — 3.4](#), documentation marked with (\*) is the documentation, which review results are documented by stamping in accordance with Fig. 8.2-1, Part II "Technical Documentation" of the Rules for Technical Supervision during Construction of Ships and Manufacture of Materials and Products for Ships.

Documentation marked with (\*\*) is the documentation, which review results are documented by stamping in accordance with Fig. 8.2-3, Part II "Technical Documentation" of the Rules for Technical Supervision during Construction of Ships and Manufacture of Materials and Products for Ships.

#### **3.3 Technical design documentation on the nuclear ship and floating facility.**

In addition to the documents listed in 3.3, Part I "Classification" of the RS Rules, the following technical design documentation on the nuclear ships and floating facilities shall be submitted to the Register for review:

##### **3.3.1 General:**

- .1 Information on Safety of Nuclear Power Plant and Ship<sup>1</sup> (refer to [Appendix 1](#)) (\*);
- .2 Operating Manual for for Nuclear Power Plant<sup>2</sup> (refer to [Appendix 2](#)) (\*);
- .3 layout of controlled and supervised areas (\*);
- .4 water- and gastight plan for the containment and shielding barrier (\*);
- .5 list of equipment located within the controlled area (\*\*).

##### **3.3.2 Hull:**

- .1 structural diagram for reactor compartment main girders (\*);
- .2 structural diagram for biological shielding (\*);
- .3 containment drawings (\*);
- .4 collision protection diagram (\*);
- .5 grounding and stranding diagram (\*);
- .6 description of containment leak tightness test instruments and procedures (\*\*);
- .7 calculation results on biological shielding and metal-water shielding tank attachment strength (\*\*).

##### **3.3.3 Documentation on fire protection:**

structural fire protection diagram for reactor compartment (may be included into general fire protection diagram for the ship) (\*).

##### **3.3.4 Documentation on steam supply system:**

list of documents on steam supply system design is specified in [3.1, Part VIII "Nuclear Steam Supply Systems"](#).

##### **3.3.5 Documentation on radiation safety:**

- .1 chart for radiation within the ship and on its external surfaces (\*\*);
- .2 memorandum for biological shielding calculation results (\*\*);
- .3 radiation monitoring system for the ship/floating facility (description, schematic diagram, layout on board the ship/floating facility, calculation results and drawings for the system and its equipment, delivery specifications) (\*\*);
- .4 decontamination procedures for spaces and equipment subject to radioactive contamination (\*\*).

<sup>1</sup> Hereinafter referred to as "the Information on Safety".

<sup>2</sup> Operating Manual may be submitted at a later design stage.

**3.3.6** Documentation on systems and piping:

- .1 schematic diagrams for systems serving the steam supply system (\*);
- .2 calculation results on systems and piping (\*\*).

**3.3.7** Documentation on electrical equipment:

schematic power supply diagram for steam supply system consumers, automatic systems and radiation monitoring system (\*).

**3.3.8** Documentation on automation equipment:

- .1 list of remotely-controlled fittings and valves with types, manufacturers and Register's approval certificates (\*\*);
- .2 control algorithms for steam supply system and steam turbine unit (\*\*);
- .3 functional and schematic diagrams for automation and remote control of steam supply systems, safety systems and systems serving steam supply system (components required for systems" operations shall be specified: sensors, converters, manipulators, actuators, etc.) (\*);
- .4 functional and schematic circuits for power air and water systems (\*);
- .5 functional and schematic circuits for control management from emergency cooling station (\*).

**3.4 Detailed design documentation for the nuclear ship/floating facility under construction.**

In addition to the documents listed in 3.4, Part I "Classification" of the RS Rules, the following detailed design documentation for the nuclear ships and floating facilities shall be submitted to the Register for review.

**3.4.1** Hull documentation:

- .1 drawings for sections and assemblies of reactor compartment main girders (\*);
- .2 containment drawings (\*);
- .3 biological shielding drawings (\*);
- .4 containment test procedure (\*).

**3.4.2** Documentation on piping:

drawings for piping with layout and piping assemblies penetrating containment and biological shielding, bulkheads, decks and platforms (\*).

**3.4.3** Documentation on steam supply system:

- .1 layout and securing arrangement drawings for steam supply system equipment (\*);
- .2 operating instructions for steam supply system (\*);
- .3 test procedure during mooring and sea trials (\*).

**3.4.4** Documentation on radiation safety (\*):

layout and attachment plans for radiation monitoring system equipment (\*).

**3.4.5** Documentation on electrical equipment (\*):

drawings for cable routing within reactor compartment with assemblies penetrating containment and shielding barrier.

**3.4.6** Documentation on automation equipment:

- .1 layout and securing arrangement drawings for safety system equipment and systems serving steam supply system (\*);
- .2 drawings for cable routing and pulse piping (\*);
- .3 layout drawings for sensors required for operation of steam supply systems, safety systems and systems serving steam supply system (\*).

**3.5 Ship's operational documentation.**

**3.5.1** For the nuclear ship (floating facility), in addition to the documents specified in Appendix 1 to Part II "Technical Documentation" of the Rules for Technical Supervision during Construction of Ships and Manufacture of Materials and Products for Ships, the RS-approved operational documentation specified in [Appendix 1 to this Section](#) shall be available on board the ship (floating facility).

**3.6 Ship's technical documentation.**

**3.6.1** For the nuclear ship (floating facility), in addition to the documents specified in Appendix 1.1 to the Rules for the Classification Surveys of Ships in Service, the documentation specified in [Appendix 1.1 to this Section](#) shall be available on board the ship (floating facility) (where applicable).

**SHIP'S OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTATION**

No.	Document name	RS approval	Flag MA approval	Stamp	Application
1	Information on safety of the nuclear power plant and ship	+	+	Approved	Reg. VIII/7 of SOLAS-74, as amended
2	Operating Manual for the nuclear power unit	+	+	Approved	Reg. VIII/8 of SOLAS-74, as amended

## **SHIP'S TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION**

### **1 GENERAL SHIP DOCUMENTATION:**

- 1.1 instructions on containment testing during operation;
- 1.2 water- and gastight plan for the containment and shielding barrier;
- 1.3 layout of equipment located within the controlled and supervised areas;
- 1.4 ayout of controlled areas.

### **2 HULL DOCUMENTATION:**

- 2.1 structural diagram for biological shielding;
- 2.2 containment drawings;
- 2.3 protection diagram for reactor compartment.

### **3 DOCUMENTATION ON SHIP'S ARRANGEMENTS AND OUTFIT:**

- 3.1 drawing for instrument space hatch cover;
- 3.2 drawings for cargo transportation to solid waste storage facility.

### **4 DOCUMENTATION ON NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM:**

- 4.1 general layout of nuclear steam supply system equipment within the containment;
- 4.2 specification for nuclear steam supply system.

### **5 SYSTEMS' DOCUMENTATION:**

- 5.1 diagrams for systems (as applicable):
  - .1 primary circuit pressure compensating, circulating and purification system;
  - .2 second circuit system;
  - .3 third and fourth circuits system;
  - .4 primary deaeration system;
  - .5 primary and third water sampling system;
  - .6 steam generator washing and storage system;
  - .7 steam generator leak detection system;
  - .8 steam generator overpressure prevention system;
  - .9 primary coolant make-up system;
  - .10 emergency cooling system;
  - .11 heating and normal cooling of nuclear steam supply system;
  - .12 condensate feeding system;
  - .13 soluble poison injection system;
  - .14 core emergency cooling system;
  - .15 liquid radioactive waste collection, storage and discharge system;
  - .16 special-purpose drainage system;
  - .17 containment drenching system;

- .18 high-pressure gas system;
- .19 sorbent unloading and hydraulic handling system;
- .20 decontamination system;
- .21 controlled area ventilation system;
- .22 pressure suit air system;
- .23 emergency pressure reduction system;
- .24 containment heat removal system;
- .25 reactor box water filling system;
- .26 containment flooding system;
- 5.2 list of scheduled checks for nuclear safety systems and equipment.

#### **6 DOCUMENTATION ON ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT:**

- 6.1 power supply and control circuit for primary circulating pump;
- 6.2 electric drives of nuclear steam supply system auxiliary machinery;
- 6.3 functional tests of power supply system and power supply circuits of nuclear steam supply system;
- 6.4 schematic main and emergency power supply circuit for nuclear steam supply system machinery;
- 6.5 drawings for cable routing within reactor compartment;
- 6.6 main and emergency lighting layout for controlled areas.

#### **7 DOCUMENTATION ON AUTOMATION SYSTEMS:**

- 7.1 emergency parameter recorder (electric circuit diagram);
- 7.2 schematic diagram for control and monitoring system of nuclear steam supply system;
- 7.3 algorithms of nuclear steam supply system and steam-turbine unit;
- 7.4 parameters to be checked (nuclear steam supply system);
- 7.5 specifications for local control devices of nuclear steam supply system;
- 7.6 radiation monitoring system schematic diagram.

## **PART III. SAFETY STANDARDS**

### **1 GENERAL**

**1.1** These requirements are mainly aimed at general safety of the nuclear ship/floating facility which includes safety of the nuclear power unit. Operation of the nuclear power unit may be required for safety of the nuclear ship/floating facility although in the context of the nuclear power unit safety, it shall be stopped or its power shall be reduced.

## **2 BASIC REQUIREMENTS**

**2.1** The following basic requirements shall be met to ensure safety of the nuclear ship/floating facility and to protect crew, people and environment against radioactive materials.

**2.1.1** To reduce dissemination of ionizing radiation and radioactive materials into environment, radioactivity sources shall be surrounded by several sequential shielding barriers.

**2.1.2** In addition to main normal operation systems, special-purpose safety systems which start automatically upon accident shall be provided.

**2.2** To ensure protection against ionizing radiation the following is required:

**.1** to provide proper biological shielding;

**.2** to earmark radiation areas on board the ship/floating facility;

**.3** to reduce time of exposure;

**.4** to prevent people from being in the vicinity of radiation sources unless it is necessary;

**.5** in case of accidents personnel shall act in accordance with Operating Manual for the ship/floating facility;

**.6** to provide individual protection means.

**2.3** Steam supply system control and protection systems, safety systems and other technical facilities specified in these Rules are to comply with single failure concept ([see Section 7](#)).

**2.4** To confirm that safety of the nuclear ship/floating facility complies with requirements of these Rules, all required operating and emergency conditions are to be scrutinized in the detailed design with regard to purpose of the ship/ floating facility and their assumed frequency and effects are to be evaluated.

Based on this evaluation, safety design concepts are adopted assuming that the more severe effects may be permitted at less frequency.

**2.5** The requirements to quality of structures, systems and equipment shall comply with their classification based on importance for the ship's safety.

**2.6** Under normal operation of the nuclear ship/floating facility and steam supply system, all shielding barriers against radioactive materials are to be operational. Steam supply system shall not be operated at power if design safety limits of shielding barriers or their safety arrangements are beyond those specified in the detailed design of the nuclear ship/floating facility according to safety operation conditions.

### 3 STATE CLASSES

**3.1** States of the ship/floating facility and its nuclear power unit shall be subdivided into four groups (SC1, SC2, SC3 and SC4) depending on their frequency and effects as per [Table 3.1](#).

Table 3.1

State Class	State of the ship and steam supply system	Possible frequency	Effects
1	2	3	4
SC1	Normal operation	Permanent or often	Ship/floating facility and its steam supply system are in normal operating state Radiation environment on board the ship is within standard limits.
SC2	Minor faults	Occasionally	Faults, which do not result in significant damage of ship/ floating facility operation. Short-term stop of die reactor may be required Minor deviations of radiation from standard limits which do not result in increase in exposure of personnel on board die ship/floating facility beyond standard limits
SC3	Major damage	Rarely	Damages to ship structures/nuclear power unit equipment which affect safety of further ship/floating facility operation. Long-term shutdown of steam supply system and containment isolation may be required. Possible deviations of radiation on board the ship/floating facility from standard limits Exposure of personnel on board the ship/floating facility is not beyond the specified limits.
SC4	Severe accidents	Very occasionally	Severe damages which require activation of emergency cooling system/ containment operation but which do not result in unacceptable radioactive emissions into environment Radiation on board the ship/floating facility significantly deviates from permissible limits. Exposure of some persons on board the ship/floating facility does not exceed the double value of permissible dose as specified by applicable Radiation Safety Standards for the Personnel.

Notes : Permanent/often means that the event occurs permanently or may occur often within service life of this ship/floating facility.  
 Occasionally means that the event may occur more than once within service life of this ship/floating facility.  
 Rarely means that the event is unlikely to occur within service life of this ship/floating facility but may occur on some sister ships/floating facilities within their service life.  
 Very occasionally means that the event is unlikely to occur but anyway it may occur within the total service life of particular sister nuclear-powered ships/floating facilities.

Class assignment of possible event shall be justified, approved by the Register and specified in the Information on Safety. Evaluation results of frequency and effects of possible accidents shall be specified in the detailed design for the ship/floating facility and its nuclear power unit.

**3.2** The effects of events that are too unlikely to occur and followed by total loss of operability of all ship's power sources (capsizing, flooding, grounding and stranding with heel more than 30°, etc) shall be evaluated. The effects of these events are not governed by these Rules.

The effects of the beyond design-basis accident shall be also accessed in the detailed design.

**3.3** For class assignment of steam supply system states, refer to [Part VIII "Nuclear Steam Supply Systems"](#).

#### **4 SAFETY CLASSES**

**4.1** Systems and equipment of nuclear ship, floating facility and nuclear power unit are subdivided into four safety classes according to their importance for the ship and floating facility. These systems and equipment are to comply with design requirements, requirements to materials, manufacture, testing and operation.

**4.2** Division of systems and equipment into safety classes shall be justified in the detailed design according to impact of failure in systems and equipment on ship's safety, as well as approved by the Register and included into Information on Safety.

**4.3** For division of steam supply system into safety classes, refer to [Part VIII "Nuclear Steam Supply Systems"](#).

## **5 DIVIDING NUCLEAR SHIP/FLOATING FACILITY INTO RADIATION SAFETY AREAS**

**5.1** The nuclear ship/floating facility shall be divided into controlled, supervised and unrestricted areas according to existing or potential radiation hazard. Area borders may be established in the form of physical structures or administratively.

## **6 BASIC DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY FUNCTIONS**

**6.1** To ensure safety in all operating conditions, the nuclear ship/floating facility shall comply to following criteria:

**.1** Criterion A: to provide means for proper shielding of ionizing radiation sources and means to reduce dissemination of radioactive materials to the least possible level to ensure that people's exposure to radiation and environmental contamination are low to the extent practicable;

**.2** Criterion B: means for effective removal of residual heat from the reactor core shall be provided;

**.3** Criterion C: means for safety control and reactor switching to subcritical state and its maintaining in this state within required time shall be provided.

**6.2** To satisfy basic criteria specified in [6.1](#), the following safety functions are to be met:

**.1** Criterion A:

**.1.1** fuel claddings in the reactor core being the first shielding barrier between nuclear fuel and environment are to be properly maintained;

**.1.2** the integrity of the primary heavy duty circuit being the second shielding barrier is to be maintained;

**.1.3** accidental release shall be excluded and leakage of radioactive materials from containment being the third barrier shall be reduced;

**.1.4** the leakage of radioactive materials from shielding being the fourth barrier shall be additionally reduced;

**.2** Criterion B:

**.2.1** residual heat shall be removed from the reactor core to the coolant;

**.2.2** coolant shall be supplied to the reactor core (core emergency cooling);

**.2.3** power supply to safety facilities specified in [6.2.2.1](#) and [6.2.2.2](#);

**.3** Criterion C:

**.3.1** reactivity shall be properly monitored;

**.3.2** reactor shall be switched to subcritical state without exceeding specified design limits for the core;

**.3.3** power shall be fed to facilities which perform safety specified in [6.2.2.1](#) and [6.2.2.2](#).

**6.3** To ensure performance of safety junctions specified in [6.2](#) for states SC2, SC3, SC4, special-purpose safety systems shall be provided in addition to operation support systems. Based on analyzed possible accidents and effects it is determined whether special-purpose safety systems are required.

## **7 SINGLE FAILURE CONCEPT**

**7.1** In the design process, safety systems shall properly respond to any initial event related to SC2, SC3 and SC4 despite of supposed single failure in any system component.

**7.2** When analyzing the safety system for compliance with single failure concept, the single failure in each component is supposed, thereby:

**.1** safety system shall be evaluated assuming that the initial event (together with any other failures resulting directly from the initial event) is combined with an accident failure in one component of safety system.

Two or more simultaneously independent failures are not required to be considered;

**.2** operator's error shall be considered as a kind of single failure or initial event.

Failures in well-designed, manufactured and tested passive components (such as pipelines, vessels, heat exchangers, electric cables) are not required to be considered provided that there are no sufficient grounds.

**7.3** To comply with single failure concept, the equipment and systems shall be reliable and appropriate redundancy methods shall be used (component wise or subsystem-based redundancy) supplemented by the following, if required:

**.1** components/subsystems shall be divided by bulkheads or located apart from each other;

**.2** subsystems shall operate independently;

**.3** components/subsystems shall be designed differently by operating principle, design, etc.

**7.4** The single failure concept shall be applied rather to the safety system considered as the system of facilities intended for safety purpose than to components of this system even though these components/subsystem are capable of operation as a system.

**7.5** The single failure concept is not required to be complied with in case of states which are more unlikely than SC4 followed by total loss of operability of ship's power supply units (capsizing, flooding, etc).

## 8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

**8.1** The states of the nuclear ship, floating facility and their nuclear power unit to be designed shall be considered under extreme environmental conditions in assumed operation area (hurricanes, tsunami, ice). The state of floating facilities exposed to seismic waves shall be also considered.

**8.2** Inertial forces affecting the ship/floating facility at a sea state shall be accepted with regard to equipment safety class. When calculating inertial forces, ship/floating facility six degrees of freedom roll (6DoF roll) shall be considered over the sea spectrum within the navigation/docking area. In general case, sea spectrum based on statistical data for the North Atlantic region may be used.

**8.3** Components and structures of 1 to 4 safety classes<sup>1</sup> shall be capable of withstanding inertial forces of accepted sea spectrum acting for a time specified in [Table 8.3](#).

Table 8.3

Safety class of components and structures	Time, days
1	15000
2 and 3	1500
4, as well as hull and machinery not subject to the requirements of international standards and rules	150

**8.4** For ships and floating facilities of restricted area of navigation, the Register may review other design requirements.

<sup>1</sup> For steam supply system safety classes, refer to [Section 5](#), Part VII "Nuclear Steam Supply Systems".

## **PART IV. HULL**

### **1 GENERAL**

**1.1** The hull of nuclear ship and floating facility shall comply in full with requirements of Part II "Hull" of the RS Rules and requirements hereof.

## **2 SCOPE OF TECHNICAL SUPERVISION**

**2.1** In addition to Part II "Hull" of the RS Rules, the following structures of nuclear ships and floating facilities are subject to technical supervision by Register during their manufacture:

- .1** collision, grounding and stranding system;
- .2** containment;
- .3** shielding barrier;
- .4** metal-water shielding tanks.

### **3 MATERIALS**

**3.1** Materials to be used for manufacturing structural system components and containment shall be of category D (for thicknesses below 12,5 mm) and category E (for thicknesses above 12,5 mm). For steel grades, see Part XIII "Materials" of the RS Rules.

#### **4 TOTAL STRENGTH**

**4.1** Calculation results which confirm that longitudinal strength of the ship/ floating facility is sufficient when longitudinal girders are broken due to design collision shall be submitted to the Register.

**4.2** The longitudinal strength of the grounded and stranded ship/floating facility shall be evaluated.

**4.3** The total strength of the ship/floating facility under action of bending torque in the water plane due to design collision with the other ship shall be evaluated.

**4.4** The hull shall be designed in a way to avoid to the extent practicable the drastic change in cross-section drag torque in structural protection area ([see 5.1](#)).

There shall be a smooth transition between the structural protection area ([see 5.1](#)) and the remainder of the hull. This transition shall ensure continuous girders contributing to the total strength of the ship/floating facility. The transition area shall be designed so as to forces induced in way of the reactor compartment and structural protection are transferred to the other parts of the ship/floating facility hull.

## **5 HULL LOCAL STRENGTH NEAR REACTOR COMPARTMENT**

**5.1** To prevent damage to shielding barriers, structural protection for absorbing power released due to collisions, grounding and stranding shall be provided in way of the reactor compartment.

If the ship/floating facility is fitted with helicopter/helideck, structural protection against helicopter crash shall be provided in way of the reactor compartment and facilities for storing cores and fuel assemblies.

**5.2** The design conditions for collision and procedure for calculating the structural onboard protection shall be approved by the Register.

The Register may require experimental check of calculation results by modeling, where necessary.

**5.3** The length of structural protection forward and aft of traverse bulkheads of reactor compartment and used fuel storage compartment shall be justified by the Designer with regard to [4.4](#) hereof. The length shall be at least 0,2 of compartment length.

**5.4** Double bottom and foundations in the reactor compartment shall be designed as to ensure protection of reactor, its safety systems and core storage facilities against damages due to grounding and stranding.

The bottom of the ship/floating facility shall be  $B/15$  or 2 m (whichever is more) apart from the lower part of the shielding barrier.

**5.5** The height of the double bottom in the vicinity of the engine compartment shall be sufficient to withstand the damage with dimensions specified in [2.1](#), Part V "Subdivision".

## 6 CONTAINMENT

**6.1** The containment shall be designed as to reduce release of radioactive materials into environment for any states of the plant (SC1 to SC4). For permissible leakage values, see [6.9](#).

**6.2** Containment may be designed as a reinforced leaktight structure if the ship/floating facility hull or as independent reinforced leaktight containment which is no integral with the hull.

If the ship/floating facility is fitted with several steam supply systems, these plants shall be enclosed in a separate containment.

**6.3** Containment shall be designed and manufactured to meet requirements of safety class 2 structures (see [Section 5, Part VIII "Nuclear Steam Supply Systems"](#)).

**6.4** Containment shall withstand the inner pressure due to emergency release of coolant caused by rupture of the primary circuit (see [7.9, Part VIII "Nuclear Steam Supply Systems"](#)).

Safety valves to release gas-vapor mixture at SC4 are not permitted on the containment.

If there is an approved system for reducing pressure in case of emergency release, maximum pressure which may occur in the containment with regard to such a system shall be taken as a design pressure.

**6.5** The containment shall be designed as to withstand the design pressure specified in [6.4](#) with regard to inertial forces at sea states.

Thermal stresses in the structure in case of emergency shall be considered.

**6.6** Containment shall be operational when compressed due to action of external pressure and in case of flooding of the ship/floating structure (refer to [3.5](#), Part VII "Machinery Installations and Machinery").

**6.7** All means of closure, doors, stop valves/shut-off valves, cable passages sealing arrangements and other components included into tight circuit of the containment shall be designed, manufactured and tested on benches (prior to mounting onto containment) under supervision of the Register and according to approved procedures.

Tightness standards for tight circuit components shall be determined as per Appendix 3 and included into design documents. These standards shall be specified in the delivery specifications.

**6.8** The constructed containment along with its means of closure shall be subject to hydraulic test at 1.1 times the design pressure (see [6.4](#)). Test pressure ( $P_{test}$ ) shall be calculated by the following formula:

$$P_{test} = (1,1\sigma_T/\sigma_t)P_{design}, \quad (6.8)$$

where  $\sigma_T$  : yield strength of containment material at test temperature,  
 $\sigma_t$  : yield strength of containment material at design temperature (maximum temperature in case of maximum design-basis accident),  
 $P_{design}$  : pressure in containment in case of maximum design-basis accident.

**6.9** If hydrostatic pressure in the course of containment test exceeds the test pressure and results in the risk of damage of structure, equipment or their foundations, hydraulic tests may be replaced with air pressure tests. The containment shall be subject to air pressure test when tight circuit of the containment is completely installed. Test pressure  $P_{test}$  shall be determined by formula as shown in [6.8](#).

**6.10** Containment shall be subject to leak test at pressure equal to the design pressure. In case of air pressure tests, the leak tests may be combined with the pressure tests provided that the test pressure ( $P_{test}$ ) is brought to design pressure ( $P_{design}$ ).

Procedures for testing and calculating relative leakage rate as well as Calibration Certificate for the measurement procedure shall be approved by the Register.

In case of hydraulic tests, the air test pressure in the containment in the course of leak test may be reduced provided that relative leakage rate shall be measured three times at test pressures of 0,07 MPa, 0,05 MPa and 0,03 MPa. Test procedures, Calibration Certificate for

the measurement procedure and extrapolation of test results at decreased pressures to the design pressure shall be approved by the Register. Permissible relative leakage rate at design pressure shall be justified by the Designer with regard to radiation safety conditions as per applicable Radiation Safety Standards for the Personnel and People. It should be noted that decrease in permissible relative leakage rate down to 1 % per day and less as compared to the design maximum permissible value results in decrease in potential radiation hazard for the personnel and population in case of maximum design-basis accident. Therefore, it shall be established with possibility of reaching and measuring this value.

**6.11** When the core is loaded into reactor and installation works are complete, the containment shall be subject to leak tests (outside and inside) at excessive air pressure of 0,05 MPa.

**6.12** When the containment is subject to leak test, compressed air parameters within the containment shall be recorded (pressure, temperature) at least every hour until the validation criterion is met at  $a \geq 0,95$  to be calculated with regard to inequalities:

$$\begin{cases} L_M + \zeta_L \leq L_P \\ \zeta_L \leq 0,3L_P \end{cases}, \quad (6.12)$$

where  $L_M$  : measured relative leakage rate based on directly measured  $P$ ,  $T$ ,  $\bar{\tau}$  obtained in tests, %/days;  
 $\zeta_L$  : design measurement error of relative leakage rate, %/day;  
 $L_P$  : permissible relative leakage rate specified in the design of nuclear ship/floating facility, %/day;  
 $a$  : confidential probability.

**6.13** The containment shall be subject to leak tests during ship/floating facility operation (in the course of periodical surveys and after reactor core reloading). In such a case, test pressure shall be 0,05 MPa, permissible relative leakage rate shall be equal to measured relative leakage rate at initial test pressure of 0,05 MPa.

The test results assessment criterion shall be the condition when the inequality holds true:

$$L_D^{EX} \leq 1,15(L_M + \zeta_L), \quad (6.13)$$

where  $L_D^{EX}$  – permissible relative leakage rate at excessive pressure of 0.05 MPa to be controlled during ship operation, %/day  
 $L_M$  : measured relative leakage rate at excessive pressure of 0.05 MPa obtained during ship construction, %/day  
 $\zeta_L$  : design measurement error at excessive pressure of 0.05 MPa obtained during ship construction, %/day  
 1.15 : factor which accounts for operating life of the ship.

The measured relative leakage rate at initial excessive test pressure of 0,05 MPa shall comply with inequalities (6.12).

## **7 SHIELDING BARRIER**

**7.1** The containment and significant radioactive sources related to steam supply system shall be surrounded by shielding barrier. Boundaries of the containment and shielding barrier shall not be combined.

**7.2** All bulkheads, decks and other structures forming the shielding barrier shall be steel and watertight as required by the RS Rules for similar structures.

**7.3** Boundary bulkheads of reactor compartment and other compartments of ship/floating facility may be used as forward and aft traverse bulkheads of shielding barrier.

**7.4** Longitudinal bulkheads forming side walls of shielding barrier shall be  $B/5$  or 11,5 m (whichever is less) apart from boards unless the other penetration height is specified for collision protection.

The Register shall be provided with reasonable evidence that the damage will not be exceeded at design collisions.

**7.5** Shielding barrier shall be subject to watertight test as per hull watertight test set-up.

**7.6** Upon completion of mounting operations, shielding barrier shall be subject to leak test. The test procedures and standards shall comply with requirements to ship's spaces.

**7.7** In the course of operation of the ship/floating facility, shielding barrier spaces are not required to be leak tested provided that the design pressure in these spaces is maintained to be below the atmospheric pressure.

**7.8** The structures of shielding barrier shall be capable of being decontaminated.

## **8 REACTOR FOUNDATIONS. FASTENERS OF CONTAINMENT AND BIOLOGICAL SHIELDING**

**8.1** Reactor foundations and fasteners of containment shall provide effective support under external conditions as specified in [Section 8](#), Part III "Safety Standards".

The foundations shall be capable of keeping the reactor and primary systems as well as containment at place in case of inclinations of the ship/floating facility up to and including capsizing.

**8.2** The foundations shall be capable of withstanding thermal stresses.

**8.3** The foundation structures shall be accessible for inspection as far as possible.

**8.4** The fasteners of biological shielding shall be designed with regard to inertial forces acting on it as specified for safety class 2 and 3 equipment and to deformation of ship's hull and exposure to excessive pressure in the containment ([see 6.4](#)).

**8.5** The structures of foundations shall be capable of being decontaminated, if required.

## **9 WELDED STRUCTURES AND JOINTS**

**9.1** When selecting design thickness of fillet welds of collision, grounding and stranding protection structures as per Part II "Hull" of the RS Rules, weld efficiency factor shall be taken to be 0,45.

Components of protection structures jointed with shell plating are to be of full penetration type.

**9.2** All welded joints of containment structure shall be subject to nondestructive testing during ship construction.

**9.3** 20 % of welded joints of hull structures in way of the reactor compartment and structural protection shall be subject to non-destructive testing during ship construction.

**9.4** No intermittent welds are allowed in the controlled area.

## **PART V. SUBDIVISION**

### **1 GENERAL**

**1.1** Subdivision of nuclear ships and floating facilities shall comply in full with requirements of Part V "Subdivision" of the RS Rules and requirements hereof.

**1.2** Nuclear ships and floating facilities shall remain afloat and have sufficient stability in case of damage specified in [2.1](#) under operational loading conditions of the ships/floating facilities.

When calculating emergency grounding and stability, one shall consider that such a damage may occur anywhere along the length of the ship/floating facility.

The nuclear ship/floating facility shall have sufficient buoyancy in case of flooding of at least two adjacent compartments.

**1.3** In case of probability evaluation of subdivision as per Part V "Subdivision" of the RS Rules, the  $R$  index shall be specially defined by the Register. Formulas for calculating  $S_c$  and  $S_m$  are selected as agreed upon with the Register with regard to structural features and assumed operation of the ship/ floating facility.

## 2 DAMAGED STABILITY OF NUCLEAR SHIP/FLOATING FACILITY

### 2.1 Damage dimensions.

**2.1.1** When calculating damaged stability, the extent of damage shall be assumed to be as follows:

**.1** side damages:

Longitudinal extent:  $1/3L_L^{2/3}$  (where  $L_L^{2/3}$  – ship length (refer to Part V "Subdivision" of the RS Rules) or 14,5 m whichever is less.

Traverse extent:  $B/5$  or 11,5 m (whichever is less) measured from inner side of shell plating at right angle to the centerline at the level of summer load line.

Vertical extent: from the base line upwards without limit;

**.2** bottom damages:

Extents	0.3L from forward perpendicular	Remainder of the ship
Longitudinal	$1/3L_L^{2/3}$ or 14,5 m <sup>1</sup>	$1/3L_L^{2/3}$ or 5 m <sup>1</sup>
Traverse	$B/6$ or 10 m <sup>1</sup>	$B/6$ or 5 m <sup>1</sup>
Vertical	$B/15$ or 2 m <sup>1</sup>	$B/15$ or 2 m <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Whichever is the least.

**2.1.2** With regard to collision, grounding and stranding protection in way of the reactor compartment (see [Section 5](#), Part IV "Hull"), the Register may accept less extents other than those specified in [2.1.1](#).

### 2.2 Permeabilities.

**2.2.1** Permeabilities mentioned in Part V "Subdivision" of the RS Rules shall be applied in assessment of damaged stability.

Permeability for cargo holds is taken to be 0,8.

**2.2.2** Permeabilities for the steam supply system spaces shall be determined with regard to actual flooding of these spaces.

### 2.3 Requirements to stability elements of damaged nuclear ship/floating facility.

**2.3.1** Heel angle at a final stage of asymmetric flooding shall not exceed 15° before measures on righting are taken (actuation of valves fitted on crosspipes). This angle can be increased up to 17° provided that bulkhead deck is not submerged.

**2.3.2** Stability at a final stage of flooding is considered to be sufficient if the righting lever curve (GZ curve) has a range of at least 20° at maximum righting lever of a least 0,2 m within the range specified. Area under the GZ curve within the same range shall be at least 3,5 cm\*rad.

The ship shall be capable of maintaining sufficient stability at the intermediate stage of flooding.

**2.3.3** Crosspipes shall not be considered as arrangements to fulfill requirements of [2.3.1](#) and [2.3.2](#).

**2.3.4** The asymmetric flooding shall be kept to minimum by using effective heel stabilizing devices.

Spaces connected by means of large section ducts may be considered as common.

**2.3.5** Systems to be applied for stabilizing heel angles, whenever reasonable and practicable, shall be capable of automatic operation.

The cross piping, if any, shall be operable from a position above the bulkhead deck.

### **3 INFORMATION ON EMERGENCY GROUNDING AND STABILITY**

**3.1** Information on emergency grounding and stability as required by Part V "Subdivision" of the RS Rules shall contain information for the Master as regards actions in case of damages greater than those specified in [2.1](#). Consequences of flooding caused by hull breach with depth to the centerline (for areas outside the reactor compartment) shall be considered.

## **PART VI. FIRE PROTECTION**

### **1 GENERAL**

**1.1** Fire protection of the nuclear ship and floating facility shall comply with Part VI "Fire Protection" of the RS Rules for passenger ships carrying up to 36 passengers, and requirements hereof.

## **2 STRUCTURAL FIRE PROTECTION**

**2.1** Reactor compartment shall be separated from adjacent spaces by means of cofferdams or class A-60 bulkheads to ensure protection against external fires and explosions.

**2.2** Only non-combustible materials shall be used in the reactor compartment and spaces where equipment for safe operation of steam supply system is located.

Combustible materials may be permitted as an exception unless if they can not be replaced with non-combustible ones. Such an exception shall be specially considered by the Register on a case-by-case basis.

**2.3** Spaces within the shielding barrier where combustible materials are used or containing installations which require the use of combustible materials (except for cables and paint materials for painting spaces) shall be enclosed with class A-60 structures.

Passages of pipelines and electric cables in the shielding barrier shall ensure gastightness and fire resistance equivalent to those for shielding barrier structure.

**2.4** Trunks and vent ducts to the space bounded by containment/shielding barrier shall be insulated to A-60 standard lengthwise within these spaces and outside them for a length equal to the duct maximum section.

If trunks and vent ducts are fitted with fire dampers capable of automatic closing in case of fire and complying with Part VII "Systems and Piping" of the RS Rules, they may be insulated to A-0 standard.

**2.5** Double bottom tanks located in the reactor compartments shall not contain fuel.

Where double bottom tanks containing fuel are provided forward or aft of the reactor compartment, they shall be separated from double bottom space of the reactor compartment by means of cofferdams with structural components to comply with Part II "Hull" of the RS Rules.

### **3 FIRE-FIGHTING EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS**

**3.1** Water shall not be used as a fire-extinguishing medium in spaces within the containment.

**3.2** Nuclear power unit control stations shall be fitted with fire extinguishing systems as per Part VI "Fire Protection" of the RS Rules.

## **4 FIRE ALARM SYSTEM**

**4.1** Fire alarm systems fitted on nuclear ships and floating facilities shall be of a type approved by RS and shall meet the requirements of this Section and of Section 4 Part VI "Fire Protection" of the RS Rules.

### **4.2 Fixed fire alarm systems.**

**4.2.1** In addition to 4.2.1 Part VI "Fire Protection" of the RS Rules, fire alarm system shall be fitted in the containment and shielding barrier spaces as well as in control stations on nuclear ships and floating facilities.

**4.2.2** Fixed fire alarm system shall be fitted:

**.1** within containment for protection of reactor plant instrument space. Fire detectors are not required in unmanned containment spaces (reactor plant space, cofferdams);

**.2** within shielding barrier for protection of all controlled area spaces. Fire detectors shall be fitted for protection of the following:

SRW storage spaces;

spaces for equipment and systems for collecting and discharge of radioactive waste;

spaces with fitted equipment, pipelines and valves of the primary and tertiary circuits;

decontamination spaces;

spaces used for work with contaminated equipment and radioactive media;

exhaust ventilation spaces;

decontamination stations;

contamination control station spaces;

automation spaces;

electric cable route corridors;

passage corridors, lobbies, etc.

**4.2.3** Fire detectors are not required in the shielding barrier spaces with minimum fire risk, for instance, in transit pipeline corridors, steam pipeline corridors, LRW tank spaces, void spaces, shower rooms, etc.

**4.2.4** Use of alarm detectors based on ionizing radiation in high-radiation spaces shall be avoided.

**4.2.5** For protection of containment spaces and shielding barrier spaces, the following shall be done:

**.1** fixed fire alarm system shall be fitted and arranged to provide smoke detection in service spaces and control stations within shielding barrier including corridors, lobbies, access trunks and escape routes as specified in 4.2.1.2.2.1, 4.2.1.2.2.3, 4.2.1.2.4 and 4.2.1.2.7 Part VI "Fire Protection" of the RS Rules;

**.2** automatic detectors shall be arranged to provide their optimum efficiency as specified in 4.2.1.4 Part VI "Fire Protection" of the RS Rules;

**.3** thermal detectors may be used in reactor plant instrument spaces, exhaust ventilation spaces and in spaces where steam may be present. When using thermal detectors, operation temperature shall be at least 20 °C higher than maximum permissible air temperature in the space;

**.4** if the dominating fire factor is not determined, it is recommended to use a combination of fire detectors reacting to different fire factors or combined fire detectors.

**4.2.6** Automatic fire detectors fitted in the containment spaces and the shielding barrier spaces shall meet the requirements in 7.5.10.1 – 7.5.10.3, 7.5.10.5, 7.5.10.7 Part X "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules.

### **4.3 Manual alarm.**

**4.3.1** In addition to 4.2.2 Part VI "Fire Protection" of the RS Rules, manual alarm detectors shall be fitted in the containment and shielding barrier spaces as well as in control stations on nuclear ships and floating facilities.

**4.3.2** Manual detectors shall be fitted in passage corridors, lobbies, access trunks, decontamination spaces, spaces used for works with contaminated equipment and radioactive media (radiochemical laboratories).

**4.4** Fire alarm system equipment in controlled area spaces shall be at least IP55 to enable deactivation of equipment surfaces.

**4.5** Cabling being part of the fire alarm system laid in the controlled area shall meet the requirements of [Section 9](#), Part X "Electric Equipment".

## **5 FIRE FIGHTING APPLIANCES**

**5.1** Containment spaces shall be equipped with CO<sub>2</sub> fire extinguishers as mentioned in Part VI "Fire Protection" of the RS Rules.

Spaces of central control station and shielding barrier shall be equipped with CO<sub>2</sub> fire extinguishers as mentioned in Part VI "Fire Protection" of the RS Rules.

**5.2** The ship shall carry emergency escape breathing devices in amount sufficient for members of damage control team + one emergency escape breathing device for training purposes.

## **PART VII. MACHINERY INSTALLATIONS AND MACHINERY**

### **1 GENERAL**

**1.1** Nuclear power unit shall comply in full with all the requirements of Parts VII "Machinery Installations", VIII "Systems and Piping", IX "Machinery", X "Boilers, Heat Exchangers and Pressure Vessels" and XV "Automation" of the RS Rules and requirements of this Part.

**1.2** The provision is to be made that at astern power of propulsion unit the ship/floating facility doesn't exceed the distance braking at full speed forward as specified in technical assignment for the ship/floating facility design. The same is to be checked during sea trails of the ship/floating facility.

**1.3** Nuclear power unit shall be capable of starting from power sources of the ship/floating facility.

**1.4** Nuclear ship and self-propelled floating facility equipped with one reactor shall have a stand-by power source to provide ship/floating facility movement, steam supply system cooling in case of its failure as well as to provide normal habitable conditions, steerability, buoyancy, fire safety, ship signals and communication, escape routes and operation of boat winches. This stand-by power source shall provide the following:

**.1** it shall be ready and provide sufficient power for safe operation of the ship/floating facility in harbor and maintain steerability at sea equal to wind force of Beaufort scale 6 under any normal loading conditions;

**.2** it shall be ready when the ship/floating facility is in restricted waters or areas of intense navigation;

**.3** it shall not depend on steam supply system;

**.4** it shall be placed outside the reactor compartment.

**1.5** Non-self-propelled floating facility shall have a stand-by power source to cool steam supply system and provide normal habitable conditions, fire safety, buoyancy, ship signals and communication, escape routes.

## 2 OPERATION AT HEELS AND TRIMS

**2.1** Main and auxiliary mechanisms shall remain operational under conditions specified in [Table 2.1](#). For particular type of nuclear floating facility, operability conditions of mechanisms may be set as agreed upon with the Register.

Table 2.1

No.	Conditions	Machinery and systems providing operation of steam supply system	Main and auxiliary machinery	Emergency machinery and equipment
1	Long-term heel (degrees)	30	15	22,5
2	Roll (degrees)	45	22,5	22,5
3	Long-term trim (degrees)	10	5	10
4	Pitch (degrees)	15	7	10

Note . If proper justification is provided the Register may reduced requirements specified in column 3. In this case the reduced requirements shall be mentioned in Information on Safety.

### **3 STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM COMPARTMENT**

**3.1** Steam supply system compartment shall be located in a manner to reduce to minimum the probability of damage to steam supply system in case of nuclear ship/floating facility collision with another ship or in case of grounding and stranding.

It is recommended that steam supply system be located in the middle part of the ship/floating facility.

Transverse distance from shell plating to shielding barrier of steam supply system is specified in [7.4](#) and height of double bottom in area of the reactor compartment is specified in [5.5](#), Part IV "Hull".

**3.2** Steam supply system and its components with radioactive substances shall be enclosed in containment (see [Section 6](#), Part IV "Hull").

**3.3** Passages of pipelines and electric cables through containment shall be minimized. These passages shall withstand conditions resulting in containment under state classes SC1 to SC4.

Layout and structure of these passages shall allow their surveys and local leakage tests.

**3.4** All pipelines connecting internal volume of the containment with shielding barrier compartments or with atmosphere shall be provided with shutoff valves. Valves shall be located outside containment as close to it as possible. They shall automatically cut off the containment and be provided with remote control.

Containment cut-off means as safety system shall comply with single failure criterion.

**3.5** Containment shall be provided with facilities for automatic external and internal pressure balancing in case of flooding of the ship/floating facility. Structure of these facilities shall be approved by the Register.

**3.6** Special facilities shall be provided for periodic inspections and tests of containment in service to determine integral leakage.

**3.7** In addition to hatch for fuel loading, special hatch shall be provided for personnel access to equipment in containment. This hatch shall maintain gas tightness of containment at state classes SC1 to SC4.

Containment shall be also provided with escape manhole.

**3.8** For pressure reducing system in containment at emergency release, see [Section 5](#), Part IX "Special Systems".

**3.9** For containment ventilation, see [Section 6](#), Part IX "Special Systems".

#### **4 ARRANGEMENT OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT OF STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM**

**4.1** For allocation of steam supply system machinery and equipment important for safety, their protection at internal and external emergencies shall be considered.

Components and systems of safety classes 1 and 2 as well as systems and storage facilities with radioactive environments and waste shall be located within protection against collision.

**4.2** It is required to provide shielding for machinery and equipment which may be dangerous for steam supply system in case they are damaged and broken into fragments.

## **5 STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM CONTROL STATIONS**

**5.1** Central control station for reactor shall be located in less vulnerable place (against fires, explosions, flying fragments, radioactivity, etc.) but as close to the reactor and machinery installation as possible in order to reduce length of control circuits. Central control stations shall be provided with at least two exits for people escape into lifeboats or fire safe places.

**5.2** Emergency cooling control station shall be located at sufficient distance from central control station in order to avoid damage in case of fire or any other emergency in central control station.

Emergency cooling control station may be functionally connected to the bridge (refer to [19.17, Part VIII "Nuclear Steam Supply Systems"](#)).

## **6 SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS TO FUEL SYSTEM OF STAND-BY AND EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS**

**6.1** Fuel system shall be designed so as similar-type failure shall not cause failure of all generator sets.

**6.2** Daily service fuel tanks shall be placed as close to diesel generators as possible.

**6.3** Stand-by and emergency diesel generators shall use the same fuel. Fuel storage tanks shall allow its mutual transfer.

**6.4** Stand-by diesel generators shall have enough fuel to provide operation at lull load considering expected length of ship/floating facility voyages.

**6.5** Fuel in emergency diesel generators shall provide operation for at least 30 days after any emergency state including SC4.

## **PART VIII. NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEMS**

### **1 APPLICATION**

**1.1** This Part covers requirements for ship two-circuit nuclear steam supply systems with pressurized water reactors.

Requirements for ship's nuclear steam supply systems with other reactors on board shall be specially defined by the Register.

**1.2** The Register may also apply the requirements of this Part in accordance with provision in force to equipment other than that specified in [2.2](#).

## **2 SCOPE OF TECHNICAL SUPERVISION**

**2.1** For general provisions of classification and surveys of steam supply system, refer to [Part II "Classification"](#).

**2.2** Machinery, equipment and systems of the steam supply system subject to technical supervision are given below:

**.1** reactors (cases, covers with their fasteners, piping attachments, removable and non-removable parts, safety devices and valves, supporting structures);

**.2** cores (fuel elements, burnable poisons, displacers, working and permanent neutron sources and their assemblies);

**.3** arrangements for control, testing and suppression of chain reactor (rods, protective liners, drives and actuators, ionization chambers with suspensions, thermocouples and resistance thermometers, level gauges);

**.4** machinery (pumps, compressors, fans);

**.5** safety valves and devices, valves and fittings of equipment, machinery and systems;

**.6** pressure vessels and units (metal-water shielding tanks), steam generators, pressure compensators, hydraulic chambers, ion-exchange and electromagnetic filters, heat exchangers and refrigerators, drainage containers, gas and air tanks, hydropneumatic cylinders);

**.7** systems:

primary coolant circulating system;

primary coolant purification system, primary coolant make-up system;

residual heat removal system;

core emergency cooling system;

primary coolant sampling system;

deaeration system;

primary water drainage, storage and distribution system, pressure compensation system;

high pressure gas system;

secondary coolant (from steam generator to the secondary circuit);

fresh water cooling system (equipment and protection system);

sea water cooling system (equipment);

ventilation system for steam supply system spaces and controlled area spaces;

sorbent storage and handling system;

explosive mixture removal and hydrogen content monitoring system;

automatic equipment operating water and fitting control system;

**.8** reactor control and protection systems and arrangements;

**.9** reactor control and alarm systems and arrangements;

**.10** control, protection, monitoring and alarm arrangements for steam supply system systems and devices;

**.11** survey facilities;

**.12** facilities for handling and repair of steam supply system machinery.

**.13** steam generating unit.

### 3 TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS

**3.1** Technical design documentation on the nuclear ship and floating facility to be submitted to the Register for review shall include:

.1 description with basic specifications, technical assignment and delivery specifications for steam supply system (\*\*);

.2 memorandum (\*\*);

.3 general arrangement drawings for steam supply system (\*);

.4 operation modes of steam supply system (\*\*);

.5 emergency modes of steam supply system that shall include the following:

reactivity change accident analysis (\*\*);

analysis of heat removal accidents followed by coolant loss (\*\*);

safety systems' reliability design analysis (\*\*);

safety analysis by strength conditions (\*\*);

.6 list of steam supply system equipment indicating the status of technical documentation review by the Register (\*\*);

.7 schematic diagrams for steam supply systems specified in [2.2.7 — 2.2.10](#) (\*);

.8 feasibility study on steam supply system safety (\*\*);

.9 list of facilities for survey of steam supply system equipment (\*\*);

.10 ways of handling of fuel assemblies and cores and description of handling equipment (\*\*);

.11 technical documentation on steam supply system equipment specified in [2.2.1 to 2.2.6](#) and [2.2.13](#), along with the nuclear ship and floating facility technical design, may be submitted to the Register for review in the following scope:

general arrangement drawings with sections and drawings for major parts (\*);

memorandum or description (\*\*);

strength calculation results (\*\*);

delivery specifications/draft delivery specifications (\*\*);

delivery-acceptance trial programs for prototype and serial equipment (\*);

.12 memorandum for core physical and thermohydraulic calculations (\*\*).

**3.2** Prior to stating manufacturing process of the steam supply system equipment specified in [Section 2](#), the detailed design documentation shall be submitted to the Register for approval.

**3.3** In the lists specified in [3.1 — 3.2](#), documentation marked with (\*) is the documentation, which review results are documented by stamping in accordance with Fig. 8.2-1, Part II "Technical Documentation" of the Rules for Technical Supervision during Construction of Ships and Manufacture of Materials and Products for Ships.

Documentation marked with (\*\*) is the documentation, which review results are documented by stamping in accordance with Fig. 8.2-3, Part II "Technical Documentation" of the Rules for Technical Supervision during Construction of Ships and Manufacture of Materials and Products for Ships.

**3.4** During review of the plan approval documentation for ships engaged in international voyages, the review results of plan approval documentation, documentation establishing inspection standards during manufacture and assembly of reactor plant shall be documented by stamping in accordance with Fig. 8.2-5, Part II "Technical Documentation" of the Rules for Technical Supervision during Construction of Ships and Manufacture of Materials and Products for Ships.

#### **4 DESIGN CRITERIA**

**4.1** To ensure safety of steam supply system at its operating and emergency states, basic design criteria mentioned in [Section 6](#), Part III "Safety Standards" shall be observed.

## 5 SAFETY AND DESIGN CLASSES

**5.1** As stated in [Section 3](#), Part III "Safety Standards", equipment, machinery, systems and devices of steam supply system shall be divided into four safety classes depending on their importance for the ship's safety.

Classification below is given for indicative purposes.

**5.2** The following components of steam supply system are of Safety Class 1:

**.1** reactors, core supporting structures, fuel assemblies, pressure vessels and other primary components including systems and piping which failure may result in emergency states SC 3 and SC4 ([see also Section 6](#)).

Equipment and piping associated with reactor cooling system and forming part of the primary circuit of reactor cooling are not required to meet requirements of Safety Class 1. In this case there should be provision for disconnecting and cooling them conventionally by making up leakages using primary make-up system only in case of design basis failure in equipment or piping under normal operation of the reactor or there should be provision for disconnecting equipment/piping from reactor cooling system by means of two valves. Each open valve shall be ready for automatic closure. The time of closure for the valve shall be as to ensure its operability and possibility of disconnection and conventional cooling of reactor in case of design-basis failure in equipment/piping at normal operation of the reactor;

**.2** steam generator and secondary piping including shut-off valves fitted on the main steam line and feed-water piping;

**.3** reactor emergency protection system including reactor control and protection system drives and monitoring system sensors which generate emergency protection signal and also produce and implement the steam supply system control algorithm according to emergency protection signals;

**.4** primary circulating pump and its cooling pipelines including shut-off valves.

**5.3** The following components are of Safety Class 2:

**.1** primary circuit components which are not part of Safety Class 1;

**.2** equipment and systems required for the following:

residual heat removal from the reactor core in case of SC2, SC3 and SC4;

monitoring the release of radioactive materials within the containment;

suppression of excessive hydrogen content within the containment after the accident followed by major leakage/loss of primary coolant;

reactor core cooling and/or decompression in the event of accident (residual heat removal system and core emergency cooling system including emergency power supply, hydro pneumatic cylinders, coolant tanks, etc);

reactor core cooling and/or decompression in the event of accident followed by coolant loss;

making up leakages of primary coolant (make-up system);

performing any other junctions which may be of similar importance for safety;

**.3** steam supply system control and monitoring system;

**.4** power supply systems and equipment for steam supply system control systems and reactor control and protection system;

**.5** containment air purification system from the primary circuit to the containment;

**.6** overpressure protection means and system for removing primary coolant from safety valves not related to Safety Class 1.

**5.4** The following components belong to Safety Class 3:

**.1** any safety systems of steam supply system or their components not related to Safety Classes 1 and 2;

**.2** auxiliary systems for maintaining safety systems: Lubricating oil systems, hydraulic systems, sea water cooling systems (equipment), compressed air systems, emergency power supply fuel system for core emergency cooling system;

.3 sea water cooling system performing safety functions to meet the basic design criterion B;

.4 systems which are not directly associated with safety but failure of these systems may result in release of radioactive materials into environment and normally requiring appropriate waiting time to reduce radioactivity.

**5.5** Safety Class 4 components are given below:

.1 feed-water and secondary vapor system downstream of the second shutoff valves not related to Safety Classes 2 and 3;

.2 turbines, condensers and turbogenerators not related to Safety Classes 1, 2 and 3;

.3 other equipment which failure may directly lead to SC2;

**5.6** The system and its components of appropriate safety class shall be related to corresponding design class (DC1 to DC4).

Every design class provides specific design, manufacture and test standards based on consequences of failure for ship's safety.

Numbers of design classes are not required to correspond to safety classes.

**5.7** Higher level design standards and tougher requirements for quality control shall be applied to equipment of Design Class 1. The following basic provisions shall be observed.

**5.7.1** Strength shall be calculated in accordance with standards approved by the Register. The following shall be taken into account for calculations:

stable pressure loads including test pressure loads;

variations in pressure during startup, operation and deactivation, pressure fluctuations caused by ship roll in a seaway, constant and variable thermal loads;

dynamic loads in accidents followed by coolant loss acting on supporting structures and internal components of the reactor;

dynamic forces caused by pipe rupture with two-sided coolant escape;

dynamic forces caused by any design-basis accidents of SC 3 and SC4;

Ship's vibration effect;

loads at ship/floating facility static heel of max. 30°, roll angles of max. 45° and trim of max. 10°.

Support reaction forces at roll of the ship/floating facility due to accidents followed by pipe rupture, actions of quick-closing valves and vibration under way shall be determined in the course of strength calculations.

If resonance oscillations due to vibration under way are excluded, these calculations are not required. In this case, appropriate evidence shall be submitted to the Register.

Static strength, brittle fracture resistance, low-cycle and radiation service durability of equipment components shall be evaluated.

**5.7.2** When selecting materials, the following shall be taken into account:

their physical, chemical and mechanical properties (ductility, strength, brittle-to-ductile transition temperature, intergranular corrosion susceptibility, weldability, radiation resistance, etc);

force actions under operating conditions (alternating loads, shocks, vibrations, pressure, temperature, radiation exposure, working fluids corrosive action, etc).

The materials to be applied shall be approved by the Register.

**5.7.3** Design requirements:

pressure vessels shall be welded with lull penetration, holes and flanges shall be fitted with stiffeners to prevent unacceptable stress concentrations.

**5.7.4** Manufacturing process and quality control:

all components of Safety Class 1 shall be manufactured as per the approved procedure;

during manufacture all welds shall be subject to non-destructive testing. All components shall be also subject to non-destructive testing in the required scope in order to detect surface and internal defects and cracks. Test results shall be recorded into logbooks and operating documents and shall be further used for assessing the equipment state during non-destructive testing when surveying ships in service;

all pressure vessels as well as pressurized bodies of pumps and engines shall be subject to hydraulic test upon completion of manufacture;

cavities and surfaces shall be clean and be checked for hygiene as per approved standards.

**5.8** Higher level design standards and tougher requirements for quality control shall be applied to equipment of Design Class 2. The following provisions shall be observed

**5.8.1** Strength shall be calculated in accordance with the RS Rules or documents approved by the Register.

Structures and their supports shall be capable of withstanding static and dynamic loads due to variations in operating parameters and ship motion in a seaway.

Pipelines with working fluid temperature of 120 °C and above shall be capable of withstanding static pressure and temperature loads with factors accounting for dynamic loads due to ship rolls under different loading conditions. Pipelines of small diameter shall meet requirements of Part V "Systems and Piping" of the RS Rules.

**5.8.2** Materials shall be selected, tested and surveyed to meet requirements of these Rules and the RS Rules.

**5.8.3** Pressure vessels and pipelines shall be designed, manufactured and tested as per requirements of the RS Rules or approved provisions for high- temperature steam piping.

**5.9** Equipment of design class 3 shall meet requirements of the RS Rules applicable to boilers, heat exchangers and pressure vessels.

**5.10** Equipment of design class 4 shall be in compliance with design, manufacture and test standards approved by the Register with regard to inertial forces affecting this equipment.

**5.11** Cyclic loads shall be taken into account in the design process of steam supply system equipment.

Assessment of effect of every accident and every test shall be conducted to identify the remaining safety service life for the primary equipment with respect to cyclic loads.

## 6 STATE CLASSES

**6.1** When designing steam supply system, arrangements to ensure its safety and reliability shall be provided at regulated state of steam supply system and ship/floating facility as well as according to weather and other environmental effects.

**6.2** Four classes (see [Section 3](#), Part III "Safety Standards") are established to assess the state of steam supply system (including emergency one) depending on frequency and consequences of events/faults and failures for equipment to be considered in the steam supply system design.

**6.3** SC1: normal state when steam supply system may be operated in any prescribed mode. In such a state, failures in some equipment components may occur. These failures do not affect plant safety operation and do not impose any restrictions to operation of the installation.

The following operating modes of steam supply system are included into SC1:

- .1 startup;
- .2 operation at prescribed power;
- .3 mooring trials and sea trials;
- .4 routine preventive inspections and maintenance;
- .5 variable modes;
- .6 exposure to bad weather conditions;
- .7 sorbent handling;
- .8 stoppage;
- .9 neutronic and thermohydraulic measurements;
- .10 recharging of reactor core.

**6.4** SC2: state of steam supply system in any prescribed mode. In such a state, there may be failures or malfunctions of equipment due to some faults or operator's errors imposing timing constraints on steam supply system operation (power reduction or short-term deactivation).

SC2 includes steam supply system operating modes in case of occasional failures in equipment or scheduled actions during such abnormal operating conditions including:

.1 failure or malfunction of machinery or device which results in variation in primary coolant parameters/maneuverability of ship/self-propelled floating facility, for example: Shutdown of power generator, turbine, condenser, fresh water heat exchanger, termination of sea water supply, closure of valves on the main pipeline, failure in the main electric system, shutdown of feed-water pump;

- .2 unintended startup of feed-water pump/primary circulating pump;
- .3 change in core reactivity as a result of cold water supply;
- .4 sticking of one or more control valves of reactor control and protection system or failure in emergency protection drive;
- .5 reactor emergency protection actuation;
- .6 shutdown/failure in primary circulating pump when other pumps are operational;
- .7 failure in control (turbine, feed-water, water flow regulators, etc);
- .8 minor leakage in primary coolant circulating system;
- .9 actuation of secondary safety valve.

**6.5** SC3 is defined as an emergency state of steam supply system which may require its deactivation. The following rare accidents are included into SC3:

.1 failure in tightness of primary coolant system which results in pressure drop in the system and requires such measures as containment isolation, primary circuit make-up and reactor deactivation;

- .2 termination of forced circulation of primary coolant;
- .3 failure in secondary feed-water supply;
- .4 grounding and stranding of ship/floating facility with no failure in heat removal from reactor in case of intact ship/floating facility;

.5 ship/floating facility collisions followed by flooding of two adjacent watertight compartments;

.6 fire/explosion on board the ship/floating facility which does not result in damaged reactor compartment;

.7 fire in engine compartment/central control station;

.8 accidents due to rare bad weather conditions and natural disasters in the planned navigation area/docking area of the ship/floating facility. These accidents are too unlikely to occur;

.9 temporary blackout of the main electric system.

**6.6** SC4 is defined as a very occasional severe emergency state of steam supply system requiring its urgent deactivation SC4 includes very occasional accidents where some power sources are capable of operation on board the ship/ floating facility:

.1 accident followed by integrity failure/depressurization of fuel element cladding, failure in heat removal and primary coolant loss;

.2 grounding and stranding of ship/floating facility followed by periodic loss of capability of heat removal to coolant;

.3 extremely occasional severe weather conditions and natural disasters;

.4 grounding or stranding of ship/floating facility with local damage to double bottom over its height or with the long-length damage to the bottom;

.5 ship/floating facility collisions followed by fire and/or explosion on board the ship;

.6 rupture of the main steam line/steam line within the shielding barrier;

.7 flooding of ship/floating facility in shallow waters (up to the upper deck);

.8 helicopter crash in the area of the reactor compartment and/or nuclear fuel storage facilities.

**6.7** According to [2.2](#), Part III "Safety Standards", the effects of extremely occasional events followed by total loss of operability of all ship's power sources (capsizing, flooding, grounding and stranding with the heel above 30°) shall be considered in the design. The effects of these events are not governed by these Rules.

## 7 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

**7.1** Analysis of possible accidents shall be performed for SC2 to SC4. The analysis results shall be specified in designs of steam generating unit and ship/ floating facility and presented in Information on Safety.

**7.2** Analysis of possible accidents shall be approved by the Register and shall include the following:

- .1** conditions at the beginning of an accident, initial data for analysis;
- .2** preventive measures, guidelines on systems and equipment being activated by steam supply system protection systems including reactor control and protection systems and other measures to be taken by personnel;
- .3** data on analysis procedures, physical and mathematical models, experimental data and computer codes;
- .4** assumptions and theory of calculated radiation effects (for example, increase in primary coolant specific activity in case of failure in fuel assemblies cladding, efficiency of coolant purification, its leakage, radioactivity propagation factor, doses);
- .5** data for assessing propagation range of radioactive materials into surrounding air (radioactive materials emission height above the upper deck, weather conditions);
- .6** description of accident development including predicted representation of radiation and other effects;
- .7** measures to prevent failures in safety systems due to one reason;
- .8** measures to protect personnel on board the ship/floating facility during accident.

**7.3** For making assumptions on accident occurrence and sequence of events it is required to take into account provisions of [Section 6](#), Part III "Safety Standards". These assumptions shall be based on the following.

**7.3.1** Systems and arrangements specified in [10.7](#) shall remain operational in the event of single failure.

**7.3.2** The stand-by subsystem of safety system shall not be considered as operational in the event of single failure in case it may be repaired during reactor operation as per its Operating Manual.

**7.3.3** Protective arrangements shall automatically actuate upon start of reactor accident. If operator's actions are required, it should be considered that they are not possible within the first 30 minutes. Operator's actions shall not obstruct normal operation of protection systems. The steam supply system shall be shown to be in safe condition when no operator's actions are taken for at least 30 min after accident.

**7.3.4** If the results of event being considered cannot be envisaged in a definite manner, the appropriate safety factors shall be adopted in assessment of possible accidents.

**7.4** When assessing effects of possible accidents, their long-term effects shall be also considered. They shall be specified in the design documents.

**7.5** When analyzing possible accidents in steam supply systems, it is required to consider the events coming as result of accidents on board the ship/ floating facility. Despite of collision, grounding and stranding protection as required by [Part IV "Hull"](#), the following concepts shall be accepted in analyzing specific accidents in steam supply system related to accidents on board the ship/floating facility.

**7.5.1** In case of collisions or grounding and stranding, the ship gets damaged to the maximum extent as accepted in [2.1, Part V "Subdivision"](#).

All equipment located within the damage reaches including equipment located in flooded spaces shall be considered as non-operational. Equipment designed specifically for underwater operations may be considered as operational if its power supply units are shown as remaining operational.

**7.5.2** It is assumed that the ship/floating facility is sunk with reactor disabled and is flooded up to the level above the upper continuous deck (flooding in shallow water). Shielding

barrier and containment remain unflooded unless special-purpose equipment is provided for flooding these spaces at such a depth. Hydrostatic pressure stabilizing devices fitted on the containment, if any, may remain non operational and the ship/floating facility may remain at inclinations as defined in [2.1, Part VI "Machinery Installations"](#).

**7.5.3** When the ship is flooded at deep water, at least criterion A specified in [6.1.1, Part III "Safety Standards"](#) shall be met.

Radioactivity shall be efficiently retained for a long period to ensure minimum possible release of radioactive materials by keeping at least one significant structural barrier of sufficient leak tightness and corrosion resistance around highly radioactive sources.

**7.5.4** The development of flooding process in terms of timing shall be considered regarding that the reactor got plugged before immersion of the ship/ floating facility.

**7.5.5** Horizontal components of shock loads due to collisions, grounding and stranding shall be determined based on analysis. Conclusions shall be given in the design document (see [5.2, Part IV "Hull"](#)).

**7.5.6** According to [3.2, Part III "Safety Standards"](#), capsizing of the ship/ floating facility shall be considered. The conditions of heat removal from the reactor core of capsized ship/floating facility shall be analyzed and the results shall be given in Information on Safety.

**7.5.7** Ship grounding and stranding with heel as specified in [2.1, Part VII "Machinery Installations and Machinery "](#) shall be evaluated with regard to the following:

- .1 loss of ability to intake sea water through board and bottom openings;
- .2 grounding and stranding in tidal waters with regular interruption of sea water supply;
- .3 grounding and stranding of ship/floating facility with heel above 30° shall be considered in terms of possible effects not regulated by these Rules.

**7.5.8** Fires and explosions on board the ship shall be analyzed with regard to the following:

- .1 it may be accepted that fire originates from a single source in any compartment with combustibles;
- .2 the analysis shall reveal that appropriate structural fire protection, fire alarm and extinguishing systems which ensure sufficient protection of reactor safety system are provided;
- .3 if cargo holds/tanks may be subject to fire/explosion hazards, these cases shall be analyzed and based on analysis results it shall be proven that reactor safety is not impaired;
- .4 collisions followed by fire and/or explosion shall be analyzed as well as impact of long-term fires on radiation safety shall be addressed;
- .5 if the ship/floating facility is fitted with helicopter, the effects of helicopter crash on board the ship/floating facility shall be analyzed. It is to be proved that this accident followed by fire will not impair the safety of ship/floating facility.

**7.6** Accidents in steam supply system which may result in hazardous situation for people/environment on board the ship/floating facility shall be classified by states and marked as main design-basis accidents.

**7.7** Accidents in equipment, machinery, systems and devices of steam supply systems included into SC2, SC3 and SC4 shall be analyzed. Particularly, the following cases shall be analyzed and results shall be specified in Information on Safety:

- .1 deactivation of any single reactor control or parts of reactor control and protection system from the core which are being driven by common drive or controlled from common control device with maximum possible speed at any initial state (cold/hot), in any conditions of subcritical or critical core regardless of its power;
- .2 leakage of primary coolant into second circuit via loose joints of piping of steam generator with regard to possible isolation of steam and feed-water lines after increase in activity in the second circuit Predicted dose rates in the engine compartment shall be specified in Information on Safety and in Operating Manual for the steam supply system;

.3 sticking of reactor control and protection system control valves in any position by height in the core and under the worst conditions for nuclear fuel burn-up or failure in core control rod drive;

.4 unintended startup of primary circulating pump with injection of cold water into the reactor;

.5 cold water supply to the reactor from make-up systems, feed-water systems or other sources with maximum possible water flow;

.6 pressure increase in primary coolant system due to stoppage of vapor removal;

.7 unintended decrease in neutron poison concentration in the primary coolant;

.8 possible failures in reactor power control system;

.9 loss of ability for sea water heat removal;

.10 accidents followed by loss of primary coolant.

.11 leakage of primary coolant out of storage for primary water drainage.

7.8 When analyzing the loss of ability for heat removal, the following shall be taken into account:

.1 stoppage of main turbine;

.2 failure in main condenser without using auxiliary condenser unless it is operating/or in stand-by mode;

.3 failure in the feed-water pump, closure of feed-water line or other failure in secondary feed-water line;

.4 failure to use one of reactor cooling ducts when the ship/floating facility is berthed.

7.9 Accidents followed by primary coolant loss shall be analyzed with regard to the following:

.1 possible rupture of any primary pipe except for reactor body branches;

.2 coolant loss rate through the assumed damaged pipe shall correspond to the two-sided coolant escape rate unless it may be proven that there is a sufficient restriction of broken pipe ends motion or other two-side coolant escape means are provided;

.3 accident followed by primary coolant loss shall be considered as maximum design-basis accident with regard to the following:

stresses in containment structure and its systems shall be within the specified limits and design pressure shall be taken with appropriate margin of estimated pressure.

radiation effects shall be within those as specified in [Part XII "Radiation Safety"](#);

The reactor core and its fuel elements shall be capable of withstanding thermal and mechanical loads and possible deformations shall not exclude heat removal by circulating coolant.

Variation in position of the ship/floating facility due to wind and sea states as accepted for SC1 and SC2 in the design process shall not impair actuation of coolant removal tanks from safety valves and pressure drop tanks;

.4 when analyzing the accident followed by coolant loss, the following initial or boundary conditions shall be considered:

one subsystem of emergency cooling system supplies the coolant to the damaged piping rather than to reactor body;

the second subsystem is being repaired (if core emergency cooling system may be maintained in service according to design);

single failure may occur in the operating system;

The reactor is switched off and maintained in safe condition for 30 minutes after the event is originated;

with steam supply system automatic and remote control system the operator may activate safety systems;

chemical reactions (for example, hydrogen and zirconium reactions) proceed;

only those systems remain operational which are specially designed for operation in case of accidents with coolant loss.

**7.10** Whenever necessary, loss of secondary vapor/feed-water after main steam line/feed-water line is completely ruptured shall be considered as the main design-basis accident. In any case, impact on such an accident on the reactor shall be evaluated and described in Information on Safety.

**7.11** Failure in active component or control error of radioactive waste treatment system shall be addressed. This failure/error shall not impair safety junctions of the system for SC3 and SC4.

**7.12** Analysis of impact of any failure in critical element of electric installation on steam supply system shall be performed based on single failure criterion.

Total blackout of main electric installation shall be considered as the main design-basis accident.

## **8 POWER SOURCES FOR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM**

**8.1** For requirements to power sources for steam supply system, refer to [Part X "Electrical Equipment"](#).

## **9 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS**

**9.1** When designing steam supply system, different environmental effects specified in [Section 8](#), Part III "Safety Standards" shall be analyzed.

## 10 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

**10.1** If the ship/floating facility is fitted with two steam supply systems, they shall operate independently and ensure operation of nuclear power unit regardless of the other steam supply system.

**10.2** The equipment of steam supply system shall be secured to prevent its displacement in case of variation in ship's position up to and including capsizing.

**10.3** The core emergency cooling system, residual heat removal system and reactor protection system shall be tested for capability of performing their intended functions. The operating reactor shall be tested without temporary deactivation of safety functions and failure in system operation.

**10.4** Liquid and gas systems as well as pressure vessels shall be provided with arrangements required for the following purposes:

- .1 filling systems and vessels after initial installation, alteration or repairs;
- .2 initial pressure test;
- .3 overpressure protection;
- .4 regular inspections and pressure tests;
- .5 system isolation;
- .6 survey procedure;
- .7 checking thermo dynamical parameters.

**10.5** Automatically controlled system critical for operation and safety of steam supply system shall be also equipped with manual local or remote controls.

**10.6** Reactor safety systems shall be capable of automatic activation as soon as events requiring quick response start.

Automatically activated systems shall be capable of keeping reactor plant in safe condition for at least 30 min without operator's assistance.

Safety systems may be controlled manually provided that operator's error does not impair normal operation of these systems and does not impede proper actuation of protection means.

**10.7** All safety systems shall meet the single failure concept. These systems are given below:

- .1 steam supply system automatic and remote control, protection, monitoring and alarm system (in terms of safety functions);
- .2 residual heat removal system;
- .3 core emergency cooling system;
- .4 containment isolation arrangements;
- .5 primary pressure rise prevention system;
- .6 containment pressure reduction system.

**10.8** Activation time for stand-by equipment shall eliminate probability of accident in the installation.

The adequacy of the accepted redundancy for equipment shall be explained in the steam supply system design.

**10.9** Systems and piping of steam supply system shall be properly secured under normal and emergency conditions. Structure of piping fasteners shall be as such to allow their thermal expansion, where necessary. The distance between piping, systems and fastening surface shall be as such to ensure their proper maintenance and repair.

**10.10** The steam supply system shall be capable of operating at decreased power in case of deactivation of parts of steam generators/steam generating sections, pumps and other equipment of steam supply system as well as parts of pumps, heat exchangers and other equipment of steam-turbine unit.

**10.11** Primary coolant shall properly circulate to ensure proper reactor cooling at any power as stipulated by operating conditions.

**10.12** Steam supply system equipment shall meet requirements regarding hygiene of its cavities and surfaces approved by the Register. Prior to assembly, in the course of assembly and workshop tests, onboard installation, testing and operation, parts, assemblies and items of steam supply system shall be properly cleaned.

**10.13** Equipment to maintain coolant hygiene and quality at a required level during operation of steam supply system as per design standards shall be provided.

**10.14** Filtering elements/substances in filters with radioactive working fluids shall be replaced by reliable shutdown of filters by means of double valves from the system under operating pressure.

**10.15** The ship/floating facility shall be fitted with water preparation equipment for steam supply system. The quality of water shall meet the standards as specified for this steam supply system.

**10.16** The ship shall be provided with equipment to maintain the primary pressure at a required level and its make-up as well as other auxiliary equipment for safe normal operation of steam supply system in all operation modes.

**10.17** It is required to envisage effective means for piping leak tightness continuous monitoring for each steam generator and effective means for deactivation of steam generators/steam generating sections in case of vapor and feed-water.

**10.18** Equipment of steam supply system shall be designed to withstand vibrations as per standards approved by the Register.

**10.19** The list and amount of spare parts for machinery and equipment of steam supply system shall be based on delivery specifications or supplier's specifications approved by the Register.

**10.20** The list and justification for selecting emergency parameters of the installation at which reactor is stopped, shall be given in the steam supply system design.

**10.21** Systems and devices with possible formation of explosive mixture in hazardous concentrations shall be fitted with effective removal system or concentration reduction system.

**10.22** Regulatory documents on welding of structures and equipment of steam supply system and welded joint quality check shall be approved by the Register.

**10.23** Steam supply system equipment intended for technical supervision by the Register shall be subjected to load test on Manufacturer's test bench as per procedures approved by the Register upon completion of manufacturing, assembling, adjustment and running-in. After these the equipment may be fitted on board the ship/floating facility.

**10.24** Prototypes of equipment shall be tested as per procedures which ensure testing for reliability, long-term operability and compliance with operating conditions.

**10.25** The steam supply system and its equipment installed on board the ship/floating facility shall be subject to mooring and sea trials as per procedures approved by the Register.

**10.26** Cases of machinery, equipment, devices, vessels and units shall be stamped as per Instructions on Stamping the Items Under Technical Supervision of the Register given in Part I "General Regulations for Technical Supervision" of the Rules for Technical Supervision During Construction of Ships and Manufacture of Materials and Products for Ships.

## **11 REACTOR CORE**

**11.1** Reactor core shall ensure continuous effective reactor operation in the specified operating and transient modes as well as interrupted operation when number of startups is not less than permissible value per core life.

**11.2** Core components and structure shall be designed as to prevent reactor uncontrolled runaway and nuclear accident in all operating and emergency states of installation and ship/floating facility.

**11.3** The core shall be designed as to ensure safe movement of devices for its operation at any permissible powers permitted by the designer in case of reactor startups and stops.

**11.4** When designing the core, permissible limits for damages to core components shall be specified and justified.

The core shall be designed as to prevent release of radioactive materials from core components in concentrations exceeding the specified limits during manufacture, testing, storage and operation in the reactor till total exhaust of energy.

**11.5** Fuel assemblies as well as core control and protection components shall be designed as to account for material properties, exposure effects, physical and chemical processes, static and dynamic loads for all states of the plant, roll effects of the ship/floating facility, manufacture tolerances and uncertainties in calculations, effect of deposits on heat-emitting surfaces on heat removal efficiency.

**11.6** The structure, shape and dimensions of the core and its components shall allow for their effective cooling for SC1 to SC4.

**11.7** There shall be safety margins for abnormal conditions of coolant consumption due to loss of power of circulating pumps or for other reasons.

**11.8** To detect damages of core components, means for permanent monitoring of primary coolant radioactivity shall be provided.

**11.9** When estimating core thermal loads, the appropriate inaccuracy in calculations shall be taken into account. Thermal margins shall be selected as operating restrictions. Estimated heat transfer values at limiting transient processes shall be verified experimentally.

**11.10** The calculated distributions of coolant flow through fuel assemblies shall be provided. The calculations shall account for variation in coolant flow and heat transfer with the roll of the ship/floating facility. Safety factors envisaged in calculations shall account for inaccuracy of similar calculations.

**11.11** Calculation results/test data confirming availability or non-availability of vibration in the core and its supports due to coolant hydraulic flows shall be presented.

## **12 REACTOR**

**12.1** The reactor shall ensure effective and stable operation under operating conditions stipulated by the design for all design loads.

**12.2** The reactor load shall be increased and decreased at a rate to ensure sufficient maneuverability of the ship/self-propelled nuclear floating facility.

**12.3** The reactor, actuating controls, adjusters and protective elements shall be designed to prevent unintended variation in reactivity in the event of roll, heel, capsizing, vibrations, shocks and other prescribed dynamic loads.

**12.4** The reactor shall be capable of being switched to subcritical state from any power for all positions of the ship/floating facility including capsizing.

**12.5** The reactor shall be designed to prevent free drainage of the coolant: All branches on reactor body shall be arranged at the level above the upper cut of the core.

**12.6** The reactor shall meet applicable nuclear safety requirements in respect of marine reactors as agreed upon with Register.

**12.7** The reactor shall be designed to allow for safety handling of the core.

**12.8** The reactor shall be designed to allow for visual internal survey and survey by means of remote/non-destructive testing.

### **13 PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM**

**13.1** Equipment, pipelines, valves and fittings forming the primary coolant system shall comply in full with requirements as applied to Safety Class 1 and 2 equipment.

**13.2** Means for detection of primary coolant leakage shall be provided.

**13.3** The primary circuit shall be designed with sufficient safety factor to ensure ductility of walls under stresses due to operation, maintenance, testing and emergency conditions adopted in the design. The safety factor shall account for impact of operating temperature on walls and radiation effects on material properties as well as other effects available in these conditions.

**13.4** When selecting materials and manufacturing procedures, the following shall be taken into account:

- .1 compatibility with working fluids;
- .2 corrosive and erosive action of coolant, washing and decontamination fluids;
- .3 forming of components with large half-life period;
- .4 impact of neutron exposure on material properties.

**13.5** The primary circuit shall be fitted with automatic arrangements which prevent its overpressure. The choice of these arrangements is justified in the design. At least two of these shall be provided for installation of safety valves/ devices. Fluid from actuation of these valves/devices shall be drained into overpressure protected container as agreed upon with the Register.

**13.5.1** Safety valves shall have sufficient capacity to prevent pressure increase by more than 10 % as compared to the design pressure for all main design-basis accidents if one valve fails to actuate.

**13.5.2** Usage of burst diaphragms instead of valves is not permitted.

**13.5.3** No shutdown devices of safety valves opening and closing are allowed:

- .1 unless effective locking device capable of automatic opening of auxiliary discharge valve of appropriate capacity is provided;
- .2 unless the nuclear reactor protection system is fitted with shutdown devices upon the pressure increase signal.

**13.5.4** Other equivalent safety valves may be used if the following criteria are met:

- .1 such valves are at least of equal efficiency as compared to safety valves;
- .2 risk is not increasing in quantity;
- .3 primary circuit remains intact for SC1 to SC4 and maximum stresses in the reactor body and in the whole primary circuit are restricted i.e. possible stress will not exceed permissible stresses due to safety factor;
- .4 state classes which include release of coolant into environment (fourth circuit) are taken into account;
- .5 it is proved that Criteria A, B, C specified in [Part III "Safety Standards"](#) are met;
- .6 similar replacement is approved by the Register.

**13.5.5** Evidence confirming that requirements of [13.5.4.1 – 13.5.4.5](#) are met shall be given as a part of Information on Safety.

**13.5.6** Expansion tanks may be located beyond the containment if the spaces where they are located comply with [13.5.4.1 – 13.5.4.5](#), as well as requirements to containment structure (see [Section 6](#), Part IV "Hull").

## **14 SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM**

**14.1** The secondary coolant system shall comply with Part VIII "Systems and Piping" of the RS Rules in addition to provisions specified in these Rules.

**14.2** Steam generators with pipelines and fittings up to the second shut-off stop valve included shall comply with the same design standards and be of the same reliability as the primary equipment.

**14.3** Steam generators with fittings under internal pressure shall be tested as per [Table 2.2, Part II "Classification"](#).

**14.4** Each reactor shall be provided with at least two steam generators or one steam generator with two separate sections capable of being switched off.

**14.5** Secondary steam lines and feed-water pipelines shall be fitted with two shut-off stop devices with draining of water in-between into the protected contained within the controlled area. Stop devices shall be fitted as close as possible to the steam generators. At least one stop device fitted on steam and feed-water pipelines shall be capable of being remotely and locally controlled, the other devices may be locally controlled only. Steam and feed-water pipelines shall be fitted with one automatic stop device which actuates upon the signal of failure in leak tightness of steam generator piping.

**14.6** Provision for washing steam generators shall be provided.

**14.7** In case of multi-section steam generators provision for isolation and disconnection of the non-tight sections shall be envisaged.

**14.8** Means for overpressure protection of secondary coolant system shall be provided.

**14.9** Each steam generator (or assembly of steam generating units connected as to prevent isolation from each other), unless rated for the primary pressure, shall be fitted with at least two safety valves located upstream of the first shut-off valve. Safety valves shall comply with Part X "Boilers, Heat Exchangers and Pressure Vessels" of the RS Rules, as far as applicable.

**14.9.1** Safety valves shall have sufficient capacity to prevent pressure increase by more than 10 % as compared to the design pressure for all main design-basis accidents if at least one valve fails to actuate.

**14.9.2** If leakage of coolant from primary to secondary circuit may result in actuation of safety valves of the secondary circuit, water through these valves shall be drained in a container located within the containment/shielding barrier.

## **15 REMOVING RESIDUAL HEAT FROM REACTOR**

**15.1** The equipment for residual heat removal from the core during normal/emergency shutdown of reactor as well as during core handling and repair shall be provided. The residual heat removal system shall comply with single failure criterion.

**15.2** The residual heat removal system shall remain operational in the course and after all accidents on board the ship except for the following:

- .1** capsizing of the ship/floating facility;
- .2** flooding at a depth where it may be proven that heat may be removed by containment flooding.

**15.3** The residual heat removal system shall remain operational for a period as specified during analysis of operating and emergency situations.

**15.4** The residual heat removal system shall be effective and have sufficient capacity and safety margin for the following purposes:

- .1** to ensure integrity of fuel elements cladding through core cooling in case of SC1 and SC2;
- .2** to ensure core cooling in case of SC3 and SC4 and to prevent exceeded permissible exposure of persons and environmental pollution due to damaged claddings of fuel elements.

## **16 CORE EMERGENCY COOLING**

**16.1** Core emergency cooling system is a safety system.

**16.1.1** This system shall comply with single failure criterion.

**16.1.2** This system shall maintain, as far as practicable, integrity of fuel elements after maximum design-basis accident followed by reactor stoppage. Core coolant supply means shall ensure effective operation until residual heat removal means appear to be capable of removing the remaining continuous heat release of the core.

**16.1.3** In case hydro pneumatic cylinders are used for core emergency cooling, they shall be fitted with safety valves, gas pressure and water level indicators. Sources for maintaining gas cushion in such vessels shall be provided.

**16.1.4** All switches of core emergency cooling system other than the main switch, shall be mechanically locked in a position required for system operation.

**16.1.5** The core emergency cooling systems shall be controlled from central control station.

**16.1.6** Machinery, devices and fittings of core emergency cooling systems shall be accessible for testing and operability checks.

**16.2** Emergency cooling systems in multiple-reactor steam supply systems shall be completely separated unless it is shown in the design that using them- assemblies in different reactors does not impair the capability of this system to perform its intended functions.

## **17 SYSTEMS AND PIPING**

**17.1** Systems and piping of Safety Classes 1 and 2 shall comply with the following requirements.

**17.1.1** Strength of systems and pipelines shall be estimated based on then-safety classes as per procedures approved by the Register.

**17.1.2** Design pressure and temperature shall be selected based on analysis of operating modes of steam supply system.

**17.1.3** Pipes and fittings shall be made of easy-to-weld, corrosion- and erosion resistant materials which are non-susceptible to intergranular corrosion and which maintain their strength and ductility when exposed to radioactive radiation during operation on board the ship/floating facility. The materials shall be capable of being decontaminated.

**17.1.4** System piping shall be made of seamless pipes.

**17.1.5** Pipeline connections located in the containment and outside it up to the second shut-off valve shall be welded.

**17.1.6** Structure, welding and test of piping welded joints as well as welded joints of branches shall be performed as per welding provisions and rules for testing welded joints approved by the Register.

**17.1.7** If non-radioactive fluid is to be supplied to the piping with radioactive fluid, the intake pipe shall be fitted with non-return and stop valves.

**17.1.8** The system fittings and valves shall be fitted with welded neck flanges and typically with bellows sealing.

**17.1.9** Piping shall be thermally insulated with regard to possibility of decontamination.

**17.1.10** Materials and structure of thermal insulation shall be approved by the Register. Thermal insulation shall be of non-combustible materials.

**17.1.11** Upon final treatment at workshop and installation on board the ship/floating facility, pipes and fittings shall be subject to hydraulic test at the test pressure and to leak tightness test. Standards for hydraulic tests shall be agreed upon with the Register.

**17.2** Systems and piping of safety classes 3 and 4 shall comply with Part VIII "Systems and Piping" of the RS Rules.

**17.3** All pipelines penetrating the containment shall comply with [3.3](#) and [3.4](#), Part VII "Machinery Installations and Machinery".

**17.4** Fittings and valves of equipment, systems and pipelines of steam supply system shall be fitted with local position indicators and legible nameplates. Remotely controlled fittings and valves shall be additionally fitted with devices for its local control from the point of its location. Fittings and valves to be controlled from central control station shall be additionally marked similarly to the console marking.

## **18 HEAT EXCHANGERS AND PRESSURE VESSELS**

**18.1** Heat exchangers and pressure vessels shall be designed with regard to their safety class.

**18.2** Heat exchangers and pressure vessels of Safety Classes 1 and 2 except for the reactor shall meet the following requirements.

**18.2.1** Strength of heat exchangers and pressure vessels shall be estimated as per procedures approved by the Register.

**18.2.2** Sealing procedures for main connectors shall be approved by the Register.

**18.2.3** Cases of heat exchangers and pressure vessels shall be adapted for hydrostatic tests.

**18.2.4** Heat exchangers and pressure vessels except for the primary circuit, shall be protected against unacceptable pressure increase by means of safety devices, where necessary.

**18.2.5** It is allowed not to install safety devices on heat exchangers and pressure vessels of Safety Classes 1 and 2 if they are connected to the vessel fitted with safety devices through non-isolated pipes.

**18.2.6** Heat exchangers and pressure vessels shall be made of easy-to-weld, corrosion- and erosion resistant materials which are non-susceptible to intergranular corrosion and which maintain their strength and ductility when exposed to radioactive radiation during operation on board the ship/floating facility. The materials shall be capable of being decontaminated and approved by the Register.

**18.2.7** Structure, welding and test of welds of heat exchangers and pressure vessels shall be performed as per welding provisions and rules for testing welds approved by the Register. All welds shall be subject to non-destructive testing.

**18.2.8** Upon manufacture and installation on board the ship/floating facility, heat exchangers and pressure vessels shall be subject to hydraulic tests at test pressure and leak tightness test as per standards for hydrostatic test approved by the Register.

**18.2.9** Prior to applying insulation/protective coating to heat exchangers and pressure vessels, they shall be subject to hydrostatic tests and other mechanical strength tests.

**18.3** Heat exchangers and pressure vessels of Safety Classes 1 to 4 shall also comply with Part X "Boilers, Heat Exchangers and Pressure Vessels" of the RS Rules to the extent to which these Rules are complied with.

## 19 CONTROL AND PROTECTION SYSTEM

**19.1** The control and protection system shall be provided for the following purposes:

- .1** continuous monitoring of the reactor operating state;
- .2** automatic and remote control of steam supply system which prevents exceeding of reactor design specifications critical for safety;
- .3** automatic and remote control of reactor at a given power;
- .4** perception of emergency state signals and activation of systems and equipment critical for safety.

**19.2** The control and protection system shall be redundant in terms of safety junctions and be able to perform its intended junctions assuming the single failure.

**19.3** The control and protection system shall ensure proper control of reactor power as per operating demands of the ship/floating facility for all operating maneuvers under normal and emergency situations and appropriate sea states. The control and protection system shall as far as practicable prevent operating restrictions for the nuclear ship/floating facility not applied to ships of similar dimensions with conventional propulsion plant of the same power.

**19.4** The control and protection system shall receive signals from sensors of parameters measured via different channels, including neutron flow.

Parameters critical for reactor control shall not be measured via one channel.

**19.5** The control and protection system shall be capable of being in-service tested without impairing safety.

**19.6** The reactor adjusters shall be designed to ensure automatic and remote control of the reactor.

**19.7** Means for testing operability of each channel of the reactor control and protection system and means for detecting faulty components shall be provided.

**19.8** To detect faults/accidents in the reactor, at least two naturally different parameters characterizing the operating process shall be tested. In case it is unreasonable or impracticable, additional redundancy shall be envisaged for variable parameters in the test channel.

**19.9** Devices of reactor protection system required for monitoring in SC3 and SC4 shall remain operational in such conditions.

**19.10** The light signal shall be supplied in case of failure or damage to the channel of the reactor control and protection system.

**19.11** Basic design provisions for reactivity control to be taken into account for design process.

**19.11.1** Events which may result in unintended increase in reactivity shall be very occasional as specified in [Section 3](#), Part III "Safety Standards" and shall not result in situations more hazardous for the crew, population and environment than mentioned in [Part XII "Radiation Safety"](#).

**19.11.2** The anticipated accidents of reactivity change shall not result in spontaneous chain reaction or depressurization of primary coolant system and impede shutdown of reactor.

**19.11.3** When reactor is operating at power corresponding to running modes of the ship/floating facility, reactivity factor shall be negative with regard to design roll and acceleration of the ship/floating facility.

**19.11.4** Control and protection system shall be capable of shutting down the reactor automatically when the ship/floating facility is inclined up to angle of vanishing stability and maintain the reactor in such state at all angles. In addition, the control and protection system shall actuate automatically if the ship/floating facility is sinking, or its static heel is 45°, or its trim is 10°.

In case of less static heel and trim angles, automatic actuation of control and protection system for reactor shutdown is not required.

**19.12** The control and protection system shall meet the following requirements:

**19.12.1** The system shall comprise at least two independent reliable reactivity control subsystems of different design.

**19.12.2** One subsystem shall be mechanical and have the following features:

**.1** be capable of automatically switching the core to the subcritical state and maintaining it in a cold subcritical state without neutron poison within the core life considering that the most effective control of reactor control and protection system is extracted from the core and may not be inserted again;

**.2** be capable of effectively controlling variations in reactivity and preventing exceeding design restrictions on fuel specifications of the core for any operating and emergency design state;

**.3** contain devices for preventing unintended motions of any control of reactor protection and control system;

**.4** properly operate in case of failure in one stand-by channel which generate signals for actuation of emergency protection including measurements

**.5** reduce reactor power at a rate preventing exceeding any design restrictions upon receipt of the emergency signal;

**.6** display position readings of each neutron poison element on reactor control console;

**.7** be designed to reduce the possibility of unplanned continuous removal of control of reactor control and protection system from the core down to the acceptable level;

**.8** issue sequence of commands to actuators of control and protection system to minimize the possibility of operator's error;

**.9** be fitted with devices for preventing removing controls of control and protection system from the core by abnormal groups or in abnormal order.

**19.12.3** The other reactivity control subsystem shall be capable of switching and maintaining the reactor core in a subcritical state.

**19.12.4** Reactivity control subsystems shall remain completely operational for all design inclinations of the ship/floating facility and ensure functional checks, regular calibrations of device within the measuring power range and tests for proper operation of devices.

**19.12.5** Controls of the reactor control and protection system being inserted into the core shall be capable of maintaining the core in a subcritical state with sufficient margin within its entire life and after total exhaust of energy including periods of maintenance, fuel handling, emergency states of reactor and ship/ floating facility including capsizing and flooding.

**19.12.6** The reactor shall remain operational at powers sufficient for steerability of the ship/self-propelled floating facility under SC1 within the specified energy of the core in case of sticking of the most effective control in the core at energy level of power and its failure to be removed from the core except for cases when the core is poisoned with xenon.

**19.12.7** The reactivity control means shall be designed to ensure control from central control station and possibility of switching and maintaining the core in the subcritical state from the emergency cooling station.

**19.13** To prevent unplanned variations in reactivity due to moderator density variation, means for estimation and control of power arbitrary fluctuations and variations within the reactor core shall be provided unless calculation results prove that such fluctuations are minimum and along with acceptable margins do not result in conditions where limited estimated specifications may be exceeded.

**19.14** For SC2, control and protection system shall switch on the reactor after its short-term shutdown at the specified time to ensure maneuverability of the ship/self-propelled floating facility without impairing safety.

**19.15** Failure in any control shall not impede safe stoppage of the reactor.

**19.16** The control and protection system shall be located as to ensure total monitoring and control of reactor for SC1, SC2, SC3 from central control station as well as reactor shutdown and control its state from the navigation bridge or from emergency cooling control station.

**19.17** Reactor emergency cooling control station located away from the central control station shall be provided for the following purposes:

**.1** independent shutdown of the reactor. The reactor may also be shutdown from the other continuously manned station;

**.2** possibility of further independent reactor cooling;

**.3** monitoring reactor state and primary circuit and maintaining the reactor in a cold state as well as indication on reactivity control position.

**19.18** Measures to prevent effects caused by incorrect operator's actions shall be provided in the control system.

**19.19** Where locking devices for emergency protection actuation are permitted by design, these locking devices shall be clearly marked on the reactor control station. Generally, locking devices for emergency protection actuation are not required in control and protection system.

**19.20** In addition to automatic and remote control, drives of control and protection system shall be manually controlled directly from the point of their location. The direction of manual handle rotation and appropriate direction of motion of controls (control and protection system) shall be clearly marked.

## **20 INSTRUMENTS**

**20.1** Instruments shall be provided to ensure equipment performance in normal operational conditions and during design-basis accidents.

**20.2** These shall include instruments ensuring reliable measurements of the parameters characterizing the operating conditions and the system's operation control.

**20.3** The most critical parameters of the steam supply system shall be automatically recorded by appropriate instruments with time and date indication.

**20.4** Instruments of control and protection system shall ensure continuous measurement of neutron flow (including reactor startup period) from minimum controlled power to the maximum design power of the reactor.

**20.5** Instruments of control and protection system shall be redundant and separated from the instruments designed for measuring the parameters and testing operation of systems.

**20.6** Instruments (including cables and penetrations) located in the containment and performing the following safety-related functions shall remain operational during design-basis accidents:

- emergency stoppage of the reactor and its maintaining in the subcritical state;
- emergency heat removal from the reactor;
- maintenance of radioactive materials and ionizing radiation within design limits;
- equipment, fittings, valves and automation means are listed in [Appendix 4](#).

**20.7** Instruments, cables and equipment shall be located and backed up so as to ensure the operability of reactor protection system instruments in case of design-basis accidents.

**20.8** Indicating gauges shall be marked with the limiting values and the setting range.

**20.9** Measuring channels shall be fitted with built-in automatic self-test system.

**20.10** Alarm shall be installed actuating in case of faults of measuring channels and instruments.

**20.11** The structure of the control system shall be such as to ensure prompt and precise estimation of the steam supply system condition.

## **21 SURVEYS**

**21.1** Steam supply system and its equipment shall be subject to technical supervision by the Register in the process of design, manufacturing and testing as well as during construction and testing, operation and repair of the ship/floating facility.

**21.2** For the scope, intervals of surveys to be conducted by the Register as well as procedure for issuing documents by the Register, see Part I "Classification" of the RS Rules, Rules for the Classification Surveys of Ships in Service and these Rules as well as Guidelines on Technical Supervision of Ships in Service, Guidelines on Technical Supervision During Construction of Nuclear Ships and Floating Facilities, Nuclear Support Vessels and Manufacture of Materials and Products.

## **PART IX. SPECIAL SYSTEMS**

### **1 SCOPE OF TECHNICAL SUPERVISION**

**1.1** This Part contains the requirements for special systems of nuclear ships and floating facilities. The systems shall meet the requirements stated in Part VIII "Systems and Piping" of the RS Rules, unless otherwise specified herein.

**1.2** The following systems are subject to the Register technical supervision:

- .1** controlled area drain system;
- .2** compressed air and hydraulic steam supply system service systems;
- .3** containment pressure reducing system;
- .4** special ventilation.

## **2 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS**

**2.1** The pipelines outside the containment which contain or might contain radioactive substances shall be fitted with double shut-off valves and leakage detectors. In the pipelines with diameter more than 15 mm provision is to be made that one of shut-off valves is remotely operated and actuated automatically in when necessary.

**2.2** As a rule there shall not be connections between ship's general systems and systems which contain or might contain radioactive substances. If such connections are inevitable, they shall be fitted with double shut-off valves, and drainage is to be provided for the pipeline section between the valves.

**2.3** The systems carrying radioactive media shall be fitted with glandless instruments and bellows sealed fittings.

### **3 SPECIAL BILGE SYSTEM FOR CONTROLLED AREA**

**3.1** The controlled area special bilge system is to be provided with means capable to prevent emission of radioactive fluids.

**3.2** The controlled area special bilge system shall be independent of the ship's bilge system. The system shall be designed for operation under state classes SC1 to SC4. Compartments shall be drained into special containers, named montejus tanks.

**3.3** The special bilge system pipelines within the controlled area shall be made of seamless pipes. All the connections of such pipelines shall be welded.

**3.4** The pipelines shall be made of corrosion-resistant materials.

**3.5** The pumps and pipelines shall be provided with biological protection, if necessary.

**3.6** The scuppers within the controlled area shall be fitted with mesh (lattice).

#### **4 COMPRESSED AIR AND HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS FOR REACTOR SERVICE**

**4.1** The compressed air systems for service of critical auxiliary equipment of the steam supply system or to be used for control purposes shall be supplied with air from two independent compressors, each compressor shall be capable of keeping the system operational.

**4.2** Every compressed air system operating as a part of the reactor safety system shall include at least two separate air cylinders having capacity sufficient for system requirements.

**4.3** Compressed air shall be cleaned and dried and its temperature shall be maintained at a specified level.

**4.4** Requirements in [4.1](#) and [4.2](#) are also applied in general to pumps and hydro pneumatic accumulators and to hydraulic systems to be used for service of critical auxiliary equipment.

## **5 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE REDUCING SYSTEM**

**5.1** If the project provides for the containment pressure reducing system to be actuated in case of emergency release of coolant out of the primary circuit, it shall be capable of maintaining operability in case the main electric generators fail.

**5.2** The system shall remain in permanent readiness and be capable of automatic actuation if increase in containment pressure is above the specified limit.

If proper justification is provided remote actuation of the system may be permitted.

**5.3** If sprinkler systems are used for pressure reducing, they shall be arranged on the principle of hydrophore, except for the case, when it is proven that the system is actuated in time during which pressure in the containment does not reach critical values taking into account a single-failure criterion.

**5.4** When installation on board the ship/floating facility is completed the pressure reducing system and its components shall be tested in operation.

**5.5** Provision is to be made for periodical surveys and trials for structure of pressure reducing system in operation on board the ship/floating facility in service.

**5.6** The pressure reducing system components (expansion tanks, bubbling chambers, etc.) may be located in compartments connected to the containment provided those compartments are similar to the containment structure as related to protection against emission of radioactive substances.

**5.7** The pressure reducing system shall also meet the requirements specified in [5.3](#) and [10.7](#), Part VIII "Nuclear Steam Supply Systems".

## **6 SPECIAL VENTILATION SYSTEM**

**6.1** The ventilation systems of controlled and supervised areas shall be isolated from each other and the rest of ventilation systems installed on board the ship/floating facility.

**6.2** Reduced pressure shall be maintained in the controlled area spaces where radioactive contaminations exist under state classes SC1 and SC2 even with one entrance opened.

Directed air flow shall be provided from spaces where probability of contamination is less into those spaces where probability of contamination is higher.

**6.3** The containment ventilation system structure shall provide for closed-circuit and open-circuit running.

**6.4** The containment ventilation system shall be fitted with automatic shutoff valves for quick closing air channels under emergency states (SC2, SC3 and SC4).

**6.5** Air from the containment shall be discharged via channels equipped with radioactivity monitoring instruments and warning devices.

**6.6** The containment is vented into atmosphere after SC3 and SC4 through special filters providing required rate of air cleaning.

**6.7** Air from the controlled area spaces shall be discharged through a special mast.

**6.8** Layout for ventilation air intake of ship spaces shall be selected so as to prevent intake of discharged radioactive gases.

**6.9** Exhaust and intake ventilation units of the spaces where radioactive contaminations occur or might occur shall be located in isolated enclosures.

**6.10** The provision is to be made for redundancy of ventilation equipment for the controlled area. One of the backup fans shall be started automatically once the running fans fail.

## **PART X. ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT**

### **1 GENERAL**

#### **1.1 Application.**

The electric equipment of nuclear ships/floating facilities shall comply in full with the requirements stated in the RS Rules Part XI, "Electrical Equipment" and requirements herein.

#### **1.2 Definitions and explanations.**

In this Part the following definitions have been adopted.

The emergency electric system of ship/floating facility is an electric system consisting of emergency generators and emergency switchboards independent of the main electric system and intended to supply electric energy to consumers important for safety of the steam supply system and the ship/floating facility as a whole, when the main and stand-by electric energy sources are not available.

The emergency electric energy sources are electric generators intended to supply electric energy to ship's critical consumers when voltage at the main switchboards is not available.

The integrated electric energy system is a system consisting of main and stand-by generators with associated driving motors, transformers, converters and distributors with power lines, intended to supply electric energy to all the ship consumers including electric propulsion systems and other systems depending on the ship's purpose.

The main electric system is a system consisting of main and stand-by electric energy sources and main switchboards intended to supply electric energy to both the steam supply system consumers and all the ship consumers.

The main electric energy sources are sources of electric energy required to maintain the ship/floating facility under normal operating condition and normal habitability conditions with the steam supply system running without engagement of the stand-by or emergency generators.

The uninterrupted power supply units are sources providing uninterrupted supply of electric energy to certain consumers when all the other electric energy sources do not operate.

The stand-by electric energy sources are electric generators independent of the steam supply system to be used in cases of steam supply system failure or in other abnormal situations instead of faulty main electric energy sources. These energy sources shall supply electric energy to the consumers ensuring safety of the ship/floating facility and restore normal operational state for minimal habitability conditions, as well as for scheduled launch and cooling of the steam supply system without engagement of the emergency generators.

The marine electric power plant is a set of primary motors and electric generators with the main switchboard intended to supply electric energy to all the ship consumers in any operation mode of the marine ship's energy system.

#### **1.3 Scope of technical supervision.**

In addition to the equipment listed in Part XI "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules, the equipment of installations and service systems of the steam supply system is subject to the technical supervision.

#### **1.4 Technical documentation.**

For requirements to technical documentation, refer to [Part II "Classification"](#).

## **2 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS**

**2.1** The electric installation of the ship/floating facility shall consist of the main and emergency electric systems.

**2.2** The electric installation with generators off shall be capable of supplying electric energy to the systems required for disabling the reactor and keeping it in safe state for at least during 30 days under any state class, including SC4 and taking into account a single failure of the electric system in addition to an initial event which caused the state class.

**2.3** When starting up the reactor and shutting down the reactor, the safety control systems and security systems of the reactor shall be supplied with electric energy from at least two independent sources.

**2.4** The stand-by and emergency generators, in case one of them fails, shall supply electric energy to the consumers required for starting up the steam supply system from cooled (or hot stand-by) state and maintaining minimal habitability conditions. The emergency generators may be used for starting up the steam supply system, if they produce enough power, and for supplying electric energy to the consumers important for safety of the ship or floating facility.

**2.5** The main electric system shall be capable of providing reliable electric energy supply for the steam supply system consumers and for all ship's critical consumers from two electric stations at least in all operational and transient modes.

**2.6** The provision is to be made for periodic inspections and trials of electric installation structure equipment which is critical for safety of the steam supply system and the ship/floating facility.

**2.7** In accordance with [Table 2.1, Part VII "Machinery Installations and Machinery"](#), electric equipment of machinery and systems important for safety of the steam supply system shall be capable of faultless operation under continuous heel up to 30°, roll up to 45° and trim up to 10°.

**2.8** All electric energy consumers depending on their importance for the safety of the steam supply system shall be referred to one of four power supply reliability groups:

**.1** first group – consumers not allowing for power failure in all modes in terms of safety including total power loss from the main, stand-by and emergency power sources (blackout mode) and requiring mandatory power supply availability after emergency protection drive reactor actuation. Transient power supply sources shall be provided for such consumers;

**.2** second group – consumers allowing for power failure for a period, determined by safety conditions at power loss from the main and stand-by power sources, and requiring mandatory power supply availability after emergency protection drive reactor actuation. Power supply from emergency diesel generators shall be provided for such consumers;

**.3** third group – consumers allowing for power failure, when switching off the main power sources and after emergency protection drive reactor actuation, and providing safe and minimum habitability onboard the ship. Power supply from stand-by diesel generators shall be provided for such consumers;

**.4** fourth group – consumers not imposing increased requirements to power supply reliability and not requiring mandatory power supply availability in case of reactor emergency protection drive actuation.

The list of consumers affecting the steam supply system divided into groups depending on reactor plant structure shall be submitted by the ship's designer for approval by the Register.

### **3 MAIN ELECTRICAL SYSTEM**

**3.1** The following shall be envisaged for the main electrical system.

**3.1.1** Failure of a single component within any main generator, drive motor of the latter and associated auxiliary machinery shall not cause shutdown of the reactor and loss of the ship or self-propelling floating facility maneuverability. Simultaneously provision shall be made for fast recovery of required electric power needed for maintaining the ship/floating facility in a normal operational state and under normal habitability conditions.

**3.1.2** Failure of a single component within distribution devices of the main electric system shall not cause shutdown of the reactor and loss of the ship/floating facility maneuverability.

**3.2** The following shall be provided as part of the main electric system (minimum):

two main generators;

two stand-by generators;

two main switchboards.

The main electrical system may be constructed on the principle of IEES. In this case different voltage levels are normally used for the electric propulsion system and for the main part of electrical consumers (auxiliary consumers). At least two main switchboards shall be provided for receiving power from the main power sources, provision of the electric propulsion system, and power transmission to the auxiliary power system, and at least two main switchboards for the auxiliary consumer power system. Power take-off for auxiliary consumer power supply shall be performed through power converters (for instance, voltage transformers) connected to the auxiliary power system main switchboard. The number and power output of these converters shall meet the requirements imposed on the main power sources. At least two converters shall be provided for each power plant.

**3.3** The main electrical system shall include at least two separate electrical stations implemented so as not to effect each other's operation in case of failure in any station under state class SC1 or SC2.

**3.4** Every electrical station within the main electrical system shall include main generator (generators), stand-by generator (generators) and main switchboard.

**3.5** Power supply of the machinery and systems of the operating steam supply system shall be provided from at least two power plants.

The fastest possible activation of stand-by sources (hot stand-by) shall be provided in the systems with one primary source (one reactor plant) or in modes with one reactor plant operation (for steam supply systems with several reactor plants).

**3.6** Total power of operating main generators within every electrical station of the main electrical system shall be sufficient for full supply of electric energy to all the consumers required for maintaining the ship/floating facility in a normal operational state and normal habitability conditions.

**3.7** Loss of voltage at the buses of any main switchboard shall automatically actuate stand-by generators to take up load for a time necessary for safe operation of the steam supply system.

**3.8** The project shall provided parallel operation of the stand-by generators with the main generators at least for a time necessary for transferring load.

**3.9** Total power of the stand-by and main generators which remain operational shall be sufficient to supply electric energy to the consumers required for maintaining the ship/floating facility in normal operational state and normal habitability conditions. In this case it is permitted that consumers which are not critical for the safety of the ship/floating facility be disconnected.

**3.10** Power of the stand-by generators actuated under abnormal conditions shall be sufficient to supply electric energy to the consumers providing safety of the ship/floating facility, to return the latter into a normal operational state at minimal habitability conditions, as well as to perform scheduled startup and cooling of the steam supply system.

**3.11** It is permitted that the jumpers between the buses of main switchboards with appropriate switching devices be used for ship's electric energy system.

**3.12** Controls and instruments located in the central control station shall be arranged in consoles and panels so as to prevent failure of the remote control and monitoring more than one electrical station if some of them fails.

**3.13** The critical consumers of electric energy if they are two or more in number (provided they are mutually redundant and stand-by consumers are engaged automatically once running equipment fail) shall be separately connected to the different main switchboards both as related to power supply and control.

**3.14** Power supply of the steam supply system consumers of the first and second power supply reliability groups shall be provided from special switchboards of the steam supply system supplied from the main switchboard and emergency switchboard. Power supply of the steam supply system consumers of the third power supply reliability group shall be provided directly from the main switchboard or from the group switchboards intended exclusively for these consumers and fed from the main switchboard.

Consumers of the fourth power supply reliability group shall be supplied in accordance with the requirements of Part XI "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules.

**3.15** Each of the main switchboards within the main electrical system shall be located in a separate compartments.

The separate compartments are those isolated from each other with watertight fire structures.

**3.16** The main generators of electric stations may be located in a common engine compartment, provided that the requirements stated in [3.15](#) are met.

**3.17** If the main generators are located in one common engine compartment, the stand-by generators shall be located in other separate compartments.

## **4 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM**

**4.1** The emergency electrical system and generators independent of the steam supply system engaged in emergency power supply, as well as the emergency distribution systems shall perform their safety functions taking into account the principle of single failure under the state classes SC1 to SC4 ([also refer to 2.2](#)).

**4.2** In addition to the requirements specified in Section 9, Part XI "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules, power of the emergency electrical system shall be sufficient to shut down the reactor, subsequently switch over into the cold subcritical state, and supply the consumers intended for performing the reactor safety functions.

**4.3** The emergency electrical system shall include not less than two emergency generators and two emergency electric energy distribution system independent on each other. It is permitted that separate emergency distribution systems with associated emergency generators be envisaged for the consumers of steam supply system and those consumers be fed as per the requirements specified in Section 9, Part XI "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules. In this case consumers of the steam supply system shall be supplied from at least two emergency generators with distribution systems and one emergency generator with an independent distribution system for power supply of the consumers as per the requirements specified in Section 9, Part XI "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules.

**4.4** Each emergency generator shall be connected only to an associated emergency switchboard.

**4.5** The emergency switchboards shall be powered from every main switchboard. If the emergency switchboards are used for power supply of the consumers in emergency modes only (from the emergency generators), they may not be connected to the main switchboards.

**4.6** The consumers in charge of the safety systems shall be powered from the emergency switchboards via two feeders. If the system features full functional redundancy of machinery, power may be supplied via one feeder, provided power to the redundant machinery is supplied from the other emergency switchboard and requirements of [4.1](#) are met.

**4.7** Each emergency generator shall automatically start by signal of voltage loss at the associated emergency switchboard bus and by the reactor emergency protection system actuation signal. In case of separate systems of emergency power supply for the steam supply system consumers and consumers specified in Section 9, Part XI "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules ([see 4.3](#)), emergency generators intended to supply the steam supply system consumers shall start by the signal of voltage loss at the connected buses on the emergency switchboards of the steam supply system consumers and by the emergency protection drive reactor actuation signal.

**4.8** Power of the steam supply system emergency cooling console, when supply from the main and emergency sources fails, shall be supplied from a transient electric energy source. Switch over from main supply to emergency and further to transient source of electric energy shall be performed automatically.

**4.9** The emergency electrical system shall take up load in a short time determined by the reactor safety conditions.

**4.10** The emergency electrical system shall be designed so as to exclude direct synchronization of electric energy sources in emergency.

**4.11** Measuring instruments for every emergency generator installed in the emergency switchboard shall be redundant in the central control station.

## **5 TRANSIENT POWER SUPPLY SOURCES**

**5.1** The provision is to be made for at least two independent transient power supply sources.

**5.2** The devices measuring parameters of the steam supply system, radiation monitoring and other instruments and indicators critical for safety of the vessel/floating facility shall be powered from each transient power supply source for 30 minutes as agreed with the Register.

**5.3** The transient power supply sources may not be required if justification is provided that the consumers specified in [5.2](#) have uninterrupted power supply where principle of single failure under any state, including SC4, is provided.

**5.4** The transient power supply sources shall be distributed and installed so that not more than one transient power supply source fails under states SC1 to SC4.

**5.5** Batteries to be used as transient sources for the steam supply system only may be located below the bulkhead deck.

**5.6** A charger of sufficient power shall be provided for charging the battery from completely discharged state to full charge during 8 hours as maximum.

**5.7** A common light indication (non-critical) of low battery shall be fitted in the central control station.

**5.8** Uninterruptible power system (UPS) units with batteries may be used as transient power supply sources. UPS units shall meet the requirements of 9.7, Part XI "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules.

## **6 LIGHTING**

### **6.1 Main lighting.**

**6.1.1** Each space within the controlled area which is important for safety of the steam supply system shall be fitted with at least two main lights.

**6.1.2** The main lights within the controlled area shall be powered from special switchboards earmarked for the controlled area only.

**6.1.3** The main lighting switchboards listed in [6.1.2](#) shall be powered from different main switchboards via separate feeders.

**6.1.4** The main lighting network of the controlled area spaces shall feature switchboard remote enable/disable system with appropriate indication in the central control station.

**6.1.5** Switches of the main lights of separate compartments or groups of compartments within the controlled area shall be installed outside these compartments.

**6.1.6** All the lighting fittings within controlled area spaces shall have protection degree not less than IP55.

### **6.2 Emergency lighting.**

**6.2.1** Emergency lights shall be fitted in spaces as follows:

- .1** central control station;
- .2** reactor emergency cooling station;
- .3** spaces to be attended by personnel within the controlled area and compartments important for safety of the steam supply system;
- .4** radiation monitoring station (if located separately);
- .5** special switchboards of the steam supply system (if available);
- .6** storages places of new and wasted fuel assemblies.

## **7 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT OF STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM AUTOMATION AND MONITORING SYSTEM AND RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM**

**7.1** The automation and monitoring systems supporting operation of the safety systems and radiation monitoring system shall be powered from the main and emergency switchboards. Power supply shall be switched over to the emergency sources automatically.

The list of automation and monitoring devices powered from the transient electric energy sources shall be approved by the Register.

**7.2** For automation and monitoring systems referred to the first power supply reliability group, UPS shall be provided in each system or a centralized power supply system with UPS intended exclusively for supplying these systems shall be arranged.

## **8 SUPPLY FROM EXTERNAL POWER SOURCE**

**8.1** Provision shall be made for a power supply board from an external electric energy source.

**8.2** Provision shall be made for power supply from switchboard mentioned in [8.1](#), to every main switchboard.

**8.3** Construction of the external power supply board shall comply with the requirements specified in Part XI "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules.

## **9 CONTROLLED AREA CABLING**

**9.1** Number of cables passing through the containment and shielding barrier shall be minimized.

**9.2** Requirements for cable glands shall not be lower than the requirements to tightness of the spaces as regard to leakages and fire resistance of bulkheads. These requirements shall not be a hurdle for conducting inspections and tests.

**9.3** The cables shall be led in through glands fitted from outside these compartments. Free spaces of these glands not filled with the cables from inside these compartments shall be properly packed with compound all over the protection thickness.

**9.4** Application of electric cables with outer metal screen is not allowed.

**9.5** Perforated panels and bridges are not allowed for cable installation.

**9.6** Cables shall be laid in the shortest routes possible.

**9.7** Cables shall be laid at distances from the planes of bulkheads, decks, framing and other hull structures so as to facilitate decontamination when necessary.

**9.8** Cables running through the containment shall be led using special gaskets or a special bulkhead connector – cable passage of leak-tight or other construction approved by the Register and performing the same junction. In the first case, the cables shall feature longitudinal tightness. Methods and standards for cable testing for longitudinal tightness and emergency factors shall meet the requirements of normative documents approved by the Register. In the second case, the cables shall be connected from both sides of the passage through the containment, and longitudinal tightness of the cable is not required.

Transit cables may be laid through the containment only in exceptional cases when this space cannot be bypassed and provided they are laid in steel tight pipes. All such cases are subject to special consideration by the Register.

**9.9** Design of the cable glands passing through the containment shall allow inspecting its tightness in the course of installation and operation and guarantee tightness of the containment under conditions stated by the design-basis accidents. The air leakage rate shall not exceed 0,5 l/h through one bundled cable entry under absolute test pressure of 0,5 MPa after operational effect, emergency states and fire.

For getting the RS approval for application of cables and glands passing through the containment, their samples shall be tested for longitudinal tightness under circumstances of the design basis accident as per the procedures specified in the Guidelines for Technical Supervision over Construction of Nuclear Ships and Floating Facilities, Nuclear Fleet Support Vessels, and Manufacture of Materials and Products.

**9.10** The safety system cables shall be laid separately from the main lines. Cables included in the safety system components which perform mutual backup junctions shall be laid at the opposite ship sides, and where it is not possible in several different spaces separated by fire structures both within and outside the controlled area.

**9.11** A single wire system can not be applied for one-phase alternate current with the ship hull used as a return wire.

**9.12** The cables and electric equipment that shall be kept operational also after design accidents shall withstand environmental factors (pressure, temperature, humidity, etc.) associated with those accidents.

**9.13** All the cables running from the transient power supply sources (if available) to the designated switchboards and going from the switchboards to consumers shall be distant from each other and from cable routes of the main and emergency distribution systems as far as possible.

**9.14** The local cables connected to the equipment to be dismantled in reloading the core shall be marked.

**9.15** The control equipment for the electric motors located within the controlled area shall be installed outside the latter. Start buttons are allowed in that case.

## **10 INTERNAL COMMUNICATION**

**10.1** Reliable communication between the central control station and spaces as mentioned below shall be provided even at total lack of power supply on the ship/floating facility:

- .1 bridge;
- .2 reactor emergency cooling control station;
- .3 main engine;
- .4 main generators;
- .5 stand-by generators;
- .6 emergency generators;
- .7 compartments to be attended within the controlled area important for safety of the steam supply system;
- .8 storages of fuel assemblies.

## **11 ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT INSPECTIONS AND TESTS**

**11.1** The project shall envisage possibility for testing the stand-by and emergency generators. The tests shall include checking automatic, remote and local startup as well as checking start-up time and 100 % load take-up. Speed regulators of the primary motors shall be tested in action as well.

**11.2** A procedure for periodical testing a transient power supply source (if available) shall be approved by the Register.

## **PART XI. AUTOMATION**

### **1 GENERAL**

#### **1.1 Application.**

This part comprises requirements to automation equipment of nuclear ships and floating facilities. The requirements in Part XV "Automation" of the RS Rules shall apply in full to automation equipment, unless otherwise specified herein.

#### **1.2 Scope of technical supervision.**

In addition to automation systems specified in Part XV "Automation" of the RS Rules, the following shall be subject to technical supervision on nuclear ship and floating facility: control, protection, alarm and indication systems required for steam supply system and safety systems operation.

#### **1.3 Technical documentation.**

For requirements to technical documentation, refer to [Part II "Classification"](#).

## **2 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS**

**2.1** In addition to the requirements for components and appliances of automation systems specified in Part XV "Automation" of the RS Rules, control, monitoring and protection systems of nuclear power unit shall also comply with requirements of [Sections 19](#) and [20](#), Part VIII "Nuclear Steam Supply Systems" as far as applicable.

**2.2** For automation systems with redundancy according to single failure concept it is allowed to use common sensors in channels of protection, control, monitoring, alarm and indication if failure in channels of control, monitoring, alarm and indication does not affect operability of protection system.

**2.3** Short power loss (up to 1 s) in the systems shall not affect operation of protection and control channels and shall not result in false actuation.

**2.4** List of steam supply system equipment subject to control and monitoring from central control station as well as level of automation and monitored parameters shall be justified in the design.

**2.5** Automation systems required for operation of systems specified in [10.7](#), Part VIII "Nuclear Steam Supply Systems" shall be reserved and shall comply with single failure criterion (see [Section 7](#), Part III "Safety Standards").

**2.6** In multi-channel automation systems the channels shall be galvanically independent.

**2.7** Systems, specified in [2.5](#), shall be provided with sound and light alarm system to indicate completeness failure, if necessary.

**2.8** Control, protection and monitoring systems of steam supply system shall allow remote actuation of safety systems.

**2.9** For control channels of safety systems, priority of automatic control over remote control shall be set by signals on protection actuation.

The scope of control channels for fulfillment of requirements specified in this para will be specially examined by the Register for every specific case.

**2.10** Failures in systems specified in [2.5](#) shall be examined taking into account [7.4](#), [Part III "Safety Principles"](#) in accordance with the following emergency situations:

- .1** failure of functional components within system (for example, fuse, card, module, etc.);
- .2** failure of structural components (for example, device, console, panel, etc.);
- .3** failure of structural components group (for example, those located in common compartment).

### **3 ALARM, INDICATION AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS**

**3.1** For the list of alarm, indication and protection parameters of the steam supply system, refer to [Table 3.1](#).

**3.2** Emergency parameters recorder providing record of pre-emergency and emergency values of steam supply system parameters shall be fitted on nuclear ships or floating facilities.

**3.3** Emergency parameters recorder shall functionally meet the following requirements:

**.1** recording method shall provide the possibility to determine the date and time of information recording at its replay using a special device;

**.2** special shielding container shall comply with the conditions specified in 5.20.4.1, Part V "Navigational Equipment" of the Rules for the Equipment of Sea-Going Ships.

The device providing detection of the special shielding container shall provide signal transmission for at least:

49 h – signal for initial detection;

168 h – homing signal.

Equipment of the emergency parameters recorder with a device providing detection of the special shielding container in the cases specified in [3.4](#) is not mandatory;

**.3** recording of other additional information from the ship equipment specified in 5.20.6, Part V "Navigational Equipment" of the Rules for the Equipment of Sea-Going Ships and fitted with respective outputs providing interface of this equipment with the emergency parameters recorder may be provided. Recording of additional information shall not falsify basic information or affect its integrity;

**.4** changing the data set to be recorded and the recorded information shall be prevented. Recording of the unauthorized tampering attempts in the emergency parameters recorder operation shall be provided;

**.5** a module for documenting the received information on a non-volatile data medium shall be designed for a rerecording cycle of at least 12 h or at least 72 h in emergency mode.

**3.4** Emergency parameters recorder may be fitted on the roof of the navigation bridge, in the navigation bridge or central control station. If the emergency parameters recorder is fitted in the navigation bridge or in the central control station, a device providing its detection is not required.

Table 3.1

No.	Parameter to be checked	Measurement point	Tolerance for alarm parameter	Protection, stop or change of mode	Parameter indication		Record on emergency parameters recorder
					Central control station	Emergency cooling control station	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	Neutron power <sup>1</sup>	Ionization chamber	↑	×	●		+
2	Reactor power doubling period	Ionization chamber	↓	×	●		+
3	Position of regulating rods	Control rods group and emergency protection drive	↓↑	×	●	●	+
4	Reactivity	Ionization chamber					
5	Pressure inside reactor	Primary circuit	↓↑	■×	●	●	+
6	Level in volume compensator	Volume compensator	↓↑	▼	●		+
7	Pressure in safety system cylinders and tanks	On container	↓↑	▼■	◐		+
8	Water temperature at reactor output	Nuclear reactor	↑	▼	●	●	+
9	Water temperature at reactor input	Nuclear reactor	↑	▼	●		+
10	Coolant temperature before filter of primary circuit	After coolant circulating pump	↑	▼	◐		+
11	Coolant activity as per radiation monitoring standard sensors	Primary circuit	↑	▼	◐		+
12	Feed-water flow	After feed-water valve	↓	▼×	●		+
13	Water flow at the auxiliary feed-water pump discharge	After auxiliary feed-water pump			◐	◐	+
14	Feed-water pressure	After feed-water pump	↓	■	◐		+
15	Feed-water temperature	At steam generator input	↓↑	▼	◐		+
16	Feed-water salinity	Before feed-water pump	↑	▼	◐		+
17	Steam pressure	After steam generator	↓↑	▼	●		+
18	Steam temperature	In main steam line	↓	▼	●		+
19	Steam and steam-water mixture activity	After steam generator and main condenser	↑	▼	◐		+
20	Primary circulating pump rpm	In primary circulating pump	↓	▼	◐	◐	+
21	Primary circulating pump load current	After nuclear steam supply system switchboard	↑	▼	◐		+
22	Temperature under the top cover of the primary circulating pump	In primary circulating pump	↑	▼	◐		+
23	Temperature under the top cover of the coolant circulating pump	In coolant circulating pump	↑		◐		+
24	Coolant flow at coolant circulating pump discharge	After coolant circulating pump	↓	■	◐	◐	+
25	Distillate flow after boost pump	After boost pump	↓		◐		+

No.	Parameter to be checked	Measurement point	Tolerance for alarm parameter	Protection, stop or change of mode	Parameter indication		Record on emergency parameters recorder
					Central control station	Emergency cooling control station	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
26	Pressure in containment	In containment	↑	▼■	●	○	
27	Air temperature in instrument space	Instrument space	↑		●		+
28	Water activity in tertiary circuit	After equipment	↑	▼	●		+
29	Pump state and valve position in primary to quaternary circuits in safety system	On pumps and valves			○		+
30	Before pressure on reactor plant and safety system pumps	On the pump	↓	▼■	●		+
31	Water levels in reactor plant tanks, safety systems tanks, deaerating plant tanks, and ice boxes	On container	↓	▼■	●		+
32	Water presence in reactor box	On drainage pipeline	↑	▼			+
33	Water presence in instrument space		↑	×			+
34	Pressure in pneumatic control system of the steam supply systems	Within the system	↓	▼■	●		+
35	Indication of power supply availability on steam supply system panels and contactors position	On steam supply system panels	↓		○		+
36	Vacuum in main condenser	On main condenser	↓	▼	●		

Notes: 1. Record is made after processing in nuclear reactor control and protection system.  
 2. Parameters in Paras [1 to 36](#) are subject to cyclic recording at standard reactor operation at power.

Symbols:

- – remote indication (constant)
- – remote indication (on call)
- ↑ – alarm signal when parameter reaches upper limit value
- ↓ – alarm signal when parameter reaches lower limit value
- – alarm signal
- – automatic start of stand-by pumps
- ▼ – mode change, load decrease
- × – nuclear reactor stop.
- + – available

## **PART XII. RADIATION SAFETY**

### **1 SCOPE OF TECHNICAL SUPERVISION**

**1.1** Facilities for protection against radioactive radiation and emissions of radioactive materials, radiation monitoring systems, systems for collecting, storage, treatment and removal of radioactive waste from the ship/floating facility, decontamination and sanitary treatment systems shall be subject to technical supervision by the Register.

**1.2** Equipment and radiation safety systems shall be subject to technical supervision by the Register in the process of design, development of design drawings, manufacture, installation and testing during construction and testing on board the ship/floating facility and in operation.

**1.3** For documents on radiation safety equipment and systems subject to technical supervision by the Register, refer to [Section 3, Part II "Classification"](#).

**1.4** For the scope of technical supervision on radiation safety equipment and systems during manufacture and testing as well as installation and testing on board the ship/floating facility, see Guidelines on Technical Supervision During Construction of Nuclear Ships and Floating Facilities, Nuclear Support Vessels and Manufacture of Materials and Products.

**1.5** For the scope of technical supervision on radiation safety equipment and systems in service, refer to [Table 2.2, Part II "Classification"](#).

## **2 DEDINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS**

**2.1** In addition to definitions given in [Part I "General"](#), the following definitions and explanations have been introduced in this Part:

**Biological shielding** comprises special structures and structural components designed to protect biological organisms and environment against radioactive emissions reduced to applicable standards.

Biological shielding may be made of steel alloys, concrete, lead, polyethylene and others.

**Unacceptable risk** is design minimum probability when the crew, passengers, population and environment are exposed to excess ionizing radiation and radioactive contaminations.

**Limited part of population** is population being in area of possible radioactive emissions in case of severe accidents in steam supply systems or cores being stored on board ship/floating facilities of SC4.

### **3 RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION**

**3.1** To ensure radiation safety for all states of steam supply system and ship/floating facility, along with shielding barriers (refer to [6.2, Part III "Safety Standards"](#)), steam supply system, storage facilities for radioactive waste and core fuel assemblies and other radioactive sources shall be provided with biological shielding.

To reduce radiation exposure, along with biological shielding it is required to use time of exposure, distance to radiation source as well as individual protection means.

**3.2** Crew members other than personnel and any other people on board and near the ship/floating facility shall be exposed to dose equivalents as specified by applicable radiation safety standards for the limited part of population.

**3.3** The radiation protection facilities shall prevent exposure of people on board or near the ship/floating facility due to penetrating radiation/radioactive contamination in amounts above the appropriate radiation dose limits as specified by the applicable Radiation Safety Standards under SC1, SC2, SC3 and in case of reactor shutdown.

**3.4** The basic design radiation dose limit for people on board the ship/ floating facility and limited part of population in case of SC4 shall be less than double maximum permissible dose as specified by applicable Radiation Safety Standards for the Personnel.

**3.5** Biological shielding directed towards the bottom of the nuclear ship/ floating facility shall prevent adverse effects on sea water when reactor plants is operating at a rated power. Radiation levels below the bottom of the ship/floating facility shall allow for required docking operations with the reactor stopped.

**3.6** The biological shielding design shall provide for repair works, reactor core handling, replacing steam supply system equipment with shielding dismantled to the minimum level as well a survey of steam supply system equipment.

**3.7** The controlled and supervised areas shall be enclosed on board the ship and floating facility according to actual and potential radiation hazards. To prevent contamination transfer into unrestricted area decontamination station shall be positioned between the controlled area and adjacent compartments. Decontamination station shall be provided with clothes changing facilities, dose control facilities for people and overalls and washing equipment. Access to supervised area spaces is to be allowed through special purpose sanitary space in case of radioactive contamination.

Warning sign shall be placed near the entrance to the controlled area and supervised area, if required.

**3.8** All controlled area spaces where radioactive contamination may occur under normal operation of the ship/floating facility shall be located inside the shielding barrier.

**3.9** Systems shall be provided to supply fresh air to pressure suits and helmets. Air shall be supplied via two independent ventilation units including the stand-by one. The redundant ventilation unit shall be capable of automatic activation in case of failure in the main ventilation unit.

**3.10** Decontamination facilities shall be provided for removing radioactive contaminations.

**3.11** Material of structures as well as paint coatings of controlled area spaces and equipment where radioactive contaminations occur under SC1 and SC2 shall allow multiple decontamination procedures.

**3.12** Controlled area spaces where decontamination solutions and washing water may stagnate shall be of simple configuration without recesses and projecting parts, if possible. Bulkhead stiffeners shall be fitted from the side of less likely contaminated spaces. Corners of hull structures shall be rounded, if possible.

**3.13** Foundations, machinery and equipment attachments in the controlled area spaces where radioactive contaminations occur under SC1 and SC2 shall be designed to ensure access to all surfaces of foundations/their attachments for decontamination.

Foundation spaces inaccessible for decontamination shall be sealed.

**3.14** Machinery and equipment not suitable for decontamination shall be easily replaceable. Arrangement for covering these machinery and equipment during operation or general decontamination of spaces shall be envisaged.

**3.15** Controlled area spaces shall have emergency escape route to the open deck.

**3.16** Controlled area spaces where radioactive contaminations may occur shall be tightly arranged within the collision protection in a single block, if possible to facilitate maintenance of machinery and equipment inside as well as to provide the shortest possible routes for people and transportation of equipment, materials and radioactive waste.

**3.17** Controlled area spaces on decks shall have an exit to cargo lift /trunk. Spaces where more fittings are located and lift/trunk is likely to be used shall have direct exit/entrance from lift/trunk, if possible.

**3.18** The controlled area spaces shall be free of equipment, machinery and device which require continuous supervision and maintenance.

**3.19** The scuppers within the controlled area spaces shall be fitted with shut-off valves and allow the water to be completely drained from spaces. Decks within compartments shall be deflected/inclined towards the scuppers.

**3.20** Equipment and machinery shall be secured within the controlled area spaces where radioactive contaminations occur under SC1 and SC2 to allow for decontamination when mounted on foundation and secured on the bulkhead.

**3.21** Compartments intended for handling contaminated radioactive substances, fluids, machinery and materials according to the design shall be equipped with local exhaust ventilation in the vicinity of workplaces.

**3.22** Through pipelines and cable routes not related to controlled area shall be laid in special-purpose sealed corridors/linings within this area. Penetrations of these routes and pipelines in bulkheads enclosing the controlled area shall be sealed.

**3.23** Layout of equipment, fittings and valves, laying of pipelines cable routes shall be arranged within the controlled area with regard to then- accessibility for maintenance, repair, inspection, decontamination and survey as well as application of protective coatings and covering.

**3.24** The structure of ladders, flooring and catwalks shall be such as to enable decontamination.

## **4 RADIATION MONITORING**

**4.1** The special-purpose radiation monitoring system complying with these requirements and Part XI "Electrical Equipment" and Part XV "Automation" of the RS Rules shall be provided to record levels of air and surface radiation, contamination and radioactivity of liquids on board the ship/floating facility.

**4.2** The radiation monitoring systems shall be designed for radiation process and radiation dose monitoring on board the ship/floating facility for all states.

The part of radiation monitoring system intended for process monitoring purposes shall ensure the following:

- .1** monitoring leak tightness of fuel element claddings;
- .2** monitoring radioactivity of primary coolant;
- .3** monitoring radioactivity of the secondary and third fluids;
- .4** monitoring radioactivity of fluids in radioactive waste storage facilities
- .5** monitoring leakages flowing from primary to secondary and third circuits and to spaces;
- .6** measuring intensity of alpha-, beta- and neutron radiation, volumetric activity of gases and aerosols in corresponding spaces of controlled area;
- .7** radiometric analysis of radioactive samples;
- .8** indication on high ionizing radiation, contamination and fluid radioactivity;
- .9** indication on open access doors to controlled area spaces and open emergency escape doors;
- .10** output of signal for isolating the faulty steam generator.

**4.3** The ionizing radiation detecting units shall be redundant within the controlled area spaces, where necessary.

Degree of protection shall be at least IP57 for the radiation control system sensors and IP23 for the rest of the equipment.

**4.4** Recording system shall record and store the following parameters:

- .1** radiation doses for people involved in operations within the controlled area and supervised area, if required;
- .2** ionizing radiation levels on board the ship/floating facility;
- .3** radioactive contamination levels within attended areas on board the ship/floating facility;
- .4** amounts and activity of radioactive waste being stored on board the ship/floating facility;
- .5** activity of waste being discharged to shore facilities/special-purpose vessels;
- .6** volumetric radioactivity of primary coolant;
- .7** data on pre-emergency situation change in radiation situation in case of accident.

**4.5** Data on radiation levels within controlled and supervised areas, air radioactivity within the containment as well as concentrations of radioactive gas and aerosols being released into environment shall be displayed on the console of radiation monitoring system. The console shall be equipped with indicators for monitoring any increase in radiation level.

**4.6** The ship/floating facility shall be equipped with sufficient portable means of radiation dose monitoring for operation under normal and emergency conditions. This equipment shall include dosimeters for alpha-, beta- and neutron radiation, air sample activity and contamination meters.

**4.7** The ship/floating facility shall be provided with sufficient amount of individual dosimeters for all people on board and for all conditions as specified by SC1 to SC4.

**4.8** In addition to devices specified in [4.6](#) and [4.7](#), the ship (floating facility) may be equipped with laboratory instruments for analyzing radioactive samples if automated radiation monitoring system is used for other purposes.

**4.9** Radiation situation shall be monitored on board the ship/floating facility under all states.

## **5 HANDLING RADIOACTIVE WASTE GENERAL**

**5.1** The design for steam supply system and ship/floating facility shall envisage safety of crew and passengers and environmentally friendly collection, storage and treatment of radioactive waste before this radioactive waste is further discharged from the ship/floating facility.

**5.2** The design of steam supply system shall ensure the minimum formation of radioactive waste to the extent practicable.

**5.3** The designs for steam supply system and ship/floating facility shall include appropriate arrangements for monitoring and handling of solid, liquid and gaseous radioactive waste being formed during normal operation to minimize its harmful effects on crew members, passengers, environment and ship/floating facility.

**5.4** When designing and operating the radioactive waste treatment and storage arrangements, the following shall be taken into account:

- .1** permissible radioactive levels;
- .2** requirement for biological shielding and usage of cooling system;
- .3** possible corrosive effects of some radioactive gases and liquids on materials of containers, pipelines, equipment and fittings;
- .4** requirement for radioactive leakage detection;
- .5** possible formation of radioactive gases and measures to be taken to reduce effects and prevent combustible gas explosions.

**5.5** Capacity of radioactive waste storage facilities shall comply with operating conditions for the ship/floating facility.

**5.6** The design shall ensure preventive measures for radioactive waste discharge from storage facilities into environment and spaces of the ship/ floating facility.

**5.7** Storage and transportation facilities as well as pipelines for radioactive waste discharge from the ship/floating facility shall be designed to prevent any discharge of radioactive substances into environment and other compartments of the ship/floating facility.

**5.8** Documents and Information on Safety shall contain criteria for design, manufacture, operation and testing intended for radioactive waste treatment and storage equipment. These criteria shall ensure subdivision of waste by their composition and volumetric radioactivity.

**5.9** Radioactive materials with major impact on individual radiation doses shall be arranged within the shielding barrier.

**5.10** The amount of radioactive gas being released into the atmosphere under SC1, SC2 and SC3 shall not result in radiation dose for passengers, crew or limited part of population above the limits as specified in the Radiation Safety Standards.

**5.11** Solid and liquid radioactive waste shall be discharged ashore in accordance with radiation and sanitary requirements.

**5.12** Radiological protection of people on board or in the vicinity of ship/floating facility during radioactive waste treatment and discharge shall comply with [3.2](#) and [3.3](#) hereof.

**5.13** Containers and pipelines with fittings shall be made of corrosion-resistant materials and alloys intended for multiple decontamination. These materials shall be approved by the Register.

**5.14** Pipelines of radioactive fluid transfer systems shall be made of seamless electro polished pipes. Pipelines shall be connected by welding as per regulatory documents approved by the Register. Flange or union connections are allowed only where pipelines are connected to the equipment (filters, pumps, separators, tanks).

**5.15** Pumps, pipelines and fittings shall have biological shielding, if necessary.

**5.16** The foundations and fasteners of radiation safety system equipment shall prevent its displacement in case of variation in ship/floating facility position up to and including capsizing.

**5.17** The interior surface of radiation safety system containers exposed to radioactive fluid and not to be painted shall have roughness not more than  $R_a = 6,3 \mu\text{m}$ .

**5.18** The distance between piping and systems shall be as such to ensure their proper maintenance and survey.

**5.19** Requirements to quality of external surfaces of structures and equipment located in the controlled and supervised areas shall be developed by the Designer and approved by the Register.

**5.20** Strength of equipment and radiation safety system shall be estimated according to standards specified for Safety Class 3 equipment.

## **6 HANDLING SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE**

**6.1** The spent ion-exchange resins and filters as well as different parts (dirty tools, overalls, laboratory kits, etc) shall be considered as typical solid radioactive waste.

**6.2** Solid radioactive waste shall be stored and transported in special-purpose containers.

Storage of solid radioactive waste shall provide for possible concentration/ formation of gases and liquids.

## **7 HANDLING LIQUID RADIOACTIVE WASTE**

**7.1** Liquid radioactive waste forming in case of SC1 and SC2 shall be collected on board into enclosed containers (montejus, tanks) located in the controlled area spaces.

**7.2** Liquid radioactive waste treatment and storage facilities shall transfer this waste ashore or on board the special-purpose vessel through two separate pipelines. One pipeline shall be used for medium-radioactivity liquid radioactive waste, the other one — for low-radioactivity liquid radioactive waste.

**7.3** The following shall be taken into account for designing liquid radioactive waste storage facilities.

**7.3.1** Waste shall be subdivided by their activity and with regard to physical and chemical properties, if required. Liquid radioactive waste shall be subdivided into low-, medium- and high-radioactivity waste as per applicable Sanitary Radiation Safety Rules.

**7.3.2** Containers/tanks shall be protected against spontaneous emptying in case of damage to pipelines due to water ejection by siphon effect or by gravity.

**7.3.3** Liquid radioactive waste discharge pipelines shall be remotely isolated from central control station and from discharge station.

**7.3.4** Liquid radioactive waste collection and storage containers shall be designed as free-standing, externally framed and inclined towards the drain hole. The roughness of containers interior surface exposed to radioactive fluid and not subject to painting, shall not exceed  $R_a = 6.3 \mu\text{m}$ .

Containers shall be designed to meet the requirements of 7.1.1.5 of the Rules for the Classification and Construction of Nuclear Support Vessels. Means for remote measurements of liquid radioactive waste levels shall be provided.

Medium- and low-radioactivity liquid radioactive waste shall be stored in separate spaces.

Containers for storing medium-radioactivity liquid radioactive waste shall be made of corrosion-resistant materials suitable for multiple decontamination and washing. Such containers shall have the appropriate biological shielding. The ship shall be provided with at least two containers.

Containers for storing low-radioactivity liquid radioactive waste may be made of ordinary structural materials with anti-corrosion coatings applied. Ship's structures and spaces may be used as a biological shielding.

**7.3.5** Overflow of high-radioactivity liquid radioactive waste to containers for low-radioactivity liquid radioactive waste is not allowed.

**7.3.6** Liquid radioactive waste containers shall allow for regular removal of contamination.

**7.3.7** When discharging liquid radioactive waste overboard, contamination of the ship and environment shall be excluded.

Arrangements for automatic discharge stop shall be provided for urgent piping shut-off or in case of spontaneous disconnection of removable pipelines. These arrangements shall be capable of automatic actuation upon the low pressure signal.

Prior to starting operations, removable pipelines shall be subject to leak tests.

Trays with water draining into liquid radioactive waste collection system shall be provided at connection points of removable pipelines. Branches for joining removable pipelines shall be arranged in a special-purpose station/ enclosure near sides. Requirements to liquid radioactive waste discharge station shall comply with 7.1.2.5 of the Rules for the Classification and Construction of Nuclear Support Vessels.

Removable pipelines shall be capable of being decontaminated, washed and completely drained without being disconnected from the liquid radioactive waste discharge pipeline.

**7.3.8** Containers for storing liquid radioactive waste shall be equipped with air pipes made of corrosion resistant materials. Air pipes from liquid radioactive waste storage

containers/tanks under hydrostatic pressure shall be led from the top of container/tanks to spaces where they are located. Air pipes from low- radioactivity liquid radioactive waste storage containers/tanks may be led to the ventilation mast through special-purpose ventilation system. Water injection from liquid radioactive waste containers to vent ducts shall be excluded. Air pipes shall be connected to each other and to containers/tanks by welding.

**7.3.9** Liquid radioactive waste storage containers under hydrostatic pressure shall be made and tested as per Part II "Hull" of the RS Rules.

In addition to air pipes, liquid radioactive waste storage containers under hydrostatic pressure only shall be fitted with overflow system for collection and discharge of liquid radioactive waste when the main containers/tanks are overfilled.

**7.3.10** Containers continuously or regularly operating under internal pressure shall be made and tested as per Part X "Boilers, Heat Exchangers and Pressure Vessels" of the RS Rules.

**7.3.11** Fittings of liquid radioactive waste storage and discharge systems shall be of bellows type with branches to be welded and fitted with local position indicators and alarm with extreme position indication.

**7.3.12** Electric pumps for liquid radioactive waste transfer shall be corrosion resistant and leak tight. At least two pumps shall be provided on board the ship. Liquid radioactive waste discharge system shall be provided with arrangements for preventing pressure increase above design values.

**7.3.13** Liquid radioactive waste pipelines and fittings shall have biological shielding (where control is provided from its location).

**7.4** Spaces which are likely to be contaminated with liquid radioactive substances shall be fitted with bilge wells and bilge alarms.

## **8 HANDLING GASEOUS RADIOACTIVE WASTE**

**8.1** All escape routes for gaseous radioactive waste shall be monitored.

**8.2** Radioactive gases and aerosols shall be discharged into environment through pipelines and vent ducts meeting tightness requirements and fitted with radioactivity filtering and monitoring equipment.

**8.3** Gaseous radioactive waste may be compressed and stored provided that pressure vessels and appropriate pipelines meet the requirements of these Rules.

Radioactivity risks shall be analyzed in the design in case of depressurization of the cylinder containing gaseous radioactive waste.

**8.4** The total volumes and radioactivity levels of aerosols and gases being discharged into the atmosphere shall be continuously and progressively monitored. These parameters shall not exceed the standards as specified in the Sanitary Radiation Safety Rules.

**8.5** Gaseous radioactive waste discharge lines shall be fitted with automatic, remote and local shutdown means to prevent uncontrolled discharge.

## **9 STORAGE FACILITIES FOR CORE FUEL ASSEMBLIES**

**9.1** Storage facilities for new fuel assemblies and spent core fuel assemblies shall be arranged on board the ship/floating facility according to Section 6 of the Rules for the Classification and Construction of Nuclear Support Vessels.

## **PART XIII. PHYSICAL SECURITY**

### **1 SCOPE OF TECHNICAL SUPERVISION**

**1.1** The system of physical security engineering facilities of nuclear ships and floating facilities shall be subject to technical supervision by the Register.

**1.2** Facilities shall be subject to technical supervision by the Register at the stages of design development, manufacturing, onboard installation, commissioning, operation and alteration (refitting) of physical security systems.

**1.3** This Part determines the scope of technical supervision for equipment of physical security systems at the stages of design development, manufacturing, onboard installation, testing and operation.

## **2 DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS**

**2.1** In addition to definitions given in [Part I "General"](#), the following definitions have been introduced in this Part:

**Physical security personnel** is personnel responsible for physical security on board the nuclear ship as part of their duty regulations.

**Physical security control station** is designated space/location equipped with engineering facilities. This space is used for control, in full scope or in part, of physical security engineering facilities in normal and emergency situations by designated physical security personnel.

**Physical security facility** is a type of equipment to be used by designated personnel for detection of unauthorized actions, receipt of information on attempts and occurrence of such actions, notifications on attempts and occurrence of these actions, detection and suspension of unauthorized actions.

**Readout device** is a device to be used for reading data from identifier.

**Physical barrier** is a physical obstacle to prevent intrusion of unauthorized persons to controlled areas, nuclear materials/vulnerable points of nuclear plant.

**Protected area** comprises open areas of decks of the ship/floating facility with restricted and controlled access.

**Internal area** is an area at interior locations of the ship/floating facility surrounded by physical barriers with restricted and controlled access.

**Critical area** is an area at interior locations surrounded by physical barriers with continuously restricted and controlled access.

**Secured area** is protected, internal or critical area.

**Identifier** is an assigned or inherent attribute to be used for proving eligibility for access to the secured area.

**Identification** is a process for identifying the subject/object by its inherent identification attribute.

**Unauthorized person** is a person who has performed or is attempting to perform the unauthorized action as well as the assisting person.

**Unauthorized action** is an action or attempt for sabotage/act of terror, theft of nuclear materials, nuclear plants, unauthorized access, carrying prohibited objects, breaking down or causing malfunction of physical security engineering facilities.

### **3 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS**

**3.1** The nuclear ships and floating facilities shall not be operated without ensuring physical security of nuclear materials, nuclear plants, storage facilities for nuclear materials and radioactive waste.

**3.2** No measures taken to ensure physical security shall impede immediate and safe entrance/escape of personnel from any space in the event of accidents (fire, flooding, etc).

**3.3** The engineering facilities system comprises engineering and technical facilities of physical security.

**3.3.1** The engineering facilities include physical barriers and engineering equipment of secured areas. Physical barriers are structural components of hull and superstructures (decks, bulkheads, doors, hatch covers) and purpose-built structures (obstructions, grating, reinforced doors).

**3.3.2** Technical facilities of physical security usually include the following main functional systems:

- .1** intrusion protection system;
- .2** security alert system;
- .3** access monitoring and control system;
- .4** optoelectronic surveillance and situation assessment system;
- .5** operational communication and address system (including wire and radio communication means);
- .6** data protection system;
- .7** power supply and lighting system.

**3.3.3** Engineering and technical facilities of physical security shall be controlled from physical security system control stations. The operator's consoles shall display incoming signals and data in at least two modes of three available (visual, light and audible). The access to control station spaces shall be provided by means of test and access control facilities.

**3.3.4** Prior to starting manufacturing process, documents for engineering facilities system of physical security shall be submitted to the Register for examination and approval.

**3.4** Electric equipment of engineering facilities system of physical security shall comply with Part XI "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules.

**3.5** The secured and limited access areas shall be enclosed and documented on board nuclear ships and floating facilities. Spaces shall be subdivided into appropriate categories. The categories of spaces shall be determined at the design development stage.

**3.6** When enclosing the secured areas, the critical area shall be located within the interior area and the interior area shall be located within the protected area.

**3.7** All entrances/exits to spaces of appropriate categories shall be equipped with detection facilities, access monitoring and control means and surveillance and situation assessment arrangements, if required.

**3.8** Failure or breakdown of any component included into physical security technical facilities system shall not result in malfunction of physical security system

**3.9** Single technical facilities of physical security may ensure compliance with requirements imposed to one or several systems (integrated systems and devices).

**3.10** Cabling of physical security system shall be properly protected on open decks of the ship.

**3.11** Computers and computer systems included into physical security engineering facilities system shall comply in full with requirements stipulated for the similar equipment mentioned in Section 7, Part XV "Automation" of the RS Rules.

**3.12** The availability of spare parts and fixtures shall be defined by Manufacturer of technical facilities and shall be agreed upon with the Owner.

#### **4 PHYSICAL BARRIERS AND ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT**

**4.1** Physical barriers shall comply in full with these requirements and all requirements of Section 7, Part III "Equipment, Arrangements and Outfit" and Section 2, Part VI "Fire Protection" of the RS Rules.

**4.2** The following provisions shall be made:

- .1** stalling/slowing down of unauthorized people;
- .2** provision for opening doors from inside the secured space;
- .3** emergency unlocking of doors/locking devices from control station in the event of accidents.

**4.3** Engineering equipment of secured areas shall prevent attempts of unauthorized access and carrying of prohibited objects.

**4.4** Check points/stations shall be fitted with arrangements for protection of personnel responsible for control and check operations against small-arms weapons.

## **5 INTRUSION PROTECTION SYSTEM**

**5.1** Intrusion protection system shall detect attempts of unauthorized actions and unauthorized actions actually occurred, provide personnel with data, transmit appropriate signals to other physical security systems.

**5.2** To prevent uncontrolled actions on intrusion protection system, the following shall be ensured:

**.1** remote control of system components state from physical security system control stations;

**.2** backing up all events occurred in the physical security system.

**5.3** In addition to the above requirements, technical facilities of the intrusion protection system shall meet the requirements of 7.3, Part XI "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules.

## **6 SECURITY ALERT SYSTEM**

**6.1** Security alert system shall notify the physical security personnel on unauthorized actions and indicate the call point.

**6.2** Unauthorized shutdown of security alert system devices shall be excluded.

**6.3** Data being transmitted to operator from security alert system equipment shall be of higher priority as compared to other signals.

**6.4** Security alert system shall transmit alert signals to physical security system control station upon pressing on alert buttons.

**6.5** In addition to the above requirements, technical means of the security alert system shall meet the requirements of 7.3, Part XI "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules.

## **7 ACCESS MONITORING AND CONTROL SYSTEM**

**7.1** Access monitoring and control system shall provide automatic and remote control for lock/locking devices actuators as per established algorithm and monitoring their state.

**7.2** Lock/locking devices actuators shall actuate only upon reading of identification attribute which permits access to the secured area at a given time. In case of power loss in actuators, locks/locking devices shall be secured in the open position.

**7.3** The following provisions shall be made: protection of signals being generated within access monitoring and control system, protection of facilities against unauthorized access which entails attempts to change system operation mode or steal/erase data, monitoring of integrity of facilities.

**7.4** The alert signal shall be generated in case of breaking/attempting to break components which when impacted may result in unauthorized passage/ malfunction of system operation.

**7.5** Facilities and devices of access monitoring and control system central control station shall ensure the following:

**.1** locking/unlocking of doors and automatically recording of events to the event log;  
**.2** monitoring authorized access of crew members/other people to secured areas and preventing attempts for unauthorized access within specified time;

**.3** submitting data on attempts for unauthorized access as well as forced actions on gate structural components to the operator of physical security system;

**.4** automatic saving of data (with recording of data and time) on current events, emergency situations, attempts for unauthorized access, states of access monitoring and control devices and elements.

**7.6** The following provisions shall be made for people attending lobbies of critical areas:

**.1** possibility for quick escape in case of accident;

**.2** monitoring and surveillance over people within the lobby;

**.3** maintaining internal microclimatic conditions at a required level rated for possible long-term staying of people.

**7.7** In addition to the above requirements, technical means of the access monitoring and control system shall meet the requirements of 5.10, Part XI "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules and Section 7, Part XV "Automation" of the RS Rules.

## **8 OPTOELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM**

**8.1** Optoelectronic surveillance and situation assessment system shall ensure surveillance in secured areas and transmission of visual data to physical security system control point/points and recording of received data.

**8.2** Technical facilities shall be protected against unauthorized access.

**8.3** Technical facilities shall be tested for faults and control station operator shall be properly notified on such a matter.

**8.4** In addition to the above requirements, surveillance and situation assessment facilities shall comply with 7.14, Part XI "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules.

## **9 SECURITY LIGHTING SYSTEM**

**9.1** Security lighting system facilities shall comply with requirements of this Section and Section 6, Part XI "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules.

**9.2** Security lighting shall be capable of automatic switching on upon actuation of intrusion protection system.

**9.3** All switchgears of security lighting system shall be protected against unauthorized actions.

**9.4** Security lighting system shall be switched over to stand-by power supply without decrease in lighting intensity of supervised area.

## **10 OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM**

**10.1** Operational communication system shall be used for voice data exchange between physical security system personnel by means of wire and radio communication.

**10.2** Operational communication system shall meet the requirements of 7.2, Part XI "Electrical Equipment" of the RS Rules and the requirements of Part IV "Radio Equipment" of the Rules for the Equipment of Sea-Going Ships.

**10.3** Operational communication system shall be provided by the system operating independently on other ship's communication systems and designed only for physical security purposes.

**10.4** The operational communication system shall be capable of recording voice conversations both manually and automatically and indicating their time and duration.

**10.5** The operational communication system equipment shall be capable of isolating the unauthorized connection.

## **11 POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY FACILITIES**

**11.1** Power supply system for physical security engineering facilities shall comply with requirements of this Section and Section 3, Part XV "Automation" of the RS Rules.

**11.2** The space where physical security system switchboard is located shall be equipped with access monitoring and control means and intrusion protection system arrangements.

**11.3** Physical security facilities shall be switched over to stand-by/ emergency power supply and vice versa without generating alert signals.

**11.4** Power supply units and cable networks shall be protected against unauthorized actions regarding their breakdown.

## **INFORMATION ON SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AND SHIP**

### **1 GENERAL PRINCIPLES**

**1.1** The Information on Safety is based on initially submitted documents followed by recommendations, supplements and revisions.

**1.2** The Information on Safety shall contain systematic analysis of technical issues related to safety of the nuclear ship (floating facility) with respect to design, construction, operation and decommissioning proving that the ship (floating facility) does not pose unacceptable risk for the crew, people and environment. The Information shall include sufficient data to allow the Register and authorized bodies of a host country to evaluate safety of the ship/floating facility.

**1.3** The Information shall be submitted in a brief form and issues shall be considered based on their importance for safety of the nuclear ship/floating facility.

**1.4** If the provisions of Rule 5, Chapter I, International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS-74) devoted to appropriate alterations are adopted, the Information on Safety shall include description of appropriate alterations with calculations proving their reliability.

### **2 PRACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS**

**2.1** It is required that a provision be made for Information on Safety document to add additional data or include revised sections. All pages of the document shall have clear numbers in sequence and respective dates. Revised pages and supplements shall distinctly differ from the initially submitted materials (revision number and revision date shall be specified).

**2.2** It is required that drawings, graphs, diagrams, tables and charts be used whenever they are needed for better understanding of the subject.

**2.3** All information to be forwarded shall be understandable. To keep the drawings clear and legible the scale shall not be reduced. The units of International System and units actually applicable to instruments shall be used.

**2.4** The Information on Safety may contain references to other documents, provided that they can be easily obtained by appropriate authorities.

### **3 GENERAL INFORMATION**

**3.1** The introduction shall contain the general overview of project including design development, construction and operation of the ship (floating facility) and its nuclear power unit, as well as conclusions on the ship (floating facility) safety.

Brief description is required for the following:

- .1** design of ship (floating facility) and its characteristics;
- .2** steam supply system and design parameters;
- .3** containment and shielding barrier;
- .4** nuclear power unit;
- .5** auxiliary machinery and systems;
- .6** electric energy systems;
- .7** stand-by propulsion plant (if provided);
- .8** collision protection.

**3.2** Evaluation is required for nuclear and radiation safety with specification of measures for preventing and restricting consequences of accidents and conclusions on safety for crew, people and environment.

#### **4 DESIGN ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS**

**4.1** The Section shall contain information on environmental factors adopted as the basis for design development highlighting those points which are important for nuclear safety as well as for general safety of the ship/floating facility. The section shall justify the choice of design environmental factors, including sea state, basic design storm, fatigue service life, and environmental risk factors in areas of operation.

#### **5 STANDARDS AND RULES**

**5.1** The Section shall provide technical, radiation and administrative safety rules used as the basis for design development, construction and operation the ship (floating facility) and nuclear power unit.

- .1** design rules:
  - standards;
  - RS rules;
  - design standards;
  - state requirements and rules;
- .2** practical experience in construction and operation;
- .3** operating instructions for operational period of the ship/floating facility and for decommissioning period for the ship/floating facility;
- .4** rules for operating the ship/floating facility in emergency conditions:
  - anticipated operating faults,
  - emergency conditions,
  - states permitting to operate the ship/floating facility beyond the conditions specified by the designer.

#### **6 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION OF DESIGN SOLUTIONS**

**6.1** This section shall contain technical specification of design solutions related to different systems, structures and components in view of their importance for safety of the ship (floating facility) and nuclear power unit.

**6.1.1** Initial design data included in the section shall define the required characteristics and parameters of the systems, as well as the external conditions required to achieve these specified characteristics.

**6.1.2** The specification shall contain information on systems to be examined and structures as follows:

- .1** functions;
- .2** normal and extreme operation parameters;
- .3** choice and characteristics of materials;
- .4** structural layout;
- .5** in-service inspections and tests;
- .6** maintenance;
- .7** results of strength analysis;
- .8** results of thermal and hydraulic calculations.

**6.2** The specifications and data required in [6.1](#) shall be applied to the following systems:

**6.2.1** Ship/floating facility and ship's systems:

- .1 arrangement;
- .2 characteristics;
- .3 stability and division into compartments;
- .4 damage control;
- .5 hull structure and strength;
- .6 collision protection;
- .7 navigation;
- .8 communication;
- .9 life saving appliances;
- .10 ship's machinery:

electric energy;  
main propulsion plant (for instance, main condenser, turbine, steam pipeline, feed water system);

steering gear;

fire detection and prevention;

HVAC systems;

bilge and ballast systems, cargo lifting gear, anchor-and-mooring gear;

.11 other systems.

**6.2.2** Steam supply system:

.1 primary circuit:

reactor;

primary circuit pumps;

safety valves;

primary circuit pipelines;

steam generators;

pressure compensating system;

fittings;

.2 auxiliary systems:

radioactive wastes, make-up system, third circuit system, sampling system; containment air ventilation and filtration, primary circuit degassing and draining, and others;

.3 reactor core;

.4 instruments and controls;

.5 safety systems:

reactor control and protection system;

core emergency cooling system;

residual heat removal system;

soluble poison injection system;

containment cut-off system;

leak detection system.

**6.2.3** Central control station and emergency cooling control station:

.1 inspection scope;

.2 instruments;

.3 location and description;

.4 fire protection;

.5 habitability and access.

## **7 NORMAL MODES OF NUCLEAR POWER UNIT**

**7.1** The Section shall contain information on functional behavior of the unit in normal operation modes.

**7.2** The information on normal operation shall include description of as follows:

- .1** initial state of the nuclear power unit prior to starting up;
- .2** starting up procedures;
- .3** operating at permanent power level;
- .4** changing power in the course of operation;
- .5** shifting to hot stand-by mode and farther to cold state;
- .6** quick return to operation at power after unexpected quick shutdown.

## **8 RADIATION SAFETY**

**8.1** The Section shall contain main data on radiation safety as follows:

- .1** main criteria of radiation protection;
- .2** radiation exposure limits;
- .3** radioactive waste discharge;
- .4** radiation levels for every zone on ship (floating facility) and procedures of access to zones at different state classes;
- .5** handling radioactive substances.

**8.2** Biological shielding description:

- .1** specification of a source to be protected;
- .2** arrangement and application;
- .3** sizes and materials.

**8.3** Data on radiation monitoring shall contain the following:

- .1** arrangement;
- .2** type, sensitivity and measurement range of sensors to be used;
- .3** methods of information display and signaling;
- .4** procedures of radiation and chemical monitoring of coolant, feed and cooling water;
- .5** instructions on reliability and durability of radiation monitoring system;
- .6** type and quantity of individual dosimeters.

**8.4** The information on radioactive materials discharge into environment shall contain data on instruments and methods for measuring leakages from the unit and data on automatic or manual actuation of discharge-restricting systems.

**8.5** The following shall be described: spaces and appliances to be used for treatment of contaminated objects and people as well as decontamination stations and laboratories (indicating their layout).

## **9 ACCIDENT AND FAILURE ANALYSIS**

**9.1** The Section shall contain detailed information on possible consequences of events affecting the unit or ship/floating facility as a result of:

- .1** failure or malfunction of systems, components or structures;
- .2** incorrect actions of personnel while operating the unit;
- .3** accidents on board the ship/floating facility (i.e. fire, collision, grounding and stranding, flooding etc.).

**9.2** The anticipated development of events after failures or accidents shall be described:

- .1 root cause of event;
- .2 sequence of events after the prime event;
- .3 final consequences.

**9.3** The analysis shall include the following information:

- .1 initial state;
- .2 assumptions used as a basis for calculations;
- .3 coolant radioactivity values;
- .4 accepted defects of fuel claddings;
- .5 value of leakage from the containment and efficiency of adsorption and filtration;
- .6 accepted automatic actions or necessary operator's actions;
- .7 time period after the event for measures to be taken.

**9.4** Accident analysis shall be conducted based on a single failure criterion.

**9.5** Faults of the nuclear power unit are as follows:

- .1 unintended radiation variation, including, for instance:  
unintended displacement of the control rod or group of rods with the highest physical weight;  
cold water injection;  
failure of the feed valve, i.e. supply of feed water with maximum flow rate in operation at low power;

- .2 malfunctions of the primary circuit system:  
failure of the make-up system;  
partial or complete breakdown of forced circulation;  
coolant pressure drop (drop of level in volume compensator);  
rupture of the primary circuit, i.e. accident with coolant loss;  
overheating of coolant, rupture of steam generator pipe;

- .3 malfunctions of the secondary coolant circuit system:  
rupture of the main steam generator or feed water main pipeline;  
pressure rise;  
closure of the main shut-off steam valve before the turbine;  
termination of steam withdrawal from the steam supply system;  
termination of cooling water supply to the main condenser;  
termination of feed water supply;

- .4 other accidents:  
malfunctions of the electric energy system;  
failure of the central control station;  
unintended starting up the emergency cooling system;  
faults of the radioactive waste treatment and storage systems and degassing systems.

**9.6** Accidents on board the ship/floating facility.

The following states shall be considered for the conditions of ship/floating facility being at sea and in harbor:

- .1 collision;
- .2 grounding and stranding;
- .3 capsizing;
- .4 flooding in shallow waters;
- .5 flooding in deep waters;
- .6 fire within shielding barrier;
- .7 fire in any other location on board the ship/floating facility;
- .8 external hazards in the vicinity of the ship/floating facility, i.e. fire, explosion, toxic gases, etc.;
- .9 loss of maneuverability;
- .10 crash of helicopter and etc.

## **10 SAFE OPERATION CONDITIONS FOR SHIP/FLOATING FACILITY**

**10.1** The following details shall be elaborated in this section: details of operating conditions and requirements of technical, administrative and systematic nature. This shall be applicable to at least the following issues:

- .1 limit conditions for operating the ship/floating facility ([refer to 5.1.4](#));
- .2 surveys and inspections of technical condition (intervals and scope of records and tests);
- .3 control (references to the Operating Manual and organizational guidelines may be given):  
organization and lines of subordination and responsibility;  
procedures for making amendments and obtaining and approvals for operating instructions and directives;  
manning (qualification and number of people);  
procedures and instructions for control under normal operating conditions, at anticipated operating faults, emergencies and accidents;
- .4 maintenance.

## **11 DECOMMISSIONING**

**11.1** The Section shall contain the procedure for decommissioning of the ship/floating facility without unacceptable radiation effects on population.

## **12 CONTENTS**

It is recommended that the following typical Contents regarding Information on Safety be provided:

- 12.1** General
  - 12.1.1** Purpose and type of ship/floating facility. Expected pattern of application
  - 12.1.2** Chronology of ship/floating facility production: shipyard, steam supply system  
Manufacturer
  - 12.1.3** Design, construction and operation supervising authorities
  - 12.1.4** Design criteria and design standards for ship/floating facility and nuclear power  
unit
- 12.2** Ship/Floating facility and general safety
  - 12.2.1** Ship/Floating facility general characteristics and description
    - 12.2.1.1** General characteristics
    - 12.2.1.2** General description
      - 12.2.1.3** Hull structure and strength
      - 12.2.1.4** Arrangement of nuclear power unit, equipment and control stations
      - 12.2.1.5** Maneuvering capabilities
    - 12.2.2** Collision protection of reactor compartment
    - 12.2.3** Stability and buoyancy under normal and emergency conditions
    - 12.2.4** Navigation and communication equipment
    - 12.2.5** Life-saving appliances
    - 12.2.6** Fire protection
    - 12.2.7** Ship's arrangements:
    - 12.2.8** Ship systems
  - 12.3** Steam supply system
    - 12.3.1** General description and characteristics
    - 12.3.2** Primary circuit
      - 12.3.2.1** General characteristics
      - 12.3.2.2** Equipment redundancy
      - 12.3.2.3** Equipment arrangement

- 12.3.2.4 Equipment
  - 12.3.2.4.1 Reactor (design, materials, strength, core)
  - 12.3.2.4.2 Steam generators
  - 12.3.2.4.3 Circulating pumps
  - 12.3.2.4.4 Actuating mechanisms of safety control systems
  - 12.3.2.4.5 Auxiliary equipment
  - 12.3.2.4.6 Pressure compensator
  - 12.3.2.4.7 Safety, pressure-relief and shut-off valves
- 12.3.3 Auxiliary systems and equipment
  - 12.3.3.1 Primary circuit coolant purification system
  - 12.3.3.2 Reactor make-up and emergency cooling systems
  - 12.3.3.3 High-pressure gas system
  - 12.3.3.4 Steam generator piping leak detection system
  - 12.3.3.5 Intermediate cooling system
  - 12.3.3.6 Sampling system
  - 12.3.3.7 Degassing and draining system
- 12.3.4 Emergency systems
  - 12.3.4.1 Emergency cooling system
  - 12.3.4.2 Core emergency cooling system
  - 12.3.4.3 Soluble poison injection
  - 12.3.4.4 Steam generator overpressure prevention system
- 12.4 Safety control systems
  - 12.4.1 Construction principles
  - 12.4.2 Description
  - 12.4.3 Parameters, instruments, equipment
  - 12.4.4 Interconnection with steam turbine and electric energy units
  - 12.4.5 Control stations
- 12.5 Containment
  - 12.5.1 Structure
  - 12.5.2 Strength
  - 12.5.3 Tightness
  - 12.5.4 Pressure reducing system
  - 12.5.5 Emergency flooding system
- 12.6 Shielding barrier
  - 12.6.1 Structure
  - 12.6.2 Strength
  - 12.6.3 Tightness
- 12.7 Radiation safety
  - 12.7.1 Biological shielding design and materials
  - 12.7.2 Radioactivity in cooling systems
  - 12.7.3 Scheme of ship/floating facility division into radiation zones
  - 12.7.4 Ionization radiation levels
  - 12.7.5 Special measures for health safety and protection means
  - 12.7.6 Radiation monitoring
  - 12.7.7 Radioactive wastes
    - 12.7.7.1 Gaseous wastes
    - 12.7.7.2 Liquid wastes
    - 12.7.7.3 Solid wastes
  - 12.7.8 Ventilation and conditioning systems
- 12.8 Steam-turbine unit
  - 12.8.1 Secondary coolant circuit description and general characteristics
  - 12.8.2 Main steam system

- 12.8.3 Main condenser cooling system
- 12.8.4 Feed water and condensate make-up system
- 12.8.5 Auxiliary steam systems
- 12.8.6 Emergency propulsion energy sources
- 12.9 Electric system
- 12.9.1 Electric energy sources
- 12.9.2 Electric power plant load analysis
- 12.9.3 Electric energy distribution
- 12.9.4 Steam supply system emergency electric supply diagram
- 12.10 Nuclear power unit operation modes
- 12.10.1 Initial state. Start-up preparation
- 12.10.2 Start-up
- 12.10.3 Power operation
- 12.10.4 Shutdown
- 12.10.5 Operation from emergency power source
- 12.11 Operation of ship or floating facility/reference to the Ship Operating Manual may be included
- 12.11.1 Organization of operation
- 12.11.2 Crew number and qualification
- 12.11.3 Watch organization
- 12.11.4 Personnel training and practice alerts
- 12.11.5 Operating documentation
- 12.11.6 Surveys
- 12.11.7 Harbor entering and berthing
- 12.11.7.1 Description of local conditions
- 12.11.7.2 Measures to be taken on board ship/floating facility prior to entering harbor
- 12.11.7.3 Berthing conditions
- 12.11.7.4 Organization of emergency alert actions
- 12.11.7.5 Ship/Floating facility security measures
- 12.11.8 Ship/Floating facility rescue operations
- 12.12 Analysis of accidents
- 12.12.1 Accidents related to steam supply system malfunctions
- 12.12.1.1 Emergency shutdown of circulating pump or primary circuit pumps
- 12.12.1.2 Rupture of steam supply system pipes
- 12.12.1.3 Termination of feed water supply
- 12.12.1.4 Termination of electric energy supply
- 12.12.1.5 Termination of steam withdrawal from steam supply system
- 12.12.1.6 Rupture of main steam piping
- 12.12.1.7 Unintended extraction of most effective control from reactor core
- 12.12.1.8 Reactor cold water injection
- 12.12.1.9 Primary circuit leakage (accident with coolant loss)
- 12.12.2 Accidents on board ship/floating facility
- 12.12.2.1 Collision (hit at reactor compartment)
- 12.12.2.2 Grounding and stranding
- 12.12.2.3 Capsizing
- 12.12.2.4 Flooding in shallow waters
- 12.12.2.5 Flooding in deep waters
- 12.12.2.6 Fire
- 12.13 General evaluation of ship/floating facility safety.

## **OPERATING MANUAL FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT**

The Operating Manual shall contain all information required for qualified personnel for safe operation of the ship/floating facility and its nuclear power unit under the normal operating conditions, as well as the instructions regarding measures to be undertaken in case of certain emergencies.

The following data shall be specified in the Operating Manual:

**1.** characteristics of the nuclear power unit with diagrams of the systems and other data related to radiation monitoring, biological shielding, fire protection and fire extinguishing means, spare parts;

**2.** parameters for normal operation of the steam supply system and associated systems, including rated and limiting values, as well as permissible deviations.

Among critical parameters the following shall be specified:

**2.1** duration of personnel stay in radiation zones;

**2.2** radiation levels in certain zones;

**2.3** activity levels for coolant in the primary and secondary circuits, as well as activity levels for liquid, solid and gaseous wastes.

**3.** Instructions for normal operating modes of the steam supply system, such as startup, normal operation, power change, and disable, including the following data:

**3.1** functional tests of safety control systems and steam supply system protection system prior to starting up and in the course of normal operation;

**3.2** determination of critical position of the control cascades and reactivity values, as well as reactivity margin of the reactor core and its variation within the core service life;

**3.3** minimum admissible redundancy of the steam supply system and energy supply equipment for reactor safe startup and operation. The equipment to be tested or repaired shall not be considered operational in evaluation of requirements for redundancy, except for those cases when equipment is made operational by certain test (for instance, generator set startup).

**4.** The operating instructions for certain emergency conditions with description of typical development of initial events, recommended troubleshooting procedures, and further operation, if necessary.

**5.** The instructions for service organization on board the ship/floating facility, including the following:

**5.1** manning and responsibility of people in charge of nuclear and radiation safety;

**5.2** watches at sea and in harbor;

**5.3** access to controlled area and containment;

**5.4** training of personnel involved in operating the steam supply system and practice alerts for crews;

**5.5** requirements for ship's documentation related to operating the steam supply system and radiation situation on board the ship/floating facility, as well as forwarding reports on equipment failures and emergencies.

**6.** Instructions for surveying the steam supply system, containment and hull structures, including data on test intervals, scopes and methods of tests.

7. In addition to any other instructions to be used to ensure safety on board the ship/floating facility and environmental control the Operating Manual shall include the following instructions:

- 7.1 docking and underwater surveys related to radiation safety of people;
- 7.2 radiation safety;
- 7.3 handling solid, liquid and gaseous radioactive wastes in storage and handing over (discharge);
- 7.4 fire safety;
- 7.5 personnel actions in emergency situations that can affect safety of the steam supply system, ship/floating facility and environment;
- 7.6 loading, carrying and unloading hazardous cargoes;
- 7.7 administrative measures to be undertaken to prevent possible intervention during inspection of reactor protection system components.

## NUCLEARSTEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM. CONTAINMENT LEAK TIGHT CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. PROCEDURE FOR CALCULATING LEAK TIGHTNESS STANDARD VALUES

### 1 SCOPE

**1.1** This Procedure covers containment leak tight circuit components for nuclearsteam supply systems of ships and floating facilities. This Document is to be used for design development and establishes procedure for calculating leak tightness standard values.

### 2 DESIGNATIONS

- $L_{PERM}$  = permissible relative leakage rate, %/day;
- $P_a$  = atmospheric pressure, Pa;
- $P_{MAX. DESIGN-BASIS}$  = absolute air pressure equal to emergency fluid pressure in case of maximum design-basis accident, Pa;
- $P_1$  = absolute air pressure within containment in 24 test hours, Pa;
- $\Delta P_{PERM}$  = permissible pressure variation for given  $L_{PERM}$ , Pa;
- $P_{TEST}$  = absolute test pressure, Pa;
- $\tau$  = time within which pressure changes by value of  $\Delta P_{PERM}$ , s;
- $Q_{PERM}$  = permissible total air flow through miniature defects of containment leak tight circuit at pressure  $P_{MAX. DESIGN-BASIS}$ , W ( $m^3Pa/s$ );
- $Q_i$  = air flow through one component of leak tight circuit at  $P_{TEST}$ , W;
- $V$  = containment volume,  $m^3$ ;
- $\sigma_{\Sigma}$  = total leakage value (leak tightness standard) for the whole containment leak tight circuit, W;
- $\sigma_i$  = leak tightness standard value for the component of leak tight circuit, W;
- $\sigma_{wj}$  = leak tightness standard value for welded joint of leak tight circuit, W;
- $\sigma_{dji}$  = leak tightness standard value for components of detachable joint tight circuit, W;
- $f_{jfi}$  = leak tightness standard value for components of flange joint tight circuit, W;
- $\sigma_i^{sf}$  = leak tightness standard value for the component of leak tight circuit with regard to safety factor  $k$ , W;
- $l_i$  = joint length on the leak tight circuit component, m;
- $n_i$  = number of leak tight circuit components;
- $l_{wj}$  = length of welded joints, m;
- $l_{dji}$  = length of detachable joints, m;
- $l_{fj}$  = length of flanged joints, m;
- $n_{sf}$  = number of stop piping fittings communicating with air pressure under test (stop valves are included into leak tight circuit);
- $n_{ns}$  = number of sealings for cable/conductor penetrations;
- $n_{cs}$  = number of cable sections.

### 3 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

**3.1** Relative leakage rate is a ratio of leakage rate (by weight/volume) to air mass/volume in the controlled volume at given initial parameters (pressure, temperature) expressed as a percentage per unit time (%/day).

At that a leakage rate is understood as an air mass/volume escaped from the controlled volume per unit time in kg/h (m<sup>3</sup>/h) or kg/day (m<sup>3</sup>/day) at given initial parameters (pressure, temperature).

**3.2** Air flow is an air consumption where air quantity is expressed as a product of volume and initial pressure drop, m<sup>3</sup>Pa/s (W).

**3.3** Leak tightness standard value is an atmospheric air flow discharged into vacuum under normal conditions:  $t = 20\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$ ,  $P_a = 101333\text{ Pa}$  (760 mm Hg), m<sup>3</sup>Pa/s (W).

**3.4** Ratio of leak tightness standard value to air flow is determined by the formulae:

$$\vartheta_i = Q_i \frac{P_a^2}{P_{TEST}^2 - P_a^2} \quad (3.4-1)$$

or

$$Q_i = \vartheta_i \frac{P_{TEST}^2 - P_a^2}{P_a^2}. \quad (3.4-2)$$

### 4 CALCULATION PROCEDURE

**4.1** The permissible air pressure variation  $\Delta P_{PERM}$  at design values of  $L_{PERM}$  and  $P_{MAX. DESIGN-BASIS}$  and assumption that  $T_0 = T_1$  and  $P_a = \text{const}(P_a = 1,0 \times 10^5\text{ Pa})$  is determined by the formula

$$\Delta P_{PERM} = L_{PERM} P_{MPa} / 100. \quad (4.1)$$

**4.2** The total permissible air flow  $Q_{PERM}$  through miniature defects of containment leak tight circuit will be calculated as follows:

$$Q_{PERM} = \Delta P_{PERM} V / \tau. \quad (4.2)$$

**4.3** Leak tightness standard value  $\vartheta_{\Sigma}$  of the containment leak tight circuit will be calculated as follows:

$$\vartheta_{\Sigma} = Q_{PERM} P_a^2 / (P_{MPa}^2 - P_a^2). \quad (4.3)$$

**4.4** For normalized ratio in leak tightness standard value ( $\vartheta_{\Sigma}$ ), refer to [Table 4.4](#).

Table 4.4

#### Leak tightness standard value

Type of joint for the leak tight circuit component					
Welded joints	Detachable joints	Flanged joints	Stop valves	Sealings for cable/conductor penetrations	Cable section
0,05 $\vartheta_{\Sigma}$	0,32 $\vartheta_{\Sigma}$	0,18 $\vartheta_{\Sigma}$	0,19 $\vartheta_{\Sigma}$	0,21 $\vartheta_{\Sigma}$	0,05 $\vartheta_{\Sigma}$

**4.5** Based on data in [Table 4.4](#) leak tightness standard values are estimated as follows:

**.1** for welded joints of leak tight circuit:

$$\vartheta_{wj} = 0,05\vartheta_{\Sigma}/l_{wj}; \quad (4.5.1)$$

**.2** for components of leak tight circuit with detachable joint:

$$\vartheta_{dji} = \frac{0,32\vartheta_{\Sigma}}{l_{dj}} l_{dji}; \quad (4.5.2)$$

**.3** for components of leak tight circuit with flanged joint:

$$\vartheta_{dji} = \frac{0,19\vartheta_{\Sigma}}{l_{dj}} l_{dji}; \quad (4.5.3)$$

**.4** for stop valves of the leak tight circuit component:

$$\vartheta_{sfi} = 0,18\vartheta_{\Sigma}/n_{sf}; \quad (4.5.4)$$

**.5** for sealings of cable/conductor penetrations of the component of the leak tight circuit:

$$\vartheta_{sfi} = 0,21\vartheta_{\Sigma}/n_{sf}; \quad (4.5.5)$$

**.6** for cable sections per cable:

$$\vartheta_{csi} = 0,05\vartheta_{\Sigma}/n_{sf}. \quad (4.5.6)$$

**4.6** Safety factor of 0,1 ( $k = 0,1$ ) shall be taken into account to test calculated values more exactly. Then leak tightness standard value with regard to safety factor will be as follows:

$$\vartheta_i^{sf} = k\vartheta_i. \quad (4.6)$$

## 5 EXAMPLE

**5.1** Supposing that design parameters have the following values:

$L_{PERM} = 1\%/day$ ;  $P_{MAX.DESIGN-BASIS} = 5,0 \times 10^5$  Pa;  $V_r = 680$  m<sup>3</sup>;  $l_{wj} = 600$  m;  $l_{dj} = 34,5$  m;  $l_{ff} = 6$  m;  $n_{sf} = 32$  items;  $n_s = 6$  items;  $n_{cs} = 800$  items.

**5.2** Permissible air pressure variation  $\Delta P_{PERM}$  is determined by Formula [\(4.1\)](#)

$$\Delta P = L_p P_{MPa} / 100 = 1 \times 5 \times 10^5 / 100 = 5000 \text{ Pa}. \quad (5.2)$$

**5.3** Total permissible air flow  $Q_{PERM}$  is determined by Formula [\(4.2\)](#)

$$Q_{PERM} = \Delta P_{PERM} V / f = 5000 \times 680 / 24 \times 3600 = 40 \text{ W (m}^3\text{Pa/s)}. \quad (5.3)$$

**5.4** Leak tightness standard value of the whole leak tight circuit is determined by Formula [\(4.3\)](#)

$$\vartheta_{\Sigma} = Q_{PERM} P_a^2 / (P_{MPa}^2 - P_a^2) = 40 \frac{(1,0 \times 10^5)^2}{(5,0 \times 10^5)^2 - (1,0 \times 10^5)^2} = 1,7 \text{ W}. \quad (5.4)$$

**5.5** With regard to [Table 4.4](#) and Formulas (4.3), (4.5.1) to (4.5.6), leak tightness standard value for welded joints of containment leak tight circuit is determined as follows:

$$\mathfrak{G}_{wj} = 0,05 \times 1,7/l_{wj} = 1,4 \times 10^{-4}; \quad (5.5-1)$$

$$\mathfrak{G}_{wj}^{sf} = 0,1 \times 1,4 \times 10^{-4} = 1,4 \times 10^{-5} \text{ W}; \quad (5.5-2)$$

**.1** for the component of leak tight circuit with detachable joint (for example, main cover,  $l_{mci} = 20 \text{ m}$ ):

$$\mathfrak{G}_{mci} = \frac{0,32 \times 1,7}{34,5} 20 = 0,3 \text{ W}; \quad (5.5.1-1)$$

$$\mathfrak{G}_{mci}^{sf} = 0,1 \times 0,3 = 3,0 \times 10^{-2} \text{ W}; \quad (5.5.1-2)$$

**.2** for the component of leak tight circuit with flanged joint (for example, fan-penetration joints  $l_{fp} = 0,6 \text{ m}$ ):

$$\mathfrak{G}_{tpi} = \frac{0,18 \times 1,7}{6} 0,6 = 0,03 \text{ W}; \quad (5.5.2-1)$$

$$\mathfrak{G}_{tpi}^{sf} = 0,1 \times 0,3 = 3,0 \times 10^{-3} \text{ W}; \quad (5.5.2-2)$$

**.3** for stop valves of the leak tight circuit component:

$$\mathfrak{G}_{svi} = \frac{0,18 \times 1,7}{32} = 9,6 \times 10^{-3} = 0,03 \text{ W}; \quad (5.5.3-1)$$

$$\mathfrak{G}_{svi}^{sf} = 0,1 \times 9,6 \times 10^{-3} = 9,6 \times 10^{-4} \text{ W}; \quad (5.5.3-2)$$

**.4** for sealings of cable penetrations:

$$\mathfrak{G}_{sci} = \frac{0,21 \times 1,7}{6} = 0,06 \text{ W}; \quad (5.5.4-1)$$

$$\mathfrak{G}_{sci}^{sf} = 0,1 \times 0,6 \times 10^{-3} = 0,6 \times 10^{-3} \text{ W}; \quad (5.5.4-2)$$

**.5** for cable sections per cable:

$$\mathfrak{G}_{csi} = \frac{0,18 \times 1,7}{6} = 1,4 \times 10^{-4} \text{ W}; \quad (5.5.5-1)$$

$$\mathfrak{G}_{csi}^{sf} = 0,1 \times 1,4 \times 10^{-4} = 1,4 \times 10^{-5} \text{ W}. \quad (5.5.5-2)$$

**5.6** Determination of standard values for bench tests of leak tight circuit components.

Example: The bench of internal void volume equal to  $V_{void} = 2 \text{ m}^3$  is made for main cover testing. Absolute air pressure at the beginning of the tests shall be taken to be  $P_{TEST} = 2,0 \times 10^5 \text{ Pa}$ . Standard values for tests are determined by Formulas (3.4-1) and (4.2):

**.1** permissible air flow:

$$Q_{PERM} = \mathfrak{G}_{mci}^{sf} \frac{P_{TEST}^2 - P_a^2}{P_a^2} = 3,0 \times 10^{-2} \times 3 = 0,9 \times 10^{-3} \text{ W}; \quad (5.6.1)$$

**.2** permissible pressure drop for 1 test hour:

$$\Delta P_{PERM} = Q_{PERM} f / V_c = 0,9 \times 10^{-3} \times 3600 / 2 = 1620 \text{ Pa}; \quad (5.6.2)$$

**.3** test standard values:

Initial absolute pressure on the bench:

$$P_{TEST} = 2,0 \times 10^5 \text{ Pa}; \quad (5.6.3-1)$$

test duration:

$$\tau = 3600 \text{ s (1 hour)}; \quad (5.6.3-2)$$

Permissible pressure drop:

$$\Delta P_{PERM} = 1620 \text{ Pa}. \quad (5.6.3-3)$$

## **6 APPLICATION NOTE**

**6.1** Leak tightness standard values for welded joints shall be given in requirements of design documents on containment hull structures.

**6.2** Leak tightness standard values shall be given in requirements of design documents on components of containment leak tight circuit with detachable and flanged joints.

**LIST OF THE EQUIPMENT, VALVES, FITTINGS AND INSTRUMENTS  
THAT SHALL REMAIN OPERATIONAL DURING MAXIMUM DESIGN-BASIS  
ACCIDENTS**

1. Equipment:
  - .1 reactor, including the reactor control and protection system (going down and position control).
  2. Pneumatically controlled valves of the following systems (position control):
    - .1 high pressure gas system;
    - .2 decontamination and cooling systems;
    - .3 primary circuit sampling systems;
    - .4 secondary circuit system (first shut-off steam and feed-water valve);
    - .5 tertiary circuit system (first shut-off valve);
    - .6 core emergency cooling systems.
  3. Instrumentation for the following parameters (operability):
    - .1 primary circuit system pressure;
    - .2 water level in primary circuit pressure compensators;
    - .3 reactor coolant temperature;
    - .4 reactor power;
    - .5 medium temperature in the containment space;
    - .6 pressure in hydraulic accumulators;
    - .7 water level in hydraulic accumulators;
    - .8 medium pressure in the inter-valve space of core emergency cooling system channels.

Russian Maritime Register of Shipping

**Rules for the Classification and Construction of Nuclear Ships and Floating Facilities**

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